Between 1892 and 1905, the Admiralty focused on the threat posed by the Dual Alliance navies. Through annual fleet manoeuvres, exercises, and academic debates, a particular ‘doctrine’ or strategy had emerged to deal with the Franco-Russian fleets. The Royal Navy's strategists proposed a close watch on, and direct attacks against, an adversary's main bases as the most expedient method to destroy an enemy fleet while protecting British seaborne trade. Weaknesses in this strategy led to the adoption of the advanced base concept as a viable component in the successful blockade of enemy ports. Coupled with new, more seaworthy vessels for inshore squadrons, the observational blockade strategy was a reality by 1902. Even with the gradual dissipation of the Dual Alliance threat after 1904–5, these strategic themes were continued as Britain prepared to meet the new naval challenge posed by Germany.

By 1901–2, the Admiralty was attentive to the rapid growth of the Kaiser's Riskflotte and its underlying raison d'être, especially after the Reichstag endorsement of Grand Admiral Tirpitz's second Naval Bill in 1900. Despite a lessening of Britain's Far Eastern commitments by the January 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the NID began to carefully monitor the rise of the German fleet alongside the Dual Alliance threat. Over the next four years, planning for a possible naval war with Germany increased dramatically and resulted in the creation of the Admiralty's first ever official war plans. Despite this development, there has been no comprehensive examination of the Admiralty's early war planning against Germany, apart from Arthur Marder's study of pre-1906 British naval policy.