After having put paid to attempts to construct a ‘positive’ account of social freedom, it is now time to return to the insights of the responsibility view. Earlier in the book it became evident that social freedom had to be accorded a place within a hierarchy of interrelated concepts. At that point, emphasis was placed on tracing its logical links vertically: to moral responsibility for the non-suppression of obstacles, and from there, in turn, to the notion of obstacles which we have some good reason to expect people to suppress. It remains to examine whether the responsibility view can shed light on the kinship of freedom to other concepts to which it may stand in more horizontal relationships, so to speak: concepts such as power, control, influence, authority, etc. These (along with freedom) tend to be referred to collectively as power concepts and be said to share certain basic characteristics such as irreflexivity. Also, their meanings are often seen as partially overlapping. In an exhaustive inquiry into the nature of power concepts, all these claims would merit investigation. However, in order to keep the scope of the present book within reasonable limits, I confine my attention in this chapter to the concept of power.