Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures, Tables and Maps
- Acknowledgements
- Preface
- 1 A Regime Approach
- 2 Poverty Regimes and the Great Recession
- 3 The Historical Roots of the Italian Poverty Regime
- 4 Long-term Trends Since the Early 1990s
- 5 Working-poor, Children and Migrants: Italy’s ‘New Poor’
- 6 Urban Poverty in Italy
- 7 A Late and Uncertain Comer in Developing Anti-Poverty Policies
- 8 Continuities and Changes in the Italian Poverty Regime
- Afterword: The Impact of the COVID-19 Epidemic
- Notes
- References
- Index
7 - A Late and Uncertain Comer in Developing Anti-Poverty Policies
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 March 2021
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures, Tables and Maps
- Acknowledgements
- Preface
- 1 A Regime Approach
- 2 Poverty Regimes and the Great Recession
- 3 The Historical Roots of the Italian Poverty Regime
- 4 Long-term Trends Since the Early 1990s
- 5 Working-poor, Children and Migrants: Italy’s ‘New Poor’
- 6 Urban Poverty in Italy
- 7 A Late and Uncertain Comer in Developing Anti-Poverty Policies
- 8 Continuities and Changes in the Italian Poverty Regime
- Afterword: The Impact of the COVID-19 Epidemic
- Notes
- References
- Index
Summary
Main features of anti-poverty policies in Italy
Until the very recent introduction of a national and tendentially universalistic minimum income benefit in 2017 and 2019, the public policy approach to poverty in Italy was historically weak, fragmented and indirect (Negri and Saraceno, 1996; Benassi, 2000; Kazepov, 2015). As discussed in previous chapters, the comparatively limited role of the state in the fight against poverty is explained by a combination of other factors that characterise the Italian social model: the pivotal role of family solidarity also beyond household boundaries; a social security system that is highly categorical and strongly skewed towards benefits based on contributions, above all pensions (Ferrera, 1996, 2010; Rhodes, 1996; Bonoli, 1997; Ascoli and Pavolini, 2015; Saraceno, 2017); and the delegation of social assistance to local governments (Kazepov, 2009, 2011) and charities.
Overall, as Figure 7.1 shows, although the size of the social budget is at the EU average, the state in Italy – and in Spain – plays a limited role in protection against all typical social risks, except for old age, widowhood and loss of the parent who was the main breadwinner. Ferrera (2006; Ferrera et al, 2012) uses the term ‘functional distortion’ to describe this phenomenon of a strong incidence of pensions in the overall social budget, leaving other social risks and needs much less covered. In the case of family or children, the per capita state expenditure in Italy (in PPS) is only €486 compared to more than €1,000 in Germany and Sweden, and close to €800 in France and the UK. Per capita housing expenditure amounts to barely €10, compared to an EU28 average of €159 (with a peak of €375 in the UK). Finally, the per capita expenditure for social exclusion in 2016 was €71 in Italy, compared to €472 in Sweden, €310 in France and €180 in the UK.
Given this distribution of social expenditure, the weak efficacy of the social transfer system in reducing poverty comes as no surprise. It is also a feature that Italy shares with other Mediterranean countries (see Figure 7.2). While in Greece the onset of the economic crisis meant that the efficacy of its social expenditure actually improved, albeit remaining at comparatively low levels, and in Spain the substantial improvement in the first period was followed by a sharp downturn, in Italy there was only a small improvement in efficacy following the crisis, which then stalled afterwards.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Poverty in ItalyFeatures and Drivers in a European Perspective, pp. 113 - 133Publisher: Bristol University PressPrint publication year: 2020