Introduction

Is folk psychology a theory? Permissive use of the term ‘theory’ makes it too easy to say yes, and may mask differences between varieties of theory-theory just as important as the well-known disagreement with the simulationists. In this paper I want to consider to what extent the postulation of a theoretical structure can help us understand the cognitive processing involved in our understanding of minds and behaviour. I shall be arguing, largely on methodological grounds, for a particular version of theory-theory according to which common-sense psychology has a core rather like the hard core of a Lakatosian research programme (Lakatos, 1970, 1978).

My strategy will be entirely conditional: if we are going to be theory-theorists, then this is the variety of theory-theory we should go for. I will not, therefore, be directly opposing the full-blown versions of simulation theory championed by Robert Gordon and Alvin Goldman (Gordon, 1986, 1992a, 1995; Goldman, 1989, 1992b). But it is important to the variety of theory-theory I advocate that it actually needs to be complemented by the modest form of simulationism argued for by Jane Heal (Heal, 1986, 1994, this volume).

Why call folk psychology / theory of mind (a) theory?

We can introduce a major division within theory-theory by asking: is folk psychology a single theory – or at least does it have a single core theory at its centre? Talk of folk psychology need not presuppose a theory.