‘It is the general intention of the law’, said Lord Atkinson in 1911, ‘that, in giving damages for breach of contract, the party complaining should, so far as it can be done by money, be placed in the same position as he would have been in if the contract had been performed’, adding confidently: ‘That is a ruling principle. It is a just principle.’ This rule, or principle, was not new in 1911. It had been stated as a rule in 1848, but it was not new even then, having been formulated only for the purpose of finding that an exception to it did not apply. Lord Atkinson's formulation was made not for the purpose of enlarging the damages available for breach of contract, but for the purpose of rejecting an excessive claim. It is significant that he said not only that it was a ‘ruling principle’, but also that it was a ‘just principle’, for general considerations of justice were prominent in the case. In rejecting the plaintiff's claim, Lord Atkinson said that ‘one cannot but feel that the reasoning which leads to results so unjust and anomalous must be fallacious’.