Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-2lccl Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-29T10:24:08.532Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

7 - Macroeconomic policy design using large econometric rational expectations models

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 December 2009

David Currie
Affiliation:
London Business School
Paul Levine
Affiliation:
University of Leicester
Get access

Summary

Introduction

This chapter examines a recurrent controversy in macroeconomics using the London Business School (LBS) model. Will attempts to stabilise either the real or nominal economy with monetary and fiscal feedback rules be effective? In considering this old debate we propose at the same time a general methodology for the design of macroeconomic policy using large, econometric rational expectations models.

Arguments against stabilisation policy range from the ‘long, variable and uncertain’ effects of monetary policy (Friedman, 1968) to the New Classical School twin propositions that only surprise inflation has real effects and that expectations are rational — which rules out the government exploiting surprise inflation.

Fully anticipated fiscal and monetary policy has both short-run and long-run real effects on the LBS model. These are described in section 2. The LBS model also assumes rational expectations in financial markets. This raises problems of credibility in the use of optimal control methods. How to address the ‘credibility problem’ whilst designing policy on a large econometric model is a central theme of the chapter.

The methodology begins by specifying a policy-maker's welfare loss function which penalises a discounted sum of deviations of target variables and instruments from some desired values over the future up to a terminal date. At this stage it is assumed that the exact specification of the welfare loss function is known; in section 4 a simple iterative process involving the policy-maker and designer of policy is simulated in which the preferences of the policy-maker are revealed.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1993

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×