Making the transition after 1945 from heavily military to predominantly civilian production proved less of a stretch for large firms in Germany and Japan than might have been expected: by the middle of the twentieth century, it had become almost impossible to distinguish clearly between arms-related and civilian-oriented industry. In other words, opportunities for recovery and growth abounded for manufacturing industry in both countries as the 1950s loomed. At the same time, however, wartime production had also served as a stress test for large-scale, high-tech industry, with the experience highlighting one overriding issue in each case. In Germany, large-scale firms built on long traditions and experience to produce high-quality goods for the war effort. But they had considerable difficulty manufacturing in quantity, and even more so in maintaining adequate levels of quality in the process. Most Japanese companies, on the other hand, found quality production challenging during the war regardless of quantity. Both countries developed the capabilities they lacked, developments epitomised at Volkswagen, founded in the Nazi period, but which became the first German-owned auto firm to engage in mass production of the iconic Beetle only after the war; and at Toyota, which eventually achieved high-quality flexible mass production.