Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-cjp7w Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-17T10:02:14.038Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - The bonus system

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 September 2009

Robert A. Hart
Affiliation:
University of Stirling
Seiichi Kawasaki
Affiliation:
Nagoya University, Japan
Get access

Summary

It has already been established that Japanese bonus payments are significantly larger than in Europe or the United States. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 contain the key comparative international details. This is a unique and important labour market phenomenon and, accordingly, the whole of this chapter is devoted to this topic.

Hypotheses

Profit-sharing within modern Japanese industrial organisations may have deep roots in centuries of agrarian village life where communities realised the advantages of mutual support, co-operative effort and risk-sharing. Over a shorter time span, there is some evidence of links between sharing practices in traditional family businesses in the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries and the more systematic adoption of bonuses for permanent employees by capitalist enterprises of the post-war period. Initially, bonuses tended to be confined to company executives and only later extended to both blue- and white-collar workers (see Taira, 1970; Dore, 1973; Iwata, 1992). However, we are concerned here not so much with the evolution of the bonus system, but rather with attempts to understand its role within the total compensation structure of the modern firm.

The bonus as a disguised regular wage

As pointed out by Ito (1992), there are several reasons why we might expect, a priori, that Japanese bonuses are essentially disguised wages. First, like wages, many bonuses are determined annually or biannually. From a bargaining perspective, it might reasonably be assumed that annual wages and bonuses are negotiated on the basis of broadly similar performance indicators, including profitability.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1999

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×