¹ The numerous questions raised by the Pact cannot be dealt with exhaustively in an article. The purpose of the present discussion is to examine as concisely as possible some of the most important problems which deserve particular attention.

² In contradistinction to the English system, the Continental system recognizes the principle according to which the court is at liberty to examine parliamentary debates, reports of commissions, and other preliminary documents pertaining to a statute which it is called upon to interpret. But even in the countries which have adopted this system it is strongly recommended not to stress too much the importance of preparatory work, especially that of individual opinions voiced during the making of the statute by its authors. Examining the case of a law which is not sufficiently clear, one of the most authoritative writers says: “La première chose a faire, pour lever de doute, est de consulter les travaux préparatoires de la loi (discussions des Chambres, rapports, exposés des motifs, etc.). Là se trouve souvent la pensée, qui a guidé le législateur. Cependant cés documents n'ont pas toujours l'autorité qu'on leur prête. D'abord l'orateur, l'auteur du rapport, etc., a pu se tromper. … Ensuite les discussions, surtout dans une assemblée un peu nombreuse, reflètent souvent des opinions individuelles, en contradiction avec la pensée vraie de la loi. Aussi estce une rémarque souvent faite que les travaux préparatoires fournissent des armes à tous les partis et que les diverses opinions en présence y trouvent des arguments qui s'annulent réciproquement.” Planiol, , Traitè élémentaire de droit civil (7th ed.), Vol. 1Google Scholar, sec. 218. Similarly, Dalloz writes: “L'exposé des motifs, sa discussion publique, d'une manière générale, les travaux préparatoires de la loi peuvent être d'un grand secours pour l'interprétation de la pensèe du législateur. Mais les opinions individuelles émises à la tribune ne sauraient prévaloir contre le texte.” Répertoire pratique. Lois, No. 567.

³ This is a rule of interpretation which the Court has applied in many instances, such as the Lotus case (Series A, No. 10, p. 16), the case of the competence of the International Labor Organization (Series B, Nos. 2 and 3, p. 41), the case of the jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube (Series B, No. 14, p. 28), and the case of the interpretation of the Statute of the Memel Territory (Series A/B, No. 47, p. 249).

⁴ The opinion according to which the Court has never stated that preparatory work might not be used to contradict the linguistic clearness of the text (Hyde, , “Judge Anzilotti on the Interpretation of Treaties,” American Journal of International Law, 1933, p. 504Google Scholar) appears to be at variance with the Court's statement that has just been quoted.

⁵ Series B, No. 4, pp. 21–24.

⁶ Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international, 1931, p. 81Google Scholar.

⁷ Borchard, , “The Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War,” American Journal of International Law, 1929, p. 117Google Scholar. Similarly, Miller, , The Peace Pact of Paris (New York, 1928), pp. 95, 117, 119Google Scholar; Morris, , “The Pact of Paris for the Renunciation of War,” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1929, p. 90Google Scholar; Gall, , Le pacte de Paris du 27 août 1928 (Paris, 1930), p. 82Google Scholar. Certain writers go still further and argue that even the Senate report is an essential part of the treaty. Morris, op. cit., p. 90. They pay little heed to the terms of the report itself, which states that “this report is made solely for the purpose of putting upon record what your Committee understands to be the true interpretation of the treaty, and not in any sense for the purpose or with the design of modifying or changing the treaty in any way or effectuating a reservation or reservations to the same.” Congressional Record, January 15, 1929 (Vol. 70, No. 29, p. 1783seq.)Google Scholar. If the opinion of Mr. Morris were right, it would be logical to apply it to the parliamentary reports made in all countries which have ratified the Pact of Paris—for instance, to the report submitted to the French Chamber of Deputies by M. Cot on behalf of the Foreign Relations Commission. Now, this report states emphatically that the parties to the Pact are bound exclusively by its text and in no way by any declarations made in the course of the negotiations. Chambre des Députés, Session de 1929, No. 1288, p. 17. Since, it is alleged, such a statement constitutes as inherent a part of the treaty as the declarations the binding force of which it denies, how possibly could this contradiction be solved? There are many other contradictions, and this even between parliamentary reports made in one and the same country. As regards France, for instance, M. Cot contends in his report submitted to the Chamber of Deputies that Article 2 of the Pact of Paris provides for compulsory arbitration without any reservation. Op. cit., p. 20. On the contrary, Senator Labrousse, the rapporteur of the Foreign Relations Commission of the Senate, emphatically denies it and states that the parties have not entered into any positive obligation to settle their disputes by pacific means. Sénat, Année 1929, Session ordinaire, No. 182, p. 15. If such statements were really supposed to form a part of the treaty, no international agreement could be properly construed.

⁸ The General Pact for the Renunciation of War. United States Government Printing Office (Washington, 1928), p. 21seq.Google Scholar

⁹ Miller, op. cit., p. 57.

¹⁰ Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Seventieth Congress, December 7 and 11, 1928, p. 8Google Scholar. The Secretary of State emphasized that Great Britain “would have no greater right under her notes than she would have under this treaty without the notes.” Op. cit., p. 12.

¹¹ Miller, op. cit., p. 117; Borchard, op. cit., p. 117.

¹² Considerations of space do not allow examination of the meaning of the so-called British regional doctrine. It may be observed that this doctrine, formulated in ambiguous terms, is susceptible of different interpretations. But one cannot tell with certainty whether it is or is not contrary to the Pact of Paris. The doctrine may very well have merely a political character and be intended to make it clear that Great Britain is determined to defend certain regions by all measures which are consistent with the Pact. Did the British government intend to reserve to itself legally its freedom to take other measures, it could have done so by making a formal reservation to this effect in its instrument of ratification. But this instrument is unconditional.

¹³ The General Pact for the Renunciation of War (Washington, 1928), p. 36Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Dealing with the Covenant, the note refers to Article 10 and quotes an interpretative resolution of the Assembly of the League under which “it is for the constitutional authorities of each member to decide, in reference to the obligation of preserving the independence and the integrity of the territory of members, in what degree the member is bound to assure the execution of this obligation by employment of its military forces.” On the basis of this resolution, the note concludes that “the Covenant can, it is true, be construed as authorizing war in certain circumstances, but it is an authorization and not a positive requirement.” First of all, it must be pointed out that the note takes into consideration only a part of the resolution submitted to the Assembly, although, according to a principle of interpretation, incivile est, nisi tota lege perspecta, una aliqua particula eius proposita judicare, vel respondere. Furthermore, it fails to realize its purpose. The resolution in question is the result of a long discussion initiated by the Canadian delegation during the first session of the Assembly. Its only purpose is to settle the question as to who has the right to take the final decision as to the application of military sanctions against an aggressor, and not whether there is or is not an obligation to apply such measures. The resolution adopts the point of view of the Canadian delegation and states that the decision in question rests, not with the Council, but with each state. However, although it is limited to this particular aspect of the problem, the resolution cannot help admitting that Article 10 does impose an obligation upon the members of the League to resort to arms in certain circumstances. This is implied even in the passage which is quoted in the American note, and which constitutes paragraph 2 of the resolution. In fact, according to its terms, each state shall decide when it is “bound to assure the execution of this obligation by employment of its military forces.” Moreover, under paragraph 3, the recommendation made by the Council as to the application of military sanctions “shall be taken into consideration of all the members of the League with the desire to execute their engagements in good faith.” The Council has not the right to impose its decision upon the members, and the latter must decide for themselves in good faith when the execution of their obligations under Article 10 requires the application of military measures. But if they reach the conclusion that such is the case, they are legally bound to resort to arms. This is a positive requirement and not a mere authorization.

As to the Locarno agreements, the note says: “If the parties to the treaties of Locarno are under any positive obligation to go to war, such obligation certainly would not attach until one of the parties has resorted to war in violation of its solemn pledges thereunder.” However, such obligation does attach and is not contingent in certain cases upon a resort to war by one of the parties. According to Article 4, sec. 3, of the Locarno Rhine Pact, in the event of a flagrant breach of Article 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles by one of the parties, the signatory powers are bound to lend at once their assistance to the other interested party, although the treaty-breaking state has neither resorted to war nor even crossed the frontier, but when simply such a breach is regarded as an unprovoked act of aggression and when, by reason of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarized zone, immediate action is necessary. Being unable to dwell any longer upon this matter, it may be added that it is dealt with at length by the present writer in his book, Société des Nations et problème de la paix (Paris, 1927), Vol. 2, Chap. 14, espec. pp. 496–510Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 5. Speaking of all the diplomatic correspondence, Mr. Kellogg said: “There is absolutely nothing in the notes of the various governments which would change this treaty if the treaty had been laid on the table and signed as it is, without any discussion.” Op. cit., p. 4. He added: “These questions, with the suggestions made about Locarno and the right of self-defense, and these other matters, were answered by me in our notes, and the treaty would have the same effect whether these notes had been exchanged or not.” And he concluded: “It is true … that if there is anything in the correspondence or negotiations contrary to the terms of the treaty, the treaty is the one that settles it. That is the contract which finally defines the rights of the parties.” Op. cit., pp. 8, 10. Similar opinions were expressed by Senator Borah, the rapporteur of the Foreign Relations Committee. See Congressional Record, Jan., 1929, p. 1126Google Scholar.

¹⁶ See, for instance, Glasgow, , “Foreign Affairs,” Contemporary Review, 1928, p. 248Google Scholar; Scelle, , Le pacte Kellogg; la paix par le droit (1928), p. 433Google Scholar; De Montluc, , “Le Pacte Briand-Kellogg,” Revue de Droit International (Geneva), 1928, p. 334Google Scholar; Balbareu, , Le pacte de Paris (Paris, 1929), p. 30Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Several speakers raised this question in the French Parliament during the discussion on the ratification of the Pact. In order to reassure its opponents, M. Briand declared emphatically in his speech delivered before the Senate on March 29, 1929, that the Pact could not in any way be substituted for the Covenant. M. Cot made a similar statement in his report. Op. cit., p. 33 seq.

¹⁸ See, for instance, Verdross, , Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft (Wien, 1926), p. 57seq.Google Scholar, Lauterpacht, , Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (London, 1927), p. 69Google Scholar; Ascher, , Wesen und Grenzen der internationalen Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit und Gerichtsbarkeit (Leipzig, 1929), p. 26seq.Google Scholar, Strupp, , Das Recht des internationalen Richters nach Billigkeit zu entscheiden (Leipzig, 1930), p. 113seq.Google Scholar After a thorough investigation into the question, the Institute of International Law reached conclusions consonant with those which are expressed above. See its Annuaire, 1932, passim.

¹⁹ The French Penal Code, for instance, deals with this matter in Articles 328 and 329. The former, without attempting to give any definition, provides simply that there is no crime when manslaughter is committed in self-defense. The latter cites, as an example, two cases in which the state of self-defense occurs.

²⁰ Dalloz, , Dictionnaire pratique de droit (8th ed., Paris), p. 1278Google Scholar, sec. 7 seq.

²¹ M. Cot does not make a correct statement when he says in his report that “self-defense implies a formal violation of the Pact of Paris.” Op. cit., p. 38. His opinion is all the less justified since he believes that Article 2 of the Pact provides for compulsory arbitration and that, accordingly, a state which refuses to submit a dispute to an arbitral tribunal violates this treaty. But it is obvious that if it confines itself to such a refusal there is no question of self-defense in so far as the other party is concerned.

²² It is very interesting to observe that this essential condition would not be fulfilled, and, consequently, the right of self-defense would ipso facto disappear, if the states could rely upon the international community to defend them and to redress their wrongs. In point of fact, while the right of self-defense is indispensable in domestic relations, it has not necessarily this character in international relations. An attacked person defends his life and cannot wait until the police arrive, without the risk of being killed. A state, however, does not run such a risk. It is true that its independence and integrity may be compared to the life of an individual, but, unlike this life, they can be restored and they would be restored by the international community. The disappearance of the right of self-defense would greatly facilitate the task of ascertaining which of the parties engaged in hostilities has resorted to war in violation of its obligations.

²³ This last sentence is taken from the American note of June 23, 1928. It expresses a sound idea, but by many a writer has not been properly understood.

²⁴ Oddly enough, the idea of international sanctions encounters the strongest opposition among some of those who consider that the Pact of Paris does not impose any obligation upon the signatories to refrain from war and constitutes a mere gesture for the simple reason that the decision as to the application of the right of self-defense rests with each state. Such an attitude reveals a strange contradiction. In fact, it is contended, on the one hand, that sanctions are superfluous because the parties will carry out their obligations in good faith; but, on the other hand, it is implied that if each state remains judge as to the execution of its solemn pledges, it will certainly violate them. It may be added that the real importance of sanctions lies not in the punishment of the treaty-breaking state, as is generally believed, but in the prevention of a breach. This question is discussed broadly in the report, “The Legal and Political Aspects of Boycotts,” made at the request of the Butler Committee on Economic Sanctions by Professor John B. Whitton and the present writer. The report is printed in the book, Boycotts and Peace, edited by Clark, Evans (New York, 1932), pp. 47–142Google Scholar.

²⁵ League of Nations Publications, VII. Political, 1932. VII, 12, p. 71.

²⁶ League of Nations. Official Journal, Special Supplement, 1933, No. 112, p. 72. Similarly, in the dispute between Italy and Ethiopia the Italian government repeatedly contended that recourse to arms constituted a measure of self-defense and was necessitated by Ethiopia's mobilization which threatened the security of Eritrea and Somaliland. The League of Nations, however, did not concur in this view. On October 7, 1935, the Council stated that in resorting to arms Italy had violated her international obligations—that is to say, both the Covenant and the Pact of Paris—and so it implicitly declared that in this case the right of self-defense was not applicable.

²⁷ Borchard, op. cit., p. 117.

²⁸ The ius belli, which the institution of war implies, does not disappear as a result of the conclusion of the Pact. It has been pointed out that the state which resorts to war in violation of this treaty should not be entitled to the rights of a belligerent. Boye, , “Shall a State which Goes to War in Violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact Have a Belligerent's Rights in Respect of Neutrals?,” American Journal of International Law, 1930, p. 769seq.Google Scholar Similarly, Moor, , “Abänderung der Völkerbundssatzung und Probleme des Pazifismus,” Zeitschrift fur öfentliches Recht, 1932, p. 670Google Scholar. But if the rules of war were not applicable, the parties would be free to have recourse to barbarous measures which are now prohibited by these rules. The question was examined by the Committee for the Amendment of the Covenant of the League of Nations in order to bring it into harmony with the Pact of Paris, and the Committee arrived at the conclusion that the rules of the laws of war would remain applicable. League of Nations. Document C. 160. M. 69. 1930. V, p. 118. See also Bardeleben, , Die zwangweise Durchsetzung im Völkerrecht (Leipzig, 1930), p. 85seq.Google Scholar; Rutgers, , “La mise en harmonie du pacte de la Société des Nations avec le pacte de Paris,” Recueil des cours de l'Academie de droit international de la Haye, 1931, Vol. IV, p. 48Google Scholar; Hassmann, , Der Kellogg-Pakt und seine Vorbehalte (Würzburg), p. 61Google Scholar.

²⁹ Ito, , “Le pacte de Paris et le pacte de la Société des Nations,” Revue politique et parlementaire, 1930, p. 33Google Scholar; Hoijer, , “La mise en harmonie du pacte de la Société des Nations et du pacte de Paris,” Revue de droit international, 1931, p. 153Google Scholar; Foreign Policy Association, Information Service, The Anti-War Pact, Vol. 4, No. 18 (1928), p. 377Google Scholar.

³⁰ League of Nations. Document C.160.M.69. 1930. V, pp. 46, 48, 53, espec. 119. See also Stratis, Calogeropoulos, Le pacte général de renonciation à la guerre (Paris, 1931), p. 128seq.Google Scholar; Politis, , “L'accord des deux pactes,” Revue de droit international et de législation comparée, 1931, p. 641Google Scholar; Gallus, , La mise en harmonie du pacte de la Société des Nations avec le pacte de Paris (Paris, 1930), p. 43Google Scholar; Erich, , “Le caractère juridique du pacte de Paris,” Revue de droit international (Geneva), 1928, p. 236Google Scholar; Scelle, , Le pacte Kellogg; la Paix par le Droit (1928), p. 435Google Scholar; Rauchberg, , “Les obligations juridiques des membres de la Société des Nations pour le maintien de la paix,” Recueil des cours de l'Académie de droit international de la Haye, 1931, Vol. 3, p. 184Google Scholar; Rutgers, “La mise en harmonie du pacte de la Société des Nations avec le pacte de Paris,” idem., 1931, Vol. 4, p. 51; Wehberg, , Die Aechtung des Krieges (Berlin, 1930), p. 115Google Scholar.

In certain cases, it may be difficult to ascertain which of the parties engaged in hostilities has violated the Pact of Paris. Thus the war between Bolivia and Paraguay originated in a contested province, the Chaco district, and the question of the responsibilities incumbent upon the parties was so complicated that the League of Nations left it open.

³¹ This animus belligerendi is recognized as the criterion of a state of war by many authorities, such as Westlake, Oppenheim, Hall, and McNair. After a thorough examination of the problem, the last writer arrives at the conclusion that a state of war occurs “upon the commission of an act of force, under the authority of a state, which is done animo belligerendi, or which, being done sine animo belligerendi but by way of reprisals or intervention, the other state elects to regard as creating a state of war, either by repelling force by force or in some other way; retroactive effect being given to this election, so that the state of war arises on the commission of the first act of force.” Transactions of the Grotius Society (1926), p. 45Google Scholar. It follows that when two states resort to acts of force, however violent, but declare that they do not intend to be engaged in war, the state of war does not exist between them. The animus belligerendi of one of the parties is sufficient to create a state of war. Westlake expresses very properly this idea when he says: “It [war] can be set up only by the will to do so, but that will may be unilateral, because the state of peace requires the concurrent wills of the two governments to live together in it, and is replaced by the state of war as soon as one of those wills is withdrawn.” International Law (Cambridge, 1913), Vol. 2, p. 2Google Scholar.

³² Wright, , “When Does War Exist?,” American Journal of International Law, 1932, p. 366Google Scholar. Similarly, another writer concludes: “‘Resort to war’ may be deduced constructively from the recourse to armed force, but it is not synonymous with the use of armed force. The members of the League are competent to establish such constructive resort to war; but they are not under a legal obligation to do so.” Lauterpacht, “Resort to War” and the Interpretation of the Covenant During the Manchurian Dispute, loc. cit., 1934, p. 58. The arguments advanced in support of this conclusion may be summarized as follows: There are instances of third states treating acts of force as indicating war although the parties were unwilling to bring about a state of war. Such was the attitude of Great Britain in 1884 when France blockaded Formosa. A similar occasion arose in 1902 concerning the blockade of Venezuela. Furthermore, recognition of belligerency constitutes, it is alleged, another instance of a state of war being brought about by the act of a third state. Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 52, 53. These instances, however, are irrelevant. The two afore-mentioned are cases of so-called pacific blockade, which constitutes one of the most controversial questions in international law. According to many authorities, pacific blockade implies the existence of a state of war and cannot be established in time of peace. Since the blockading power enforces the blockade not only against the vessels of the blockaded country but also against those of third states, it injures the interests of these states without at the same time assuming the responsibilities which the state of war implies. The states in question are entitled to claim that they will not suffer such an infringement of their rights unless there is an actual state of war, in which case they will apply the rules of neutrality. This is exactly what Great Britain, did in 1884, and as a result of the British attitude France brought about a state of war with China. Similarly, after the United States declared in 1902 that it would not recognize a pacific blockade enforced against its vessels, the blockading powers established a war blockade of Venezuela. In these cases, a state of war was not created, as it is contended, by third states contrary to the will of the parties. The parties themselves did so, and it is legally irrelevant that in fact the attitude of third states might weigh upon their decision. As regards recognition of belligerency, the act of a third state determines the relations between this state and the disputants, but it does not in any way bring about a state of war between the parties themselves. The legitimate government is perfectly free to refrain from applying the rules of the laws of war and to punish the insurgents according to its penal law, regardless of the fact that they have been recognized as belligerents by third states. Finally, it has been contended that the opinion that a state of war can be created by an act of third states is supported by the committee of jurists which was set up in 1923 with a view to examining certain questions raised by the Corfu incident, and which reached the conclusion that coercive measures might or might not be consistent with the Covenant and that it was for the Council to decide the maintenance or withdrawal of such measures. Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 54. It must be pointed out, however, that the committee did not contemplate the question of bringing about a state of war and confined itself to expressing its opinion as to the consistency of acts of force short of war with the Covenant. Moreover, this opinion, inspired by political reasons, gave rise to the strongest criticism in the Assembly of the League of Nations. According to the dominant opinion, acts of force short of war are inconsistent with Article 12 of the Covenant for several reasons, the chief of which is that recourse to such measures necessarily implies the existence of a “dispute likely to lead to a rupture” which should have been submitted to the pacific procedure, and the state in refraining from doing so violates its obligations. Gonsiorowski, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 339 seq.; Cohn, , “Neutralité et la Société des Nations,” in Munch's, Les origines et l'oeuvre de la Société des Nations (Copenhague, 1924), Vol. 2, p. 160Google Scholar; Gralinski, , Le règlement pacifique obligatoire des différends internationaux suivant le pacte de la Société des Nations (Paris, 1925), p. 78seq.Google Scholar; Guani, , “Les mesures de coercition entre membres de la Société des Nations,” Revue générale de droit international public, 1924Google Scholar; Kulski, , Le probleme de la sécurité depuis le pacte de la Société des Nations (Paris, 1927), p. 104Google Scholar; Petrascu, , Les mesures de contrainte internalionale qui ne sont pas la guerre entre Etats membres de la Société des Nations (Paris, 1927), p. 190Google Scholar; Politis, , “Les représailles entre Etats membres de la Société des Nations,” Revue générale de droit international public, 1924Google Scholar; Schücking, und Wehberg, , Die Satzung des Völkerbundes (Berlin, 1924), p. 508seq.Google Scholar; Schuhmann, , Die Repressalien (Rostock, 1927), p. 80seq.Google Scholar It would seem that the League of Nations has concurred in this view. Thus in the Greco-Bulgarian dispute the Council considered that by occupying a part of Bulgarian territory with her military forces, Greece had violated the Covenant. Most recently, the Assembly held, in its report adopted on November 24, 1934, in the dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay, that in resorting to force and in refraining from submitting the dispute to pacific procedure the parties had violated Article 12 of the Covenant (Part IV, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the report). The above considerations dispose of the opinion according to which “if members of the League wish to declare measures of armed force illegal in a particular case, they are legally authorized and entitled to do it; but they can, without acting illegally, refrain from doing so.” Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 59. Such measures are illegal under the Covenant, and the members of the League cannot alter this fact. They do not, however, give rise automatically to the application of the sanctions provided for in Article 16, because such an application is contingent, not only upon a violation of the Covenant, but also upon a resort to war. The theory concerning an alleged possibility of bringing about a state of war by an act of third states is apparently intended to show that the League of Nations had the right to apply sanctions in the Sino-Japanese dispute. But this artificial theory is quite superfluous, and the fact has been lost sight of that even in the absence of a state of war the members of the League could, if they only wanted to do so, take most drastic measures of coercion under certain provisions of the Covenant, especially under Article 10.

³³ Bardeleben, op. cit., p. 85; Gallus, op. cit., p. 33; Moller, op. cit., p. 95 seq., Wright, , “The Meaning of the Pact of Paris,” American Journal of International Law, 1933, p. 52Google Scholar; Hassmann, op. cit., p. 56.

³⁴ Borchard, , “‘War’ and ‘Peace’,” American Journal of International Law, 1933, p. 114CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁵ There is a difference between the English text and the French text of this article. While according to the former “the high contracting parties agree …,” under the latter “les hautes parties contractantes reconnaissent …” The French expression is much weaker than the English one and conveys the idea of a mere recognition of a general principle.

³⁶ Miller, op. cit., p. 124 seq.; Calogeropoulos Stratis, op. cit., p. 106 seq.

³⁷ Op. cit., p. 20 seq., 28 seq. It is interesting to add that Senator Labrousse emphatically opposed this view in his report, op. cit., p. 15.

³⁸ Gallus, op. cit., p. 13; Ito, op. cit., p. 26; Hoijer, op. cit., p. 138; Le Gall, op. cit., p. 93; Moller, op. cit., p. 95; Politis, , “L'importanoe juridique du pacte de Paris,” L'Europe nouvelle, 1929, p. 315Google Scholar; Rutgers, op. cit., p. 64.

³⁹ Borchard, , “The Arms Embargo and Neutrality,” American Journal of International Law, 1933, p. 296Google Scholar.