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The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?

  • Daniel Bodansky (a1)

Know your limits. This familiar adage is not an inspirational rallying cry or a recipe for bold action. It serves better as the motto for the tortoise than the hare. But, after many false starts over the past twenty years, states were well advised to heed it when negotiating the Paris Agreement. While it is still far too early to say whether the Agreement will be a success, its comparatively modest approach provides a firmer foundation on which to build than its more ambitious predecessor, the Kyoto Protocol.

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1 This article draws on the author’s previous writings about the UN climate change regime, including: A Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and Future UN Climate Change Regime, 43 Ariz. St. L. J. 697 (2011); The Durban Platform Negotiations: Goals and Options (Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, July 2012) [hereinafter Bodansky, Durban Platform Negotiations]; The Durban Platform: Issues and Options for a 2015 Agreement (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, Dec. 2012); and Legally-Binding vs. Non-Legally Binding Instruments, in Towards a Workable and Effective Climate Regime, at 155 (Scott Barrett, Carlo Carraro & Jaime de Melo eds., 2015).

2 Paris Agreement (Dec. 13, 2015), in UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Twenty-First Session [hereinafter COP Report and session number], Addendum, at 21, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Paris Agreement]. The Agreement is annexed to Decision 1/CP21 of the Conference of the Parties, infra note 13. UNFCCC documents cited herein are available at the Convention’s website,

3 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 UNTS 162 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].

4 Tiffany Germain, Kristen Ellingboe & Kiley Kroh, The Anti-Science Climate Denier Caucus: 114th Congress Edition, Climate Progress (Jan. 8, 2015), at

5 Richard Martin, India’s Energy Crisis, MIT Technology Review (Oct. 7, 2015), at

6 Lazarus, Richard J., Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1153 (2009).

7 David Roberts, The Conceptual Breakthrough Behind the Paris Climate Treaty, VOX (Dec. 15, 2015), at

8 Joby Warrick & Chris Mooney, 196 Countries Approve Historic Climate Agreement, Wash. Post (Dec. 12, 2015), at

9 Coral Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 2015, at A1.

10 Fiona Harvey, Paris Climate Change Agreement: The World’s Greatest Diplomatic Success, Guardian (Dec. 14, 2015), at

11 Thomas L. Friedman, Paris Climate Accord Is a Big, Big Deal, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2015, at A35.

12 See Bodansky, Daniel, The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem, 104 AJIL 230 (2010).

13 In the conference decision adopting the Paris Agreement, the parties themselves acknowledged that the intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) submitted prior to the Paris Conference are insufficient. Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Decision 1/CP.21, in COP Report No. 21, Addendum, at 2, UN Doc. FCCC/ CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Paris Decision].

14 According to Climate Action Tracker, full implementation of the INDCs submitted as of December 15, 2015, would put the world on a pathway to 2.4 –2.7 degrees Celsius. Effect of Current Pledges and Policies on Global Temperature, Climate Action Tracker, at (last visited Mar. 15, 2016).

15 Copenhagen Accord (Dec 18, 2009), in COP Report No. 15, Decision 2/CP.15, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/ 11/Add.1, at 4 (March 30, 2010) [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord].

16 Climate Action Tracker, supra note 14. For a listing of the INDCs submitted, see INDCs as Communicated by Parties, UNFCCC at (last visited Mar. 15, 2016).

17 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc No. 102–38 (1992), 1771 UNTS 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].

18 Louis Brandeis, Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It 92 (1914).

19 At the UN signing ceremony on April 22, 2016, 175 countries signed the Paris Agreement, apparently the most ever to sign an international treaty on a single day. For a listing of signatories, see Only Nicaragua has voiced objections to the Agreement, both at the closing plenary at COP-21 and at the signing ceremony. See Statement by Paul Oquist Kelley, Minister, Private Secretary for National Policies to the President of Nicaragua, at the High-Level Signature Ceremony (Apr. 22, 2016), at

20 Paris Decision, supra note 13.

21 See infra Part V for a discussion of these parallel initiatives.

22 See, e.g., European Commission, Winning the Battle Against Climate Change, COM(2005) 35 final (Feb. 9, 2005).

23 Consideration of Commitments for Subsequent Periods for Parties Included in Annex I to the Convention Under Article 3, Paragraph 9, of the Kyoto Protocol, Decision 1/CMP.1 (Dec. 9–10, 2005), in Kyoto Protocol Meeting of the Parties Report No. 1, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2006).

24 Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13 (Dec.14–15, 2007), in COP Report No. 13, Addendum, at 3, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (reissued March 14, 2008).

25 See Bodansky, supra note 12.

26 Id. at 239–40.

27 Cancún Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention, Dec. 1/CP.16 (Dec. 10–11, 2010), in COP Report No. 16, Addendum, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (March 15, 2011) [hereinafter Cancun Agreements].

28 Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, Decision 1/CP.17 (Dec. 11, 2011), in COP Report No. 17, Addendum, at 2, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (March 15, 2012) [hereinafter Durban Platform].

29 Bodansky, Durban Platform Negotiations, supra note 1.

30 Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 8, 2012, in Kyoto Protocol Meeting of the Parties Report No. 8, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.1 (Feb. 28, 2013).

31 Durban Platform, supra note 28, para. 2.

32 Further Advancing the Durban Platform, Dec.1/CP.19(Nov.23, 2013), in COP Report No. 19, Addendum, at 3, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1 (Jan. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Warsaw Decision].

33 Lima Call for Climate Action, Dec. 1/CP.20 (Dec. 14, 2014), in COP Report No. 20, Addendum, at 2, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1 (Feb. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Lima Call for Climate Action].

34 White House Press Release, U.S.–China Joint Announcement on Climate Change (Nov.12, 2014), at

35 See Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 110 AJIL 374, 375 notes 8–9 and accompanying text (2016).

36 White House Press Release, U.S.-China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change (Sept. 25, 2015), at

37 Negotiating Text, in UNFCCC, Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, UN Doc. FCCC/ADP/2015/1 (Feb. 25, 2015).

38 Draft Paris Outcome: Revised Draft Conclusions Proposed by the Co-Chairs, Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, Addendum, UN Doc. FCCC/ADP/2015/L.6/Rev.1 (Dec. 5, 2015).

39 At COP-17 in Durban, the South African presidency introduced the concept of an Indaba—a closed, open-ended meeting of parties, with limited seating, at which important decisions would be made. Proceedings, in COP Report No. 17, at 11, para. 35, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9 (Mar. 15, 2012).

40 For example, the text distributed in the middle of the final week had only about fifty square brackets, as compared to the nine hundred brackets in the text forwarded by the ADP to ministers at the beginning of the week. For a tracking of brackets in the successive negotiating drafts, see Paris Agreement. ORG, at (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).

41 See Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 35, at 381, notes 66–72 and accompanying text.

42 See Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement, Rev. Eur., Comp. & Int’l Envtl. L. (forthcoming 2016).

43 G.A. Res. 45/212, Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, GAOR Supp. No. 49A, UN Doc. A/45/49, at 147 (Dec. 21, 1990).

44 UNFCCC, supra note 17, Art. 4.2(b) (requiring parties to communicate policies and measures “with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels”).

45 The Berlin Mandate, Dec.1/CP.1, pmbl.(Apr.7, 1995), in COP Report No.1, Addendum, UN Doc.FCCC/ CP/1995/7/Add.1 (June 6, 1995) (calling for negotiation of “a protocol or another legal instrument”) [hereinafter Berlin Mandate].

46 Id., para. 2(a).

47 Geneva Ministerial Declaration (July 18, 1996), in COP Report No. 2, Addendum, Annex, at 71, 73, para. 8, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/15/Add.1 (Oct. 29, 1996) (calling for negotiation of commitments for AnnexI parties regarding “quantified legally-binding objectives for emissions limitations and significant overall reductions within specified time frames”). As with the Copenhagen Accord, the COP “took note” of the Geneva Declaration, rather than formally adopting it. Id. at 70.

48 Durban Platform, supra note 28, para. 2.

49 Indian Submission to the ADP Work Plan, para.7, UN Doc. FCCC/ADP/2012/Misc.3 (April 30, 2012); see also Rajamani, Lavanya, The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action and the Future of the Climate Regime, 61 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 501, 506–07 (2012).

50 Negotiating Text, supra note 37, paras. 215–24.

51 E.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Paris Approach to Global Governance, Project Syndicate (Dec. 28, 2015), at

52 The term “treaty” has a narrower meaning in U.S. constitutional law than in international law, referring to international agreements that are submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, pursuant to Article II of the Constitution. U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2.

53 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Arts. 20–29.

54 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (defining treaty as “an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, . . . what ever its particular designation”).

55 The fact that the title “Paris Implementing Agreement” was proposed in the ADP and apparently rejected undercuts Annalisa Savaresi’s argument that the Paris Agreement can be regarded as an implementing agreement. Annalisa Savaresi, The Paris Agreement – A Rejoinder, EJIL:TALK! (Feb. 16, 2016), at

56 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Arts. 9.8, 16–19.

57 Daniel Bodansky, Legal Options for U.S. Acceptance of a New Climate Agreement 14 (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, May 2015), at

58 See Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 35, at 382, notes 67–72 and accompanying text.

59 Warsaw Decision, supra note 32, para. 2(b).

60 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 4.2.

61 On differentiation, see generally Lavanya Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (2006).

62 Compare UNFCCC, Article 4.1 (establishing common obligations) with Articles 4.2–4.4 (establishing differentiated obligations for Annex Iand Annex II parties). In addition to Annex I and II, the UNFCCC also differentiates other categories of countries, including economies intransition (Article 4.6), small island states (Article 4.8(a)), and least developed countries (Article 4.9).

63 Id. Art. 4.2(f).

64 Berlin Mandate, supra note 45, para. 2(b).

65 Joanna Depledge, Tracing the Origins of the Kyoto Protocol: An Article-by-Article Textual History, UNFCCC Technical Paper, UN Doc. FCCC/TP/2000/2, at 102–05 (Nov. 25, 2000).

66 Zhu Liu, China’s Carbon Emissions Report 2015, at 2 (Harvard Kennedy School, May 2015), at

67 Copenhagen Accord, supra note 15, para. 5. See generally Bodansky, supra note 12, at 240.

68 Rajamani, supra note 49, at 502.

69 US–China Joint Announcement, supra note 34.

70 Lima Call for Climate Action, supra note 33.

71 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, pmbl., para. 3.

72 Id. Arts. 4.2, 4.6, 4.8, 4.9, 4.13.

73 Id. Arts. 13.1, 13.2.

74 Id. Arts. 4.5 (support for developing countries to implement mitigation article), 6.6 (share of proceeds from new sustainable development mechanism for developing countries), 7.6 (recognizing the importance of support for adaptation), 7.13 (support for adaptation for developing countries), 9 (finance), 10 (technology), 11 (capacity building), 13.14 (support for developing countries for implementation), 13.15 (support to build transparency-related capacity of developing countries).

75 Id. Arts. 4.1 (peaking will take longer for developing countries), 4.4 (recommending that developed countries “continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets,” while only encouraging developing countries “to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in light of different national circumstances.”).

76 U.S. Climate Action Network, Who’s on Board with the Copenhagen Accord?, at (last visited Mar. 15, 2016).

77 Durban Platform, supra note 28, pmbl., para. 3.

78 Warsaw Decision, supra note 32.

79 Id., para. 2(b).

80 Lima Call for Climate Action, supra note 33, para. 14.

81 Rajamani, Lavanya, Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretive Possibilities and Underlying Politics, 65 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 493 (2016) (the “friends of rules” group included South Africa, the European Union, the United States, Switzerland, New Zealand, Australia, and others, as well as the Singaporean facilitator).

82 Paris Agreement, supra note 2.

83 Paris Decision, supra note 13.

84 Id., paras. 22–104.

85 Id., paras. 5–11.

86 Id., paras. 12–21.

87 Id., paras. 105–32.

88 Id., paras. 133–36.

89 UNFCCC, supra note 17, Art. 2.

90 Copenhagen Accord, supra note 15, paras. 1–2.

91 Cancún Agreements, supra note 27, para. 4.

92 Victor, David G. & Kennel, Charles F., Ditch the 2°C Warming Goal, 514 Nature 30, 30–31 (2014); see also Victor, David G., Why Paris Worked: A Different Approach to Climate Diplomacy, Environment 360 (Dec. 15, 2015), at (characterizing 1.5 degree goal as “ridiculous”); Michael Le Page, Paris Deal Is Agreed—But Is It Really Good Enough?, New Scientist (Dec. 12, 2015) at (quoting Michael Grubb that “actually delivering 1.5 degrees C is simply incompatible with democracy”).

93 Global Temperatures Set to Reach 1°C Marker for First Time, United Kingdom Met Office (Nov. 9, 2015) at

94 Scenarios for achieving the below-2 degree Celsius temperature goal all rely on using carbon dioxide removal techniques in the second half of the century, such as bioenergy and carbon capture and storage (BECCS). See Tollefson, Jeff, The 2°C Dream, 527 Nature 436, 437 (2015).

95 Paris Decision, supra note 13, para. 17.

96 As one observer in Paris reportedly said, “They may as well agree that all fairies shall ride unicorns too.” Jeff Goodell, Will the Paris Climate Deal Save the World?, Rolling Stone (Jan. 13, 2016), at

97 See generally Sunstein, Cass, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Penn. L. Rev. 2021 (1996).

98 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 2.

99 Paris Decision, supra note 13, para. 21.

100 White House Press Release, G-7 Leaders’ Declaration, Schloss Elmau, Germany (June 8, 2015), at

101 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 4.1.

102 Given the strong opposition by many states to inclusion of an “obligation to achieve,” NDCs cannot be considered unilaterally binding acts, contrary to a suggestion by Jorge Vinuales, The Paris Climate Agreement: An Initial Examination, Part II, EJIL: TALK! (Feb. 8, 2016), at

103 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 4.2.

104 Id. Art. 4.4. This was the provision at issue on the final day, concerning “shall” versus “should.” See supra Part II, n.41 and accompanying text. It reflects a Brazilian “concentric circles” proposal during the negotiations. See Views of Brazil on the Elements of a New Agreement under the Convention Applicable to All Parties, ADP Submission (Nov. 6, 2014), at

105 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 4.5.

106 Id. Art. 4.6.

107 Warsaw Decision, supra note 32, para. 2(b). See supra note 79 and accompanying text.

108 Lima Call for Climate Action, supra note 33, para. 14.

109 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 4.8.

110 Paris Decision, supra note 13, para. 27.

111 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 4.13.

112 Id. Art. 4.8.

113 Id. Art. 4.10.

114 Id. Art. 4.13.

115 Id. Art. 14.2.

116 Id. Art. 14.1.

117 Id. Art. 4.9.

118 Id. Art. 4.3. The expectation of “progression” appears stronger than the “no-backsliding” principle that some proposed during the negotiations, because it implies that parties will advance rather than merely not retreat. It could be satisfied through changes to a contribution’s stringency, scope, or type.

119 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 4.19.

120 Paris Decision, supra note 13, para. 20.

121 Id., paras. 23, 24.

122 Id., para. 35.

123 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 14.2

124 Paris Decision, supra note 13, para. 25.

125 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 4.9.

126 International Carbon Action Partnership(ICAP), Emissions Trading Worldwide: Status Report 2016, at 25 (2016) (sixty-four INDCs said they planned to use markets, and twenty-five said they were considering using markets).

127 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 6.8.

128 See Daniel Bodansky, Seth A. Hoedl, Gilbert E. Metcalf & Robert N. Stavins, Facilitating Linkage of Climate Policies Through the Paris Outcome, Climate Policy (2015).

129 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 6.7; Paris Decision, supra note 13, para. 37(f).

130 Cancún Agreements, supra note 27, paras. 13–14.

131 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 7.9.

132 Id. Art. 7.2.

133 Id. Art. 7.3.

134 Id. Art. 7.6.

135 Id. Art. 7.7

136 Id. Art. 7.10.

137 See Submission by Swaziland on behalf of the African Group on Adaptation in the 2015 Agreement, ADP Submission (Oct. 8, 2013), at

138 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 7.1.

139 Id. Art. 14.1.

140 Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts, Dec. 2/CP.19 (Nov. 23, 2013), in COP Report No. 19, supra note 32, at 6.

141 Paris Decision, supra note 13, para. 51.

142 See Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 35, at ____, notes 30–32 and accompanying text.

143 UNFCCC, supra note 17, Arts. 4.3, 4.4.

144 Copenhagen Accord, supra note 15, para. 8.

145 OECD, Climate Finance IN 2013–2014 and the USD 100 Billion Goal (2015), available at

146 Ministry Of Finance, Government Of India, Climate Change Finance, Analysis of a Recent OECD Report, at 2–5 (Nov. 27, 2015).

147 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 9.3.

148 Id. Art. 9.2

149 Paris Decision, supra note 13, para. 53.

150 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 9.4.

151 See generally Harro Van Asselt, Håkon Sælen & Pieter Pauw, Assessment and Review Under a 2015 Climate Change Agreement (2015).

152 See Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Nonbinding Norms in the International Legal System (Shelton, Dinah, ed., 2003); The Implementation and Effectiveness of international Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice (Victor, David, Raustiala, Kal & Skolnikoff, Eugene B. eds., 1998).

153 Cancún Agreements, supra note 27, paras. 44, 46(d), 63, 66.

154 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 13.1.

155 Id. Art. 13.2.

156 Paris Decision, supra note 13, para. 84.

157 See id., paras. 90 (requiring reporting “no less frequently than on a biennial basis”), 92(e) (noting need to ensure that parties maintain at least their current frequency of reporting, which for developed country GHG inventories is annually).

158 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 13.7. The accompanying COP decision gives greater specificity to the term, “regularly,” by providing that all parties, except for least developed and small island states, shall report on at least a biennial basis. Paris Decision, supra note 13, para. 90.

159 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Arts. 13.11, 13.12.

160 Id. Art. 13.11.

161 Id. Art. 13.8.

162 Id. Art. 13.9.

163 Id. Art. 13.10.

164 Id. Art. 13.11.

165 Id. Art. 13.3.

166 Id. Art. 13.4.

167 Paris Decision, supra note 13, para. 89.

168 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 13.13.

169 Id. Art. 15.2.

170 Id. Art. 15.3.

171 Id. Art. 13.3.

172 Id. Art. 15.3.

173 See Off. of the High Comm’r for H.R., Understanding Human Rights and Climate Change: Submission of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Nov. 26, 2015).

174 Cancún Agreements, supra note 27, para. 8.

175 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, pmbl., para. 7.

176 Id. Art. 20.

177 Id. Art. 21. The penultimate version of the negotiating text had also included bracketed language providing that the Agreement would not enter into force prior to 2020, but this language somewhat mysteriously dropped out of the final text, raising the possibility of early entry into force, before many countries have ratified. See UNFCCC Legal Aff. Programme, Information Note: Entry into Force of the Paris Agreement: Legal Requirements and Implications (Apr. 6, 2016).

178 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 22.

179 Id. Art. 23.

180 Id. Art. 24.

181 Id. Art. 27.

182 Id. Art. 28.

183 Paris Decision, supra note 13, para. 22.

184 Id., para. 7.

185 Id., paras. 7, 8, 10, 11, 26, 28, 31, 91–96, 99–101, 103.

186 Announcing: “Mission Innovation”, The White House (Nov. 29, 2015), at

187 Breakthrough Energy Coalition, at (last visited Mar. 15, 2016).

188 Paris Pledge for Action, at (last visited Mar. 15, 2016).

189 NAZCA stands for Nonstate Actor Zone for Climate Action. NAZCA: Accelerating Climate Action, at (last visited Mar. 15, 2016).

190 Compact of Mayors, at (last visited May 9, 2016).

191 Daniel C. Esty, Bottom-Up Climate Fix, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 2014, at A25.

192 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, pmbl. para. 15.

193 Paris Decision, supra note 13, paras. 133–34.

194 Tom Switzer, Paris Agreement Is a Triumph of Hope over Facts, Sydney Morning Herald (Dec. 30, 2015), at

195 Synthesis Report on the Aggregate Effect of the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, in COP Report No. 21, supra note 2, at 10.

196 Paris Agreement: Near Term Actions Do Not Match Long-Term Purpose—But Stage Is Set to Ramp Up Climate Action, Climate Action Tracker Statement (Dec. 12, 2015) at

197 Thomas Day, Frauke Röser, Ritika Tewari, Marie Kurdziel & Niklas Höhne, Preparation of Intended Nation ally Determined Contributions (INDCs) as a Catalyst for National Climate Action, at 2 (NewClimate Institute, Nov. 2015) at

198 E.g., The Paris Agreement Marks an Unprecedented Political Recognition of the Risks of Climate Change, Economist (Dec. 12, 2015), at (Paris a “far cry from the botched mess of the Copenhagen climate summit”); Harvey, supra note 10 (contrast of Paris and Copenhagen “could not have been greater”); Savaresi, Annalisa, The Paris Agreement: A New Beginning?, 34 J. Energy Nat. Res. L. 16, 18 (2016) (describing Copenhagen as “the low-point in the history of the climate regime”).

199 See Bodansky, supra note 12, at 239–40.

200 E.g., Henrik Selin & Adil Najam, Paris Agreement on Climate Change: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, The Conversation (Dec. 14, 2015), at (describing Paris as “refreshingly transparent”).

201 The Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action was founded in 2010 and has involved at one time or another roughly thirty developing and developed parties, including Australia, Bangladesh, Colombia, Costa Rica, France, Germany, Indonesia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the European Commission.

202 White House Press Release, supra note 36.

* Many thanks to Susan Biniaz, Franz Perez, Nigel Purvis, Lavanya Rajamani, and Bryce Rudyk for their very helpful comments and to my research assistants, Ian Bucon, and Elizabeth Christy.

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