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Bibliography

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2015

Bradley Armour-Garb  and
James A. Woodbridge
Bradley Armour-Garb
Affiliation:
University at Albany, State University of New York
James A. Woodbridge
Affiliation:
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
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Pretense and Pathology
Philosophical Fictionalism and its Applications
 , pp. 259 - 266
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2015

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  • Bibliography
  • Bradley Armour-Garb, University at Albany, State University of New York, James A. Woodbridge, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  • Book: Pretense and Pathology
  • Online publication: 05 September 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139235990.009
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  • Bibliography
  • Bradley Armour-Garb, University at Albany, State University of New York, James A. Woodbridge, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  • Book: Pretense and Pathology
  • Online publication: 05 September 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139235990.009
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Bibliography
  • Bradley Armour-Garb, University at Albany, State University of New York, James A. Woodbridge, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  • Book: Pretense and Pathology
  • Online publication: 05 September 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139235990.009
Available formats
×