Hostname: page-component-5db58dd55d-xnzfm Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-06-11T18:47:49.911Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Building Strategic Capacity: The Political Underpinnings of Coordinated Wage Bargaining

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

JOHN S. AHLQUIST*
Affiliation:
Florida State University
*
John S. Ahlquist is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Florids State University, 513 Bellamy Building, Tallahassee, Florida32306-2230 (jsahlquist@fsu.edu).

Abstract

Encompassing labor movements and coordinated wage setting are central to the social democratic economic model that has proven successful among the nations of Western Europe. The coordination of wage bargaining across many unions and employers has been used to explain everything from inequality to unemployment. Yet there has been limited theoretical and quantitative empirical work exploring the determinants of bargaining coordination. I argue formally that more unequally distributed resources across unions should inhibit the centralization of strike powers in union federations. Using membership as a proxy for union resources, I find empirical evidence for this hypothesis in a panel of 15 OECD democracies, 1950–2000. I then show that the centralization of strike powers is a strong predictor of coordinated bargaining.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.