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7 - The Hobbesian Hypothesis in Contemporary Political Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 April 2017

Karl Widerquist
Affiliation:
Georgetown University
Grant S. McCall
Affiliation:
Tulane University
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Summary

Contractarianism and propertarianism didn't completely go away during the years that utilitarianism dominated political theory, and certainly the Hobbesian hypothesis and the violence hypothesis remained widely believed. But these topics gained renewed attention as utilitarianism declined in prominence starting in the mid-twentieth century. For simplicity, we use the word “contemporary” to refer to the period after about 1950.

Contemporary political philosophy addresses a wide range of issues, but various versions of contractarianism and related theories dominate the discussion of political obligations, and arguments for and against propertarianism dominate discussions of property. Therefore, theories relying on a Lockean proviso and an accompanying version of the Hobbesian hypothesis play a large role in contemporary political philosophy.

This chapter shows that contemporary political theory has a wide but unexamined consensus in favor of the Hobbesian hypothesis. Theorists tend to divide into two camps. One side believes that the weak version of the Lockean proviso is high enough to justify the institution in question and that it is fulfilled. The other side believes that the proviso is not high enough; a stronger standard is ethically required; and that standard (whatever it is) has not been fulfilled. Therefore the disagreement over the proviso occurs almost entirely in the area of pure normative theory (how high should the standard be?) and against the presumed empirical background that the weak proviso has been fulfilled, while strong versions have not. Few on either side call attention to that tacit presumption or to the lack of evidence presented to affirm that it reflects reality.

This chapter reveals that some of those affirming the hypothesis clearly assert that their claims about the state of nature include possibilities of people living by their own efforts as—say—a hunter-gatherer or a subsistence farmer. None clearly rules out that interpretation of their state of nature. None argues against that interpretation or the relevance of that comparison in favor of an extra-weak proviso or for a purely a priori justification of the state without any empirical claims.

The aura of an unspoken consensus around the weak Hobbesian hypothesis has allowed people asserting it to be less clear about its exact meaning and to present less supporting evidence than Bastiat, Locke, or Hobbes did centuries ago.

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Publisher: Edinburgh University Press
Print publication year: 2017

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