Introduction

In this chapter, we draw on theories of desistance and research into desistance to argue that ceasing to offend is a process that involves the development of the motivation, capacity and opportunities to live well, in both a moral and a prudential sense. We present an argument that supporting people to desist from crime is likely to require forms and styles of penal practice that model ways of being and becoming ‘good’, and that central to such practice are questions of the legitimacy of criminal justice processes and of the moral performance of practitioners. In developing these arguments, our aim is to contribute to policy and practice debates about how best to configure and deliver key penal institutions and practices, particularly those associated with sentencing and sanctioning. However, since those institutions and practices inevitably reflect and refract their social, political and cultural contexts, the question of how to support the acquisition of virtues in the process of desistance inevitably forces us back to questions about the values, virtues and vices of society itself.

The relationship between virtue and necessity – between the moral and the prudential – has been much debated in moral philosophy. Although some philosophers draw a clear distinction between the two, for example, in Immanuel Kant's insistence that only actions motivated by a sense of duty can be morally praiseworthy, others regard the two concepts as overlapping. Indeed, Aristotle's account of ethics implies that we cannot truly flourish as human beings unless we live well in the moral sense, so being a good or virtuous person is inevitably good for a person: virtue is a necessity if we are to live a life that is good for us.

The relationship between necessity and virtue is also frequently discussed in literature. Although the origins of the phrase ‘to make a necessity of virtue’ may be unclear, its most famous use was by Shakespeare in Two gentlemen of Verona. The scene in question finds our hero Valentine, having been banished (unjustly) by the Duke of Milan, wandering in a forest, where he is set upon by other outlaws.