1939–1940: Looking backward

It was inevitable that at the beginning of the Second World War belligerents and neutrals alike should have looked to the past for guidance. The Allies entered the war committed to a strategy of ‘containment’. Over a period of up to three years, Germany would be worn down by ‘economic pressure combined with anti-Hitler propaganda’ while the Allies gradually built up their armaments to the point at which they could challenge the enemy in the field. As part of this strategy they began to negotiate war trade agreements with neutral governments. The Nordic countries, for their part, set in motion the machinery which would enable them either individually or – to a limited extent – collectively to resist economic pressure, while some of their citizens – a much larger and more heterogeneous group than in the last war – attempted to mediate between the belligerents. But the war did not develop as expected. There was no German offensive in the west, no aerial bombardment of the British Isles and no peace. This should have given the British and French governments confidence in their frequently repeated claim that ‘time was on our side’. In fact, by the end of 1939 their faith had begun to waver. Faced with no great military crises, the Allied governments' main task had become the irksome one of maintaining morale at home and prestige abroad while waiting for an increasingly improbable ‘collapse of the German home front’. They were thus susceptible to any suggestions – short of a direct assault on Germany – which might promise a speedy end to the war.