Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-ttngx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-16T17:20:19.446Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

8 - Wittgenstein on Aspect-Seeing, the Nature of Discursive Consciousness, and the Experience of Agency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

William Day
Affiliation:
Le Moyne College, Syracuse
Victor J. Krebs
Affiliation:
Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
Get access

Summary

We find certain things about seeing puzzling, because we do not find the whole business of seeing puzzling enough.

(PI 212f)

Consciousness or awareness is possessed by at least a wide range of higher chordates. But genuine discursive consciousness is possessed – at least in its complex forms – only by human beings. Only human beings can, so it seems, be aware of seeing a given object as this or that, under one or another concept. The ability to be thus aware informs our perception, giving it both a judgmental character and a relation to self-consciousness. We typically see or hear that x is F, over and above simply taking in sensations. There is for any one of us always the potential to step back from our conceptually structured, judgmental perceiving so as to become explicitly aware that it is I who have judged that x is F (rather than, say, G). This openness to awareness of one's own role in judgmental perceiving further opens for us the possibility of a normative question arising. Am I correct so to have judged? This question does not arise for other higher mammals. They do not thus call their own being into question.

Historically, the apparently special character of human judgmental consciousness has motivated a variety of attempts to explain it, including at least Plato's theory of the immortal soul's ability to recollect eternal Forms, Aristotle's theory of nous as actively instancing essences both in us and in things, and Augustine's theory of the scintilla animae.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×