The case studies we have undertaken to this point have examined episodes from the history of the theory of judgment – theories spanning a range of scientific and philosophical disciplines. In this final chapter I turn to theories of quite a different sort, drawn not from science or philosophy but rather from the history of painting. The English word, “theory” derives from the Greek, θεᾶσθαι, to look at or contemplate, and the “theories of judgment” I consider here are theories in just this sense: attempts by painters to present or represent the act of judgment to our contemplating vision. My aim is to follow the lead that emerged from Heidegger's doctoral dissertation: the strategy of seeking a phenomenological articulation of judgment by focusing on the characteristic comportments or intentional orientations of the judge. Painting is a medium well-suited to the representation of comportments, and in the painterly representation of judgment we find significant resources for exploring its phenomenological structure. This will be surprising only if one continues to labor under the idea that phenomenology must report on some secretive, entirely inner experience. But to follow Lipps and Heidegger is to reject that particular straightjacket in favor of an approach which finds the phenomenological structure of judgment in the ways judges comport themselves toward the entities in their surrounding world.