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¹ See James D. Bowen, The Right in “New Left” Latin America, 3 J. Pol. Latin Am. 99 (2011).

² See The Resilience of the Latin American Right (Juan Pablo Luna & Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser eds., 2014); Omar G. Encarnación, The Rise and Fall of the Latin American Left, The Nation (May 9, 2018).

³ See Jorge Contesse, Resisting the Inter-American Human Rights System, 44 Yale J. Int'l L. 179 (2019); Alexandra Huneeus & René Urueña, Treaty Exit and Latin America's Constitutional Courts, 111 AJIL Unbound 456 (2017); Ximena Soley & Silvia Steininger, Parting Ways or Lashing Back? Withdrawals, Backlash and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 14 Int'l J. L. Context 237 (2018).

⁴ Statement from the Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Paraguay to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Apr. 11, 2019).

⁵ Id.

⁶ See Letter from José Miguel Vivanco, Human Rights Watch Americas Director (Apr. 25, 2019).

⁷ Id.

⁸ Id.

⁹ @CIDH, Twitter (Apr. 23, 2019, 2:04 PM).

¹⁰ According to this doctrine, domestic judges and national authorities are directly bound by the American Convention and the Court's interpretation of the Convention. See Symposium on the Constitutionalization of International Law in Latin America, 109 AJIL Unbound 89 (2015).

¹¹ Once the five governments’ letter to the Inter-American Commission was made public, the Chilean House of Representatives summoned the Minister of Justice and Human Rights to explain the statement. Before the House, the minister expressed concerns with the inter-American system's performance, ranging from the Court's handling of public policy issues that should be left to states’ democratic processes to the Court's misuse of sources of international law. See Gobierno Reiteró Fundamentos de Carta a Comisión Interamericana de DD.HH, Cámara de Diputados de Chile (May 13, 2019).

¹² Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75 (Mar. 14, 2001).

¹³ See id. at 10 (explaining the doctrine).

¹⁴ Gelman v. Uruguay, Merits and Reparations, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 221 (Feb. 24, 2011).

¹⁵ State Obligations Concerning Change of Name, Gender Identity, and Rights Derived from a Relationship Between Same-Sex Couples (Interpretation and Scope of Articles 1(1), 3, 7, 11(2), 13, 17, 18 and 24, In Relation to Article 1, of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 24 (Nov. 24, 2017) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-24/17].

¹⁶ Lagos del Campo v. Peru, Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 340 (Aug. 31, 2017). Article 26 of the American Convention provides: “The States Parties undertake to adopt measures, both internally and through international cooperation, especially those of an economic and technical nature, with a view to achieving progressively, by legislation or other appropriate means, the full realization of the rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires.”

¹⁷ Id. at para. 139.

¹⁸ See Poblete Vilches and Others v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 349 (Mar. 8, 2018), Concurring Opinion by Sierra Porto, J., ¶ 17.

¹⁹ Latin America's Human-Rights Court Moves into Touchy Territory, The Economist (Feb. 1, 2018).

²⁰ See Jorge Contesse, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Inter-American Human Rights Law, 44 N.C. J. Int'l L. 353 (2019).

²¹ See Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra note 15.

²² See René Urueña, Double or Nothing? The Inter-American Court of Human Rights in an Increasingly Adverse Context, 35 Wisc. Int'l L.J. 398 (2018).

²³ See Alexandra Huneeus, When Illiberals Embrace Human Rights, 113 AJIL Unbound 380 (2019); Laurence R. Helfer, Populism and International Human Rights Institutions: A Survival Guide, in Human Rights in a Time of Populism: Challenges and Responses (Gerald L. Neuman ed., forthcoming 2019).

²⁴ See Jorge Contesse, Case of Barrios Altos and La Cantuta v. Peru, 113 AJIL 568 (2019).

²⁵ In previous decisions, the Inter-American Court had declared that amnesty laws “lack legal effect.” See Barrios Altos v. Peru, supra note 12, para. 44.

²⁶ Id.

²⁷ See Statement from the Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Paraguay to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 4.

²⁸ See Andrea Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19 EJIL 491 (2008).

²⁹ The Inter-American Commission routinely issues precautionary measures on behalf of individuals who face imminent risk of irreparable harm to their right to life or physical integrity.

³⁰ As judge Sierra Porto has written, “the Inter-American Court is an international tribunal and, therefore, it is reasonable to expect that it acts as such.” Poblete Vilches and Others v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Concurring Opinion by Sierra Porto, J. para. 22 (March 8, 2018) (emphasis added). On the distinction between international and constitutional authority, see Jorge Contesse, The International Authority of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: A Critique of Conventionality Control, 22 Int'l J. Hum. Rts. 1168 (2018).