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Military Capabilities and Escalation: A Correction to Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

M. Cristina Molinari*
Affiliation:
University of Venice

Abstract

Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick analyze the evolution of crises as a two-sided incomplete information game in order to illuminate the relationship between observable military capabilities and the escalation of a dispute to armed conflict. I show that an error in the derivation of the equilibria invalidates their conclusions, and I offer a few suggestions on how to model the evolution of crises as incomplete information games.

Type
Forum
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2000

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References

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