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  1. Home
  2. Books
  3. Power and Global Economic Institutions
  • Cited by 31
  • Ayse Kaya, Swarthmore College, Pennsylvania
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
December 2015
Print publication year:
2015
Online ISBN:
9781316343258
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316343258
Subjects:
Economics, International Economics, Politics and International Relations, International Relations and International Organisations
Information

Book description

What is the relationship between states' economic power and their formal political power in multilateral economic institutions? Why do we see variation in states' formal political power across economic institutions of the same era? In this book, Ayse Kaya examines these crucial under-explored questions, drawing on multiple theoretical traditions within international relations to advance a new approach of 'adjusted power'. She explains how the economic shifts of our time, marked by the rise of Brazil, Russia, India, China and other emerging economies, have affected and will impact key multilateral economic institutions. Through detailed contemporary and historical analyses of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the G20, and the International Trade Organization, Kaya shows that the institutional setting mediates the significance of the underlying distribution of economic power across states. The book presents both case studies and key statistics.

Reviews

‘This ambitious study opens up the black box of how power and institutions interact in the rapidly changing post-Crisis world of global economic governance. Kaya exposes the tensions between the formal and informal faces of power in the struggle to influence both rules and outcomes across the World Bank, the IMF, and the emerging G20 process. Her analysis tells us that where the 'declining old' might prove too slow in ceding their formal institutional prerogatives, the 'rising new' may up the ante and take the game elsewhere to new forums. Global governance thus becomes less predictable and institutions less effective at adapting to the need for change. In short, Kaya's analysis shows us how familiar institutions remain a potentially fragile part of an increasingly fragile world order. A 'must' for scholars and students alike.'

Geoffrey Underhill - University of Amsterdam

‘Increasingly, students of international political economy are returning to consideration of the role of power in the functioning of the world economy. With this thoughtful analysis, Ayse Kaya makes a notable contribution to current debates, focusing in particular on the relationship between the economic power of states and formal power in multilateral institutions. Even seasoned specialists will find much to learn in this knowledgeable and well-crafted study.'

Benjamin Jerry Cohen - University of California, Santa Barbara

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Contents

Contents
References

References

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Documents from Multilateral Institutions

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E/CONF.2/7. 1948. Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment: Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization. United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, March 24.
E/PC/T/33. 1946. Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee.
E/PC/T/C.V/14. 1946. Voting in the International Trade Organization – Memorandum by the United Kingdom Delegation for Committee V, November 5.
E/PC/T/C.V/21. 1946. The Question of Voting in the International Trade Organization – Memorandum Submitted by the Delegations of the Netherlands and the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union, November 9.
E/PC/T/C.6/25. 1947. Summary Record of the Fourth Meeting of the Drafting Committee of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, January 30.
E/PC/T/C.6/62. 1947. First Report of the Administrative Sub-Committee (Report on Executive Board Membership and Voting, February 10.
E/PC/T/C.6/W.3. 1947. Formula for Weighted Voting – Proposed by the United Kingdom Representative, January 21.
E/PC/T/C.6/W.6/Add.1. 1947. United States Suggestion Addition to E/PC/T/C.6/W.6 Concerning Weighted Voting, January 27.
E/PC/T/W/221. 1947. Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment – Chapter VIII, June 23.
Flaherty, J. 2006. Statement to the IMF/World Bank Board Annual Meetings, Press Release No. 25. Washington, DC, September 19–20.
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G20. 2008. “Declaration,” Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, November 15.
G20. 2008. The Group of Twenty: A History.
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Geithner, T. 2011. Written Testimony Before the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs. One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, March 9. Washington, DC.
IMF EBD/69/165. 1969. “Incremental Approach” to Quota Calculations, October 16.
IMF EBM. 2000a. Staff Commentary on the External Review of Quota Formulas, June 6.
IMF 2000b. Report to the IMF Executive Board of the Quota Formula Review Group, April 28.
IMF 2001. Alternative Quota Formulas: Considerations, September 27.
IMF 2003. Quota Distribution – Selected Issues, July 17.
IMF 2005. Quotas and Voice – Further Considerations, September 2.
IMF 2006a. Quotas and Voice: Further Thoughts on Approaches to Reform, June 23.
IMF 2006b. Quotas and Voice – A Possible Package of Reforms, and the Chairman’s Concluding Remarks, August 4.
IMF 2006c. Quotas – Further Thoughts on a New Quota Formula, and Statistical Appendices I and II, November 22.
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IMF 2009. The Implications of the Global Financial Crisis for Low-Income Countries.
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IMF 2010c. IMF Governance Reform, July 7.
IMF 2011a. Criteria for Broadening the SDR Currency Basket, September 23.
IMF 2011b. Enhancing Monetary Financial Stability – A Role for the SDR?, January 7.
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IMF EBM/90/79. 1990. Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting, May 21.
IMF EBM/97/97. 1997. Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting, November 18.
IMF EBS/58/59. 1958. Enlarging Fund Resources through Increases in Quotas.
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US Official Documents1

Acheson, D. 1945. In US House of Representatives Committee on Banking and Currency. Bretton Woods agreements act hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency. 79th Cong., 1st session.
Clayton, W. and Wilcox, C. 1947. Issues at Havana Conference, September 30. US National Archives, College Park.
Congressional Budget Office. 2009. Budget implications of US contributions to the International Monetary Fund, May 19. www.cbo.gov/publication/24901.
ECEFP D-41/46. 1946. “The Subcommittee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions,” April 7.
ECEFP D-43/47. 1947. Draft Report of the Drafting Committee of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, March 18.
ECEFP D-45/46. 1946. “Draft Charter of the International Organization of the United Nations,” May 27.
ECEFP D-47/45. 1945. “Outline of Proposed International Trade Organization,” April 3.
ECEFP D-54/47. 1947. Suggested United States Position with Regard to Weighted Voting and Other Provisions to Protect the Interests of the United States in the ITO Charter, March 31.
ECEFP D-62/47. 1947. Suggested United States Position with Regard to Weighted Voting and Other Provisions to Protect the Interests of the United States in the ITO Charter, April 16.
ECEFP D-63/44. 1945. “Proposed Multilateral Convention on Commercial Policy, Draft Text of Articles of Agreement,” February.
ECEFP D-64/44. 1944. “Analysis of the Draft Text of the Proposed Multilateral Convention on Commercial Policy,” October.
ECEFP D-72/45. 1945. “Outline of Proposed International Trade Organization,” April 27.
ECEFP D-102/48. 1948. “The Development of the Charter for an International Trade Organization,” August 16.
ECEFP D 218-/47. 1947. “Preliminary Summary of Geneva Draft of ITO Charter,” October 13.
ECEFP M-20/46. 1946. The Minutes of the Meeting of the ECEFP, June 28.
ECEFP M-20/47. 1947. Minutes of the Meeting of the ECEFP, November 7.
Memorandum. 1947. Memorandum from Wilcox to Messieurs Kellogg, Leddy, Bronz, July 11. US National Archives, College Park.
Memorandum. 1948. Memorandum for Mr. Wilcox, February 26. US National Archives, College Park.
Morgenthau, H. 1944. “Bretton Woods Decisions: Closing Address by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau,” in Pamphlet no. 4, pillars of peace: documents pertaining to American interest in establishing a lasting world peace: January 1941-February 1946. Carlisle Barracks: Book Department, Army Information School.
Office Memorandum. 1947. “US Position on Voting Under the ITO Charter,” October 20. US National Archives, College Park.
Office Memorandum Letters. 1946. Letter between Ed Kellogg and John Tomlinson, November 19. US National Archives, College Park.
Paper on Organizational Chapters. 1947. Geneva Draft Charter, December 19. US National Archives, College Park.
Truman, H. 1949. Special Message to the Congress Transmitting the Charter for the International Trade Organization. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1966.
United States Delegation. 1947a. “The United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment … Havana.” DS/9, November 21. US National Archives, College Park.
United States Delegation. 1947b. Speeches Made at the Plenary Sessions of ITO Conference, SD/15, December 6. US National Archives, College Park.
US Department of State 1946a. Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organization of the United Nations. Document No. 2598. Washington, DC: Department of State.
U.S. Department of State 1946b. Foreign Relations of the United States. Document No. AL/12–3046. Washington, DC: Department of State Office of the Historian.
US House of Representatives. 1945. Committee on Banking and Currency. Bretton Woods Agreements Act: Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency. 79th Cong., 1st session, June, 12–25.
U.S. House of Representatives. 2013. Committee on Financial Services. Evaluating U.S. Contributions to the International Monetary Fund. 113th Cong., 1st session, April 24.
US Senate. 1947. Committee on Finance. Hearings Before the Committee on Finance: First Session on Trade Agreements System and Proposed International Trade Organization Charter. 80th Cong., 1st session.
U.S. Senate. 2010. Committee on Foreign Relations. The International Financial Institutions: A Call For Change. 111th Cong., 2nd session, 10 March.
US Treasury. 1944a. Joint Statement by Experts on the Establishment of an International Monetary Fund of the United States and Associated Nations. Washington, DC: Department of the Treasury, April, 21.
U.S. Treasury. 1944b. Questions and Answers on the Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Washington, DC: Department of the Treasury, June 10.
White, H. D. 1945. Quoted in US House of Representatives Committee on Banking and Currency. Bretton Woods Agreements Act Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency. 79th Cong., 1st session.
Wilcox, C. 1947b. Department of State, Division of Central Services, Washington DC, Meeting Transcript, October 1. US National Archives, College Park.

1 All documents that begin with “ECEFP” are from the US National Archives, College Park, Maryland, USA.

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