In the preceding chapters, we have traced the politics of deportation as it evolves over the various stages of the policy process. This final chapter will serve two distinct purposes. First, we will return to the most significant findings of this book. I will begin by summarizing the principal claims of the theory of coercive regulatory capacity developed and tested against the case of deportation. The chapter will then identify some key contributions of this research to the study of migration control: what has this analysis told us about the capacity of liberal states to control unwanted immigration?

The second purpose of this chapter is to apply the argument to two sets of larger questions. The first set of questions extends the argument across policy fields and considers how the findings of this book might be generalizable beyond the case of deportation. The second set of questions extends the argument over time. Have the immigration reforms that were passed in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, succeeded in strengthening the deportation capacity of immigration bureaucrats? And, given the pervasiveness of policy failure in this field, has there been correction by means of negative feedback effects in either of the two countries? In other words, has implementation failure served as a policy lesson for subsequent rounds of legislative reform?

THEORIZING SOCIALLY COERCIVE STATE CAPACITY

The theoretical framework presented and tested in Chapters 1 through 4 specified the basic dynamics that drive policy-making and implementation in the sphere of coercive social regulation. Let us reiterate what I have argued are the key components of a theory of coercive regulatory state capacity – components that significantly distinguish this policy field from that of economic regulation, and from the politics of distribution and redistribution.