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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
For some years prior to the outbreak of the great war the proposed reorganization of the administrative system of France occupied a leading place among the questions of French internal politics. It provoked a flood of discussion in parliament; it was the subject of investigation and report by various parliamentary, extra-parliamentary and inter-ministerial commissions; it was dwelt upon regularly in the annual reports on the budget; it was a standing subject of discussion by the functionaries in their associations and by the political parties in their annual congresses; it was responsible for a vast output of literature in the form of books, brochures and articles; and it occupied a conspicuous place in the declaration of each incoming ministry upon taking office. In the parliamentary election campaign of 1910 no other question, except proportional representation, was so widely discussed by the candidates.
1 Of the 597 deputies elected in 1910, 346 had made administrative reform a part of their platforms. The platforms of the successful candidates were published by the state in a volume of 1267 pages under the title, Professions de Foi et Engagements Électoraux. The Professions were summarized and classified by M. Camille Fouquet and published by the state in a Rapport sur les Programmes et Engagements Électoraux. As to administrative reform see the latter publication, pp. 32 ff.
2 “We have universal suffrage and the parliamentary régime,” says Deschanel, M. Paul, now president of the chamber of deputies, “the country is spanned by a network of railroads and telegraphs but our administrative régime dates from the end of the eighteenth century at a time when none of these existed.” L'Organisation de la Démocratie (Paris, 1910), p. 121.Google Scholar “France,” he says, “is not a democracy but a bureaucracy.” La Décentralisation, p. 11. See also the speeches by Deschanel, M. in the chamber of deputies, Jan. 13, 1905, Journal Officiel, p. 6Google Scholar; of May 11, 1909, ibid., p. 1003; and of June 21, 1910, ibid., p. 2234. “The truth is,” says Professor Barthélemy, “our institutions are monarchical; their democratic character is only partial and more apparent than real.” Revue Pénitentiaire, June, 1906. For similar criticisms, see Chardon, , Les Travaux Publics, 2nd ed. 1904, p. 347Google Scholar; Autesserre, , La Centralisation Administrative (Paris, 1904), pp. 130 ffGoogle Scholar; Ripert, , “La Réforme Administrative” in the Revue des Sciences Politiques, Vol. XXVI, p. 390Google Scholar; and Rabany, , “Réforme Administrative,” in the Revue Générale de l'Administration, 1910, p. 7.Google Scholar
3 The mayors, it will be recalled, are not elected by the people directly but by the municipal councils.
4 Commissioners of police are now appointed by the President of the Republic and may be removed by him. Municipal collectors are appointed by the President or by the prefect, depending on the importance of the commune. Other collectors are appointed either by the prefect or by the subprefect. Conservators of municipal museums are appointed by the prefect. Guards of communal forests are appointed by the prefect from lists of candidates presented by the conservators of forests. Teachers, communal highway inspectors and agents, public weighers, and firemen although their functions appear to be entirely local in character are appointed by the prefect, and the municipal authorities have no voice whatever in their selection. Berthélemy, , Le Contrôle Exercé en France par le Pouvoir Central sur l'Administration des Communes, in the reports of the Premier Congrès International des Sciences Administratives (1910), Vol. I, sec. 1: 4.Google Scholar
5 “Only Caesar and the distances have been annihilated,” says Chardon, M., one of the best known writers on French administration, “‘R. F.’ is stamped on the reports but they are intended for the Emperor.” Les Travaux Publics, p. 347.Google Scholar
6 Cf. Boncour, et Maurras, , Un Début Nouveau sur la République et la Centralisation, p. 136.Google Scholar
7 Études Administratives, Vol. I, p. 74.
8 Cf. Avenel, , La Décentralisation, p. 16.Google Scholar The physical impossibility of the ministers giving attention to any but the most important questions of public policy is dwelt upon by Poincaré, M. Raymond in the Revue Bleue of June 9, 1911.Google Scholar
9 Cf. Chautemps, , Rapport sur le Budget Général de l'Exercise, 1912Google Scholar, Ministère de l'Interieur, No. 1239, Chambre des Députés, p. 87.
10 The advantage of this reform is dwelt upon by Cheron, M. in his Rapport sur le Budget Général de l'Exercise, 1912Google Scholar, No. 1260, Chambre des Députés, p. 88.
11 This, of course, has been a source of much complaint. The practice of the government of summarily dismissing politically hostile mayors who nevertheless had the confidence of the local inhabitants led to the enactment of a law in 1908 giving the mayor a right to a hearing and requiring orders of suspension or dismissal to be accompanied by a statement of reasons. See Barthélemy, , “Le Mouvement de Décentralisation” in the Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique, Vol. XXVI, p. 131.Google Scholar The same law relieved mayors from the necessity of obtaining the consent of the prefect in order to resign their offices, and was passed as a result of the events following a “strike” of mayors in the Midi in June, 1907, when many of them abandoned their offices, for which act they were prose cuted by the government.
12 J. Barthélemy, article cited above, p. 117. The prefect, it may be added, has the power to dismiss any member of the municipal council whom he regards as ineligible, but the latter has the right of appeal to the prefectoral council. Likewise the prefect may remove any member of the council who absents himself without valid excuse from three successive meetings of the council, and the council of state may declare vacant the seat of any member who refuses to perform a duty required of him by law.
13 The taxing power of the municipal councils is subject to many restrictions. In general they may levy only such taxes as are authorized by law and the amount authorized is limited. In some cases they may levy extraordinary taxes up to a certain amount. In other cases they may levy only with the approval of the central authorities, sometimes the President of the Republic, sometimes the prefect and sometimes the council-general. The whole subject is fully discussed by Basdevant in a report entitled Pouvoir des Autorités Locales d'Etablir des Impôts ou Taxes, in the proceedings of the Premier Congrès International des Sciences Administratives (1910), Vol. I, sec. 1, pp. 7 ff and by Delpech, Pouvoirs des Autorités Locales en Matière d'Emprunts, ibid., sec. 1, pp. 4 ff.
14 Berthélemy, H., Droit Administratif, 6th ed., p. 192.Google Scholar
15 In cities of over 40,000 inhabitants the organization of the police force is regulated by decree of the central government. Since the municipality bears the expense, the avis of the municipal council is required to be taken but its disapproval has no effect.
16 Cf. Berthélemy, H., Droit Administratif, p. 203.Google Scholar
17 This power is also conferred on the prefect by special laws in certain other cases, for example, when the mayor refuses or neglects to perform the duty required of him by the law of 1903 relating to the establishment of primary schools. In case the municipal council refuses or neglects to make provision in the budget for an appropriation for the maintenance of a service imposed on the municipality by law, the prefect may himself insert the appropriation in the budget.
18 Cf. Autesserre, , La Centralisation Administrative, p. 180Google Scholar, and Molliet, , Le Pouvoir Hiérarchique, p. 99.Google Scholar See also, Berthélemy, op. cit., p. 200, n. 1.
19 Theoretically the municipalities do have the right to determine the names of their streets and public places, but when Waldeck-Rousseau was president of the council of ministers he called the attention of the prefects to the fact that such designations as had the character of public homage could only be authorized by decree of the President of the Republic. “You must abstain,” he said, “from submitting to me propositions tending to confer homage of this kind upon living persons or on those upon whom history has not yet pronounced judgment.” MacMahon vetoed the acts of many municipal councils which attempted to honor Thiers in this way, perhaps, says Avenel, (La Décentralisation, p. 52)Google Scholar for the reason that history had not at that time rendered judgment upon the liberator of France and the founder of the Republic.
20 Communal loans which are reimbursable out of the ordinary revenues do not require the authorization of the central authorities; but those which exceed this amount require the authorization by the prefect and the approval of the council of state. Before 1902 authorization by the President of the Republic and even by Parliament was necessary in the case of certain loans. See Delpech, article cited, pp. 12–14.
21 For a defense of the tutelle administrative particularly in respect to the financial powers of the communes, see Barthélemy, in the Revue du Droit Public, Vol. XXVI, p. 152Google Scholar; Rabany, , in the Revue Générale de l'Administration, 1910, p. 11Google Scholar; Ripert, , in the Revue des Sciences Politiques, Vol. XXVI, p. 402 ffGoogle Scholar; Ferrièrre, La in the proceedings of the Premier Congrès International des Sciences Administratives, Vol. IGoogle Scholar; Delpech, ibid., Vol. I; Colson, , Cours d'Economie Politique, Book IV, 2nd ed., p. 61Google Scholar; Autesserre, op. cit., p. 170; Molliet, op. cit., p. 97; Roden, , La Réforme Administrative par la Réforme Géographique, p. 190–192Google Scholar; Tour, Imbart de la in the Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Vol. XXII, pp. 84 ffGoogle Scholar; the Rapport by Chautemps, cited above, p. 19; and Avenel, op. cit., p. 23. The central authorities have usually, it must be said, shown great liberality in permitting the municipalities to incur long-time loans and to levy taxes in excess of the limit fixed by the law. Thus the debts of the communes between 1898 and 1907 increased from 3,682 million francs to 4,166 millions; in 1906 fifty departments out of 89 were authorized to incur loans for a longer period than that fixed by law. In 1905 the centimes additional of the communes and departments reached 229 in the department of Aude, 225 in Savoy, 263 in Upper Savoy and 356 in Corsica—all of which, says Ripert in the article cited above (p. 153), proves that the state cannot surrender its financial control over the local governments. Delpech in his article referred to above gives some interesting statistics showing the extravagance of the cities in incurring loans. See also the Bulletin de Statistique, Vol. XXXIII (1909), p. 501. Professor J. Barthélemy answers the charge that the policy of the central government in respect to the financial activities of the local governments has been to stifle them and to prevent them from engaging in useful undertakings. In 1906, he says, 58 departments were authorized to incur loans for a period exceeding the legal limit. In the case of 32 of them the period of the loan reached 50 years. See also the statistics which he publishes regarding the amount of centimes additionnels levied by the departments and communes in 1905. Revue du Droit Public, Vol. XXVI, p. 153.
22 Professor J. M. Mathews has pointed out that in many communities of the United States state law goes unenforced and indeed state authority is sometimes defied by the local authorities charged with enforcing it, and the state authorities are powerless to prevent it because they have no power to remove recalcitrant local officials or otherwise control their acts. Principles of American State Administration, especially pp. 422 ff.
23 La Décentralisation, pp. 63, 73.
24 Cf. Ripert, op. cit., p. 403, and Rabany, op. cit., p. 11.
25 Siegfried, in the Revue du Droit Public, Vol. XXIV, p. 129.Google Scholar
26 The law of 1884 reversed the principle hitherto in force by establishing the rule that henceforth the municipal councils should have the general power to regulate their own affairs while the central government should intervene only in exceptional cases. The former rule that the acts of the municipal council should be valid only when approved by the central government was replaced by the inverse principle that the municipal council should regulate by its own deliberations the affairs of the commune. This principle, however, was strictly limited to communal affairs and even as to these there are many exceptions. Cf. Barthélemy, in the Revue du Droit Public, Vol. XXVI, p. 119.Google Scholar
27 It is impossible to summarize this legislation here. A review of it may be found in an admirable article entitled “Le Mouvement de Décentralisation” by ProfessorBarthélemy, J. in the Revue du Droit Public, Vol. XXVI, pp. 115–155Google Scholar; also his paper in the proceedings of the First International Congress of Administrative Sciences, referred to above. See also Roden, , Réforme Administrative, pp. 131 ffGoogle Scholar; Berthélemy, H., Droit Administratif, 6th ed., pp. 88–89, 142–176Google Scholar; Ripert, in the Revue des Sciences Politiques, Vol. XXVI, pp. 390 ffGoogle Scholar; Autesserre, op. cit., ch. 9; Lucay, , La Décentralisation, 1895.Google Scholar
28 Cf. Ripert, article cited, pp. 401–402; Barthélemy, , Revue du Droit Public, Vol. XXVI, p. 131 ff.Google Scholar
29 M. Joseph Barthélemy, one of the most redoubtable antagonists of the principle of centralization, frankly admits that decentralization, so much to be desired in many matters, cannot be thought of in the fields of police and financial administration. The municipal authorities, he says, cannot be depended upon to maintain public order. The municipal police have shown themselves powerless in some cases while in others they have shown a criminal unwillingness to enforce the law. Likewise in respect to the financial activities of the local governments it is impossible to free them from the control of the central government. Revue du Droit Public, Vol. XXVI, p. 152.
30 Cf. Vivien, op. cit., Vol. XI, pp. 13–14.
31 Chautemps, , Rapport, p. 9Google Scholar: The Congress of the Radical party in 1902 adopted unanimously the following resolution: “Considering that the French people are the most administered in the world and that they maintain at great expense an army of functionaries a large number of whom might be abolished without inconveniences; considering, that local and individual initiative is stifled by the bureaucratic despotism of an overcentralized administration; considering that this excessive centralization is absolutely contrary to the very nature of the republican system and that it constitutes a danger to the Republic, the Congress demands a decentralization of the public services, a new administrative organization of France, an organization which will give greater power to the communal and departmental assemblies, leaving to them the discussion and management of their local interests usurped by the state; in short, the Congress demands the application of the maxim: ‘to the State, the national interests; to the departments, regional and departmental interests; and to the communes, communal interests.’ “Text in Le Parti Radical et Radical Socialiste à Travers ses Congrès 1901–1911, p. 358. As to the views of the Radical party on administrative reform in general, see Buisson, , La Politique Radicale, pp. 168 ff.Google Scholar
32 For the text of the report and comments thereon by the chairman of the commission, Lallemand, M., see his Réorganisation Administrative, (Paris, 1909).Google Scholar
33 See his preface to the French translation of Jenks', Local Government in England (Paris, 1902).Google Scholar Professor Barthélemy declares that the people of France are not free because the administrative institutions of the country rest upon then Napoleonic foundations of the First Empire; they can never be free, he adds, until they break open the cage in which they were imprisoned by the emperor. The problem of liberty in France, he declares, is the problem of decentralization, the resuscitation of the communes and the strengthening of their local life and patriotism.
34 Such is the thesis, for example, of Foncin, Pierre, “Les Pays de France,” Revue de Paris, Apr. 16, 1898, p. 753.Google Scholar
35 On the area, population and inequalities of the departments, see Lucay, , La Décentralisation (Paris, 1895), p. 144.Google Scholar
36 Thouret said in the constituent assembly that the purpose in parceling the country into eighty divisions was to make it possible for one to travel from the remotest point in the department to the seat of government of the department in a single day. Mirabeau said he considered numerous departments necessary for the same reason and also to render it possible for a large number of citizens to participate in the government. Roden, , La Réforme Administrative par la Réforme Géographique, p. 37.Google Scholar
37 Roden, op. cit., p. 172, estimates that the saving would amount to at least 120,000,000 francs a year, and that it would reach 25,000,000 in the ministry of the interior alone. It costs as much today, he says, to collect the taxes in Lozère as in the Nord where the receipts are fifty times as great. All the departments regardless of size or population have the same general staff of prefects, inspectors, directors, controllers, etc.
38 Cf. Brette, , “Les Limites et les Divisions Territoriales de la France in 1789, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Vol. LXII, p. 270.Google Scholar
39 The more important “regional” projets are summarized and discussed by Barthélemy, in the Revue du Droit Public, Vol. XXVI, p. 145 ff.Google Scholar See also Cayla, , in the Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Vol. X, p. 373Google Scholar; Bluzet, , Les Attributions des Sous-Préfets, pp. 489 ffGoogle Scholar, and Beauquiers, Rapport, cited below.
40 Annuaire du Parlement, 1901–1911, p. 190. In supportof the regional scheme see Audiffried, Senator, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Vol. LXVII, p. 425 ffGoogle Scholar; Brette, ibid., Vol. LXII, pp. 258–281; Rotours, Angot des, “Les Departments ontils Detruit les Provinces,” Revue Hebdomidaire, Aug. 5, 1911Google Scholar; Beauquiers, , Rapport number 731Google Scholar, Chambredes Députés, session de 1907; Rolland, , Revue du Droit Public, Vol. XXVI, p. 99Google Scholar; and J. Paul-Boncour et Maurras, La République et la Dé centralisation, ch. 1. The principle of “regionalism” was approved by the Radical party in its annual convention in 1903. Le Parti Radical et Radical Socialiste à Travers ses Congrès 1901–1911, p. 364.
41 Chautemps, , Rapport, pp. 12–14.Google Scholar
42 Barthélemy, , Revue du Droit Public, Vol. XXVI, pp. 144–147.Google Scholar
43 Ripert, , Revue des Sciences Politiques, Vol. XXVI, p. 390.Google Scholar
44 So argues Bienvenu-Martin, M. in an article entitled “L'Organisation Régional de la France” in the Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Vol. LXVII, pp. 217–239.Google Scholar
45 Cf. Demartial, , La Réforme Administrative, p. 4.Google Scholar M. Cheron, reporter of the general budget for 1912, emphasized this point. “It is not at all necessary,” he remarks, “to constitute larger units in order to decentralize the administration. Decentralize with that which already exists. Let the central government limit its action to larger questions of general interest and leave to the local authorities under proper control the administration of local affairs. Give the prefect more initiative and relieve him from the necessity of consulting the ministers except in regard to important matters. Increase the powers of the councils-general and relieve Parliament from the duty of passing upon a mass of projets of local interest which it never in fact considers—a duty which often requires the communes to wait months before they can levy a petty sur tax to meet the cost of an expenditure imposed upon them by the state. Why not give to the local assemblies who know best what are their own needs the power to determine such matters?” Rapport sur le Budget Général cited above. Professor Barthélemy points out that the regionalist scheme does not necessarily mean decentralization.
46 Le Pouvoir Administratif, pp. 36, 250–279.
47 Revue du Droit Public, Vol. XXVIII, p. 272. Compare also Demartial, , La Réforme Administrative, pp. 4, 8.Google Scholar
48 Elements du Droit Public et Administratif ((Paris, 1901), p. 278. This is the opinion also of Demartial, p. 8; and Chardon, p. 252. For a defense of the prefect, see Rabany, in Revue Générale de l'Administration, May, 1910, p. 5Google Scholar, and Monteil, , L'Administration dela République, p. 166.Google Scholar See also Leyret, , La Tyrannie des Politiciens (Paris, 1910), pp. 41–54.Google Scholar
49 Chardon, , Pouvoir Administratif, p. 251Google Scholar; Jèze, , Revue du Droit Public, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 278–279Google Scholar, also his Droit Public et Administratif, p. 160. A deputy in his electoral program in 1910 referring to the “exorbitant powers” of the prefects declared that it was possible for them completely to annihilate the liberties of the communes without even violating the law or exercising their power arbitrarily. Fouquet, , Programmes et Engagements Electoraux, Rapport, number 385Google Scholar, Chambre des Députés, 1910, p. 35.
50 A good example is the Delpech, case described in the Revue du Droit Public, Vol. XXVIII, p. 283.Google Scholar
51 The practice of constantly shifting the prefects about from one department to another has been much criticized. Georgin, (Le Statut des Fonctionnaires, Paris, 1912, p. 626)Google Scholar mentions one department in which twelve prefects arrived and departed in a period of eleven years.
52 See the speech of M. Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu in the Chamber of Deputies, Nov. 30, 1911, Journal Officiel, p. 3140. The Radical party at its annual convention of 1905 voted in favor of abolishing the office, which it declared was merely a useless cog. Le Parti Radical et Radical Socialiste à Travers ses Congrès 1901–1911, p. 358.
53 The first instance was in 1886; the last in Nov., 1912. See Berthélemy, , Droit Administratif, p. 139Google Scholar, n. 1.
54 Many deputies have voted for the maintenance of the subprefectoral institution although favoring its abolition, for the reason that they are opposed to the policy of trying to bring about administrative reform through amendments to the budget. Chautemps, , Rapport, cited above, p. 30Google Scholar,
55 Cf. Bluzet, , Les Attributions des Sous-Préfets (Paris, 1902), p. 525Google Scholar; Mesmay, de, La Question des Sous-Préfets (Paris, 1907), p. 55Google Scholar; and Leroy-Beaulieu, , Journal Officiel, 1911, p. 3441.Google Scholar
56 Jèze, , Elements, p. 138Google Scholar; de Mesmay, op. cit., pp. 43, 55. Berthélemy, , Droit Administratif, p. 138Google Scholar; Hauriou, , Précis, 7th ed., p. 241Google Scholar; the Temps, Oct. 10 and Nov. 28, 1912. The Temps, however, maintains that the government not only has an undoubted right to see that prefects and subprefects do not actually oppose its policies but that it may require them to put their services at its disposal. See also a similar defense of their political activity in Arnaud, , “Le Rôle Social du Sous-Préfet,” in the Revue Générale d'Administration, June-July, 1907Google Scholar, separately reprinted, p. 7.
57 See the Temps, Nov. 7, 1911, and Oct. 10, 1912. “The evil customs of our electoral régime have made the sub-prefect a courtier of the Deputy of his arrondissement. It is no secret that today he is chosen by the Deputy and counts upon his influence to secure promotion. … Political agent of the government and protégé of the members of Parliament he passes his life serving them and being served.”
58 Cf. Bluzet, 475; de Mesmay, 56.
59 This function of the subprefect is emphasized by Arnaud in “Le Rôle Social du Sous-Préfet Dans une Démocratie,” Paris, 1907. For further defense of the subprefect see Angot, Baron J. des Rotours in the Revue Hebdomidaire, Apr. 21, 1906, pp. 257–267Google Scholar; an article by “an old auditor and councilor of State” entitled “La Question des Sous Préfets et la Réforme Administrative” in the Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Vol. XXV, pp. 300–343; and Montchanin, , Le Sous-Préfet (Paris, 1893).Google Scholar
60 Lallemand, , Réorganisation Administrative (Paris, 1909), pp. 32–48.Google Scholar
61 Deschanel, , La Décentralisation, pp. 149–181Google Scholar; Avenel, , La Réforme Administrative, pp. 54–55Google Scholar; Boncour, et Maurras, , Début Nouveau, p. 157Google Scholar; Roden, op. cit., p. 54; Chautemps, , Rapport, pp. 30–32.Google Scholar
62 Jèze, , Bulletin de la Societé d'Études Legislatives, No. 1, 1910, p. 26.Google Scholar
63 See Chautemps, report on the budget (cited above), p. 37.
64 As a matter of fact, however, the prefect, it is said, has almost ceased to preside over the sessions of the council.
65 Cf. Chardon, , L'Administration de la France, p. 357Google Scholar, and Berthélemy, , Droit Administratif, p. 920Google Scholar, who says there should be an absolute separation of the functions of administration and of justice and for this reason if for no other the councils should be reorganized. See also Rolland, in the Revue du Droit Public, Vol. XXVI, p. 96.Google Scholar
66 Thus in 1895 the various councils throughout France adjudged 369,498 affairs, but of these only 5,549 were actually examined and discussed; the others being approved without observation. D'Angelis, , Le Projet de Réforme des Conseils de Préfecture (Paris, 1909), p. 70.Google Scholar
67 Cf. D'Angelis, p. 73, and Chardon, p. 374.
68 On these points see the report of M. Jèze cited above; Chardon, op. cit., pp. 357, 373–376; D'Angelis, pp. 70–71; Berton, , La Réforme des Conseils de Préfecture (Paris, 1910), pp. 11–12Google Scholar; also an article by the same author in the Revue Générale d'Administration, 1910, 1, p. 257 ff., and 11, pp. 24 ff. M. D'Angelis estimates that of the more than 300,000 affairs passed on by the councils of prefecture in 1895 the average number of matters actually examined and considered by each council in France was about 90. M. Morlot who introduced a bill in 1899 for the abolition of the councils reached essentially the same conclusion. M. Berton estimates that in 1902 the average number of affairs actually considered by each council was about one hundred and fifty per year. M. Chardon fixes the number at about one hundred.
69 The text of the Clemenceau, bill is analyzed in the Revue du Droit Public, Vol. XXV, pp. 707 ff.Google Scholar
70 For discussions of these various projets see D'Angelis, pp. 55–58; Berton, p. 3 ff; Bellenger, , La Réforme du Conseil de Préfecture (Paris, 1911), ch. 11Google Scholar; Cremineux, , Les Conseils de Préfecture et la Réforme Administrative (Paris, 1887), ch. xiGoogle Scholar; Rolland, , “La Réforme des Conseils de Préfecture” in the Revue du Droit Public, Vol. XXVI, pp. 95–111Google Scholar; see also the same Revue, Vol. XXV, p. 707, and Vol. XXIV, p. 763, for lists of the various projets and propositions that have been laid before parliament for the reform of the councils.
71 Chautemps, , Rapport, p. 37.Google Scholar
72 The proposal to substitute regional administrative tribunals in the place of the councils of prefecture was submitted to the council of state for its advice but this body gave a strong adverse opinion, mainly for the reasons stated above. D'Angelis, p. 62.
73 See also articles on administrative reform after the war, in Revue Générale d'Administration, Janv.-Fev., Mars-Avril, 1918; and Revue Politique et Parliamentaire, Août, 1918.
