Derogatory characterizations of out-groups by in-groups are as old as recorded history. And various forms of bond-servitude, particularly in connection with conquest and captivity, are at least as old as settled agricultural societies. Christianity, despite its doctrine of the universal “brotherhood of mankind” as all God's children, generally accommodated itself to established practices of servitude and bondage: it was not until the latter half of the eighteenth century that there was sustained opposition to slavery as such from that quarter. And the rationalized universalism of philosophy was no better in this respect: from Aristotle's justification of enslaving those who are inferior by nature, through medieval disquisitions on why man's fallen nature and spiritual bondage called for corresponding forms of earthly subordination and bondage, to modern liberal accounts of the civilizing mission of Europe toward savage and barbaric non-European peoples not yet ready for equal liberty. In this quarter too, the emergence of sustained opposition to racial slavery had to await the latter half of the eighteenth century. The dismal record of philosophical thought in this regard raises the obvious question of how putatively universalistic, inclusive, moral doctrines could so readily countenance particularistic, exclusionary practices – and, as it seems, with surprisingly little cognitive dissonance. This question is no less important than it is obvious, both for coming to a better understanding of our history and traditions and also for heightening sensitivity to the presence of similar hidden dissonances in our current thinking.