Book contents
- Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action
- Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 Holism in Action
- 2 Davidson’s Wittgensteinian View of Meaning
- 3 Davidson and Wittgenstein
- 4 Rule-Following and Charity
- 5 Davidson’s Treatment of Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Paradox
- 6 Davidson and Wittgenstein on Meaning and Understanding
- 7 The Search for “The Essence of Human Language” in Wittgenstein and Davidson
- 8 Wittgenstein and Davidson on Animal Minds
- 9 Wittgenstein and Davidson on First-Person Authority and the Univocality of Mental Terms
- 10 The Harmony of Thought and Reality
- 11 Davidson, Russell, and Wittgenstein on the Problem of Predication
- Index
- References
1 - Holism in Action
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 October 2017
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Book contents
- Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action
- Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 Holism in Action
- 2 Davidson’s Wittgensteinian View of Meaning
- 3 Davidson and Wittgenstein
- 4 Rule-Following and Charity
- 5 Davidson’s Treatment of Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Paradox
- 6 Davidson and Wittgenstein on Meaning and Understanding
- 7 The Search for “The Essence of Human Language” in Wittgenstein and Davidson
- 8 Wittgenstein and Davidson on Animal Minds
- 9 Wittgenstein and Davidson on First-Person Authority and the Univocality of Mental Terms
- 10 The Harmony of Thought and Reality
- 11 Davidson, Russell, and Wittgenstein on the Problem of Predication
- Index
- References
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- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2017
References
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Ford, Anton, Hornsby, Jennifer, and Stoutland, Frederick, eds. 2011. Essays on Anscombe’s Intention. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Frankfurt, Harry. 1978. “The Problem of Action.” Reprinted in his The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.Google Scholar
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Myers, Robert and Verheggen, Claudine. 2016. Donald Davidson’s Triangulation Argument: A Philosophical Inquiry. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
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