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10 - Words

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 January 2010

Christophe P. Chamley
Affiliation:
Boston University
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Summary

If we all think alike, it means we do not think anymore.

Trust but verify.

In this chapter, the actions of agents (experts) are words (messages). The payoff depends on the message and some independent information of the receiver of the message. The condition for no herding and telling the truth is the same as in the BHW model of Chapter 4. In some cases, the payoff depends on a reputation for being informed or for being nonmanipulative. An expanded set of messages may not improve the transmission of information (contrary to Chapter 4). If the expert has information on the independent information of the receiver, the receiver should try to increase his information. The order in which experts should speak in a panel (trial jury) is analyzed: the antiseniority rule does not seem to be superior to other rules.

Communication with words is the subject of a vast literature. This chapter will be selective and focus on the relations between models of communication through words (models of “cheap talk”) and the issues of social learning that are addressed in other parts of this book. For example, herding may arise in financial markets because of the observation of others' actions or because of the behavior of financial advisors who are influenced by others' predictions. We will see that herding on actions and herding on words occur under similar conditions.

In the generic setting, an agent is an expert with private information on the state of nature, and his action takes the form of a message that is sent to a receiver. How can he transmit his information credibly by mere words?

Type
Chapter
Information
Rational Herds
Economic Models of Social Learning
, pp. 211 - 234
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2003

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  • Words
  • Christophe P. Chamley, Boston University
  • Book: Rational Herds
  • Online publication: 12 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511616372.011
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  • Words
  • Christophe P. Chamley, Boston University
  • Book: Rational Herds
  • Online publication: 12 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511616372.011
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Words
  • Christophe P. Chamley, Boston University
  • Book: Rational Herds
  • Online publication: 12 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511616372.011
Available formats
×