I WOULD LIKE TO FOCUS ON THREE TOPICS. THE FIRST RELATES to some personal perspectives on the role of lawyers in the formulation of American foreign policy. The second compares L's experience in connection with Grenada and Nicaragua, two instances involving United States use of force. And the third comments on L's experiences in U.S. international adjudication during my tenure. Of course, my term in office is now long ago, and there have been major changes in the world since then. The United States, for example, has gone from contending with one large elephant to dealing with 1,000 snakes.

The main lesson that I drew from my days in L is that, if the U.S. Government is to realize the full benefit of the potential contribution of its international lawyers, the lawyers need to participate from the beginning of a takeoff in policy and not just in a crash landing whenever things go wrong. This is especially so where the use of force by the United States is involved, and that applies in my judgment whether that use of force is overt or covert. In this connection, I will compare the overt Grenada “rescue mission” with the supposedly covert mining of the harbors in Nicaragua.

A lot of my days in L were devoted to U.S. participation in the peaceful settlement of disputes by international adjudication, and I will also comment on that subject.