Every student of Dharmaśāstra knows that Jīmūtavāhana's Dāyabhāga, which “is of paramount authority in modern British Indian courts in Bengal” (Kane 1930–1962: 1.322), defends the view that the head of the family is the sole owner of the joint family property. The other members do not acquire any proprietary rights, for instance by birth, as is the case in other Hindu “legal texts.” They only become owners at the time when the right of the present owner ceases to exist, by his death or otherwise.

Jīmūtavāhana himself (1.13) introduces a possible objection to this theory. The opponent states that in order to become the owner of an object, there has to be acquisition (arjana). And arjana is an activity (vyāpāra) on the part of the acquirer (arjayitṛ). Therefore, the acquirer acquires the status of an owner contingent upon his activity of acquisition. For instance, birth is an activity of the son (putravyāpāra); it constitutes acquisition of a proprietary right in the joint property. Consequently, the son acquires this right while his father is still alive, not after his father's death.

Jīmūtavāhana (1.21) refutes this objection. The activity of the acquirer does not make him the owner. A person's proprietary right can very well come into being by an act on the part of someone else:

Consequently, the death of the father —literally, the father's act of dying— can create his son's proprietary right, without any activity on the part of the son.