The cycle of war in the Horn of Africa seems to be incessant. Instead of peace and stability, it is more likely that conflict appears after war. As this postscript is being written, eight years after the signing of the Algiers peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia on 12 December 2000, the two countries are yet again closer to war than ever before. The Algiers agreement has collapsed and the UN peace-keeping mission to Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) terminated its operations during the summer of 2008 and pulled out all troops and military observers from the two countries. The failure of the UN to pressure Ethiopia to accept the Boundary Commission's decision on the ground, in combination with Eritrea's obstructions to UNMEE's operational mandate, effectively eradicated the peace-keeping mission which UN diplomats eight years earlier had characterised as ‘doomed to succeed’. The end result? The border is yet to be demarcated on the ground; Eritrea and Ethiopia are in disagreement on where the physical border markers should be erected; both countries have mobilised a huge number of troops along the border; and the parties continue their proxy war and hostile rhetoric against each other.

In this postscript I shall briefly revisit Ethiopia and present some of the changes that have taken place in the aftermath of the war which are of relevance to the argument of the book: the emergence of new enemies from within and without.