Even before entering the White House, George W. Bush and his top aides were plotting how to pass the incoming president's top legislative priority: revising the tax code to the tune of 1.6 trillion dollars. Fueling their efforts was President Bush's insistence that the goal was not passing a major tax cut but rather passing his major tax cut, as he noted at a Rose Garden launching event: “I urge the Congress to pass my tax relief plan with the swiftness these uncertain times demand. I will now sign a letter of transmittal, and soon hope I'll be signing the needed tax relief” (8 February 2001). The following day's Washington Post summarized the situation succinctly: “President Bush sent Congress a plan yesterday for the deepest federal income tax cut in 20 years and used a dire warning about the economy as opening ammunition in a legislative battle that could define his first year in office” (9 February 2001, A1).

Given the tax cut's high stakes and uncertain prospects, that President Bush emphasized devising and executing an effective “legislative strategy” seemed reasonable. After all, such strategic gaming has been a staple of White House decision making ever since Franklin Roosevelt advocated his New Deal agenda. Indeed, the basic question the Bush team considered early in 2001 is the same one all modern administrations have mulled over time and again: By what means can we best build winning congressional coalitions for the president's legislative proposals? Or, more operationally, Whom should we lobby? and How should we lobby them?