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8 - Exploring Sen on self-interest and commitment

from Part II - Inclusiveness, Social and Individual Agency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2024

By
Gay Meeks
Edited by
Flavio Comim ,
P. B. Anand  and
Shailaja Fennell
Flavio Comim
Affiliation:
Universitat Ramon Llull
P. B. Anand
Affiliation:
University of Bradford
Shailaja Fennell
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
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Summary

This chapter explores aspects of Sen’s analysis of self-interest and commitment, seeking to highlight their interplay by probing some imagined situations. Detailing three facets of self-interest the author detects in traditional economic theory and the two forms of committed behaviour he then identifies (not confining one’s goals to the pursuit of ones own welfare and not basing one’s choices exclusively on one’s goals at the expense of those of others), the implied eightfold pattern of interrelations between these subtle concepts is presented, illustrated by a hypothetical internet dating conundrum. Sen’s stress on the self as a reasoning, self-scrutinizing agent who may but (in contrast with much prevailing theory) need not choose on the basis of self-interest underpins an account of rational choice that pays more respect to individual freedom, with significance in economics. Using an example outlining conflicting duties and pressures UK MPs might have felt during Brexit votes, Sen’s account is defended against attacks that, through reliance on strained definitions of interests and goals, seem to over-exploit the potential malleability of language.

Keywords

Amartya Sencommitmentself-interestrationalityRational Choice Theoryagencyself-scrutinychoicepreferencesfreedom
Type
Chapter
Information
Social Choice, Agency, Inclusiveness and Capabilities , pp. 170 - 201
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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