¹ It is only recent generations that have practically ignored it altogether; earlier observers, like Alexis de Tocqueville, were not unaware of its existence. Writing in 1835 he remarks: “In no other country of the world has the principle of association been more successfully used or applied to a greater multitude of objects than in America. Besides the permanent associations which are established by law under the names of townships, cities, and counties, a vast number of others are formed and maintained by the agency of private individuals” (Democracy in America [New York, 1946], Vol. 1, p. 191Google Scholar).

² In his refreshingly different study, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It (New York, 1948)Google Scholar, Richard Hofstadter calls attention to “the tendency to place political conflict in the foreground of history,” at the expense of what he terms “shared convictions” within “the common climate of American opinion.” See the Introduction, pp. vii ff.

³ This tradition I shall therefore call, following Francis W. Coker, “empirical collectivism.” In his Recent Political Thought (New York, 1934)Google Scholar, Professor Coker entitled the last chapter “Empirical Collectivism” (Ch. 20, pp. 545–559). In that chapter he treats of British as well as American thought, while this essay is, of course, confined to the development of an American tradition of empirical collectivism.

⁴ In thus setting the primacy of the public interest over any lesser interest, the empirical collectivist reflects a strong community sense. He realizes that members of society are economically interdependent, just as they are socially, politically, culturally, and otherwise; he recognizes this interdependency as a condition of life in the “Great Society,” to which the people and their governments must accommodate their actions if public problems are to be solved. Hence on occasion the empirical collectivist may advocate action which advances the interests of some special group—especially a large underprivileged group—of the population, on the grounds that the public interest can best be promoted in that way. (See Coker, p. 545.) His preoccupation with the welfare of the whole community leads the empirical collectivist in many instances to take the point of view of the consumer. Though not all members of society are workers or employers or businessmen or farmers, all members are consumers, as they are citizens; thus the empirical collectivist is able to espouse the public interest as it is reflected in the welfare of citizens as consumers.

⁵ Cf. Coker, p. 547: “No single or simple panacea is offered; and no sudden, sweeping, root-and-branch reconstruction of the present economic order is advocated. Existing methods are to be changed in an eclectic, piecemeal manner.”

⁶ Professor Turner's essay was first published in 1893 under the title of “The Significance of the Frontier in American History.” It is reprinted in the collection of essays entitled The Frontier in American History (New York, 1947)Google Scholar.

⁷ In 1835 he wrote: “It was never assumed in the United States that the citizen of a free country has a right to do as he pleases; on the contrary, more social obligations were there imposed upon him than anywhere else. No idea was ever entertained of attacking the principle or contesting the rights of society …” (Democracy in America, Vol. 1, p. 71Google Scholar).

⁸ See Turner, , The Frontier in American History, pp. 343 ffGoogle Scholar. Perhaps it should be noted that in his thesis Professor Turner, though recognizing frontier collectivism, stressed the influence of the frontier in fostering an individualist tradition. I believe that he overstressed the role of individualism, and underemphasized the role of collectivism, in American frontier experience.

⁹ In this connection see de Tocqueville, Vol. 1, pp. 300–14; Vol. 2, pp. 20–28, 125–27, 143–47.

¹⁰ Cf. Coker, p. 546. The extent of government intervention in economic affairs during the earlier periods of our history is sometimes overlooked. For an account of one sort of government intervention in the pre-Constitution period, see Morris, R. B.Government and Labor in Early America (New York, 1946)Google Scholar, especially the introduction, entitled “The Mercantilist Background of American Labor Relations,” pp. 1–54; Ch. 1, “Regulation of Wages Prior to the Revolution,” pp. 55–90; and Ch. 2, “Regulation of Wages during the Revolution,” pp. 92–135. Joseph Dorfman's two-volume study, The Economic Mind in American Civilization, 1606–1865 (New York, 1946)Google Scholar, is an historical account of the economic ideas advanced to justify (or condemn) government intervention.

¹¹ The American Commonwealth, first published in 1888 (rev. ed., Philadelphia, 1906), p. 167Google Scholar.

¹² The way in which empirical collectivism was accommodated to the American constitutional system is revealed by efforts to obtain federal sponsorship of internal improvements during the first half of the nineteenth century. The Constitution expressly granted to the federal government no power to undertake internal improvements. This does not mean that no action was attempted or taken by the federal government: the fight for internal improvements was under way in Congress when Jefferson was inaugurated, and in some form or other it continued throughout the century. Jefferson and his “strict constructionist” successors, though not always as strict in political practice as in constitutional theory, for the most part opposed congressional legislation for internal improvements. But what is ordinarily overlooked is that their opposition was always on constitutional grounds. From their point of view the question was not whether government should undertake collective action for the purpose in internal improvements, but rather whether federal or state governments should assume the responsibility. Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and Jackson all vetoed congressional bills for internal improvements, yet they did not reject the doctrine that government should undertake collective action to solve public problems. Instead they held that either the Constitution should be amended to give Congress the power to enact such legislation, or the states should undertake the responsibility. In his veto of the Maysville Road Bill in 1830, for example, Jackson maintained that improvement of the road was the duty of the State of Ohio rather than of the federal government. Jefferson and Madison both recommended, at one time or other, passage of a constitutional amendment authorizing Congress to appropriate money for internal improvements. (See, for example, Madison's veto message on the Bonus Bill of 1817.) Clearly their opposition to congressional legislation for internal improvements was not founded on a belief that government should not undertake collective action for such public purposes, and their view was not exceptional. The popular sentiment of the time is reflected in the so-called Preemption Act of 1841; Section 8 granted each state 500,000 acres of public land, proceeds from the sale of which were to be used by the states for internal improvements—“roads, railways, bridges, canals and improvement of watercourses, and drainage of swamps.” (The Act is reprinted in part in Commager, H. S. [ed.], Documents of American History [3d ed., New York], 1946, pp. 291–92)Google Scholar. Since in practice the constitutional barrier proved considerable, most government action taken for internal improvements came from the states, aside from certain undertakings during the administration of John Quincy Adams, or exceptional undertakings during the administration of “strict constructionist” Presidents. It was New York State, after all, that built the Erie Canal; other states similarly built, either directly or by subsidizing construction with public funds, waterways and railways and, of course, highways. (For a summary account, see Hicks, J. D., A Short History of American Democracy [Boston, 1943], pp. 220 ff.)Google Scholar By mid-century the federal government had assumed a major role; between 1850 and 1860, for example, Congress granted about twenty million acres of public lands as subsidies to encourage construction of railroads, especially to the Pacific Coast (ibid., p. 326). In the 1860 presidential campaign the platforms of all political parties endorsed the principle that the federal government should promote the opening of the Far West by sponsoring railroad construction. (See Porter, K. [ed.], National Party Platforms [New York, 1924], pp. 52–58.Google Scholar)

¹³ See Coker, p. 547.

¹⁴ Democracy in America, Vol. 1, p. 245Google Scholar.

¹⁵ The New Nationalism (New York, 1910), pp. 23–24Google Scholar; also note pp. 241 ff. This idea is not of twentieth-century vintage. In the famous Charles River Bridge case (1837), Chief Justice Taney asserted: “While the rights of private property are sacredly guarded, we must not forget, that the community also have rights, and that the happiness and well-being of every citizen depend upon their faithful preservation” (11 Peters 420). Cf. Coker, F. W., “American Traditions Concerning Property,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 30, pp. 1–23 (Feb., 1936)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶ Indicative of this is the power of eminent domain, provided for in the United States Constitution (Amendment V) and in state constitutions. Indeed, as Professor Coker has observed: “Private property is itself a highly collectivistic institution, depending for its existence upon very substantial restraints, rigorously applied by the organized force of the community, upon individual freedom” (Recent Political Thought, p. 559).

¹⁷ The millions of dollars invested in public forests, parks, highways, and institutions testify that the American ideal of private ownership of property does not preclude public ownership when Americans deem that policy advisable. The postal system is an obvious example of public ownership and operation. When the Republic was formed, one need was for a system of mail communication which would be both reliable and inexpensive. Private enterprise had not responded during the days of the Confederation to such an unprofitable undertaking as providing postal service, and local and state governments were incompetent to set up a national system. In the same year that the Constitution was adopted, the federal government established the United States Postal System; in 1789 Samuel Osgood was appointed the first Postmaster General (though under the Articles of Confederation there had likewise been such an office). Since then the functions of the Post Office Department have steadily expanded, as private and state agencies have failed to serve the needs of the American people for inexpensive and reliable postal service.

¹⁸ The Constitution of the State of Indiana is illustrative; in 1816 it provided: “Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout the community, being essential to the preservation of free government; it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all suitable means, moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement; and to provide, by law, for a general and uniform system of Common Schools, wherein tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to all” (Art. 8, Sec. 1). Actually the history of free public education in America began with the earliest years of the Massachusetts Bay colonies when, for the purpose of frustrating the activities of “the old deluder Satan,” the Massachusetts School Law of 1642 imposed upon the towns the duty of providing all children with an opportunity to learn to read and write; in 1647 the law was strengthened and became a model for other colonies to follow. More than a century later the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the organic act for the territory around the Great Lakes, asserted that “schools and means of education shall forever be encouraged.” This was no empty proclamation, for as their constitutions were accepted and they were admitted to the Union, the new western states did provide for free public education. See, for example, “Public Instruction in Michigan,” The United States Magazine and Democratic Review, Vol. 2, pp. 370–81 (July, 1838)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Democracy in America, Vol. 1, p. 91Google Scholar. In 1903 Professor Turner echoed de Tocqueville's remark: “By its system of public schools, from the grades to the graduate work of great universities, the West has created a larger single body of intelligent plain people than can be found elsewhere in the world” (The Frontier in American History, pp. 266–67).

²⁰ By 1850 there were fifteen state universities, mostly in the West and South. The Morrill Act of 1862 granted thirteen million acres of public lands to states for the institution and promotion of agricultural and mechanical colleges.

²¹ In the first decade of the century, Maryland had led the way by proclaiming universal manhood suffrage in its amended Constitution; other states, notably the new western states (of the Mississippi Valley), followed in such course that by 1830 the “democratic franchise” had become the rule. See Porter, K., History of the Suffrage in the United States (Chicago, 1918)Google Scholar.

²² Democracy in America, Vol. 1, pp. 173, 245Google Scholar.

²³ See Hovell, M., The Chartist Movement (2d ed., London, 1925)Google Scholar, and “Chartism,” Ch. 13 in Wallas, G., The Life of Francis Place (3d ed., London, 1918), pp. 353–84Google Scholar.

²⁴ “The most important effect of the frontier has been the promotion of democracy.” And: “The rise of democracy as an effective force in the nation came in with the Western preponderance under Jackson and William Henry Harrison, and it meant the triumph of the frontier” (The Frontier in American History, pp. 30–31). In his The Age of Jackson (Boston, 1946)Google Scholar, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. apparently endeavors to take a position contrary to Turner's. Curiously, in his book he does not discuss Turner's thesis nor in his bibliography does he list any of Turner's more important writings. Yet Schlesinger asserts: “The legend that Jacksonian democracy was the explosion of the frontier, lifting into government some violent men filled with rustic prejudices against big business, does not explain the facts, which were somewhat more complex. Jacksonian democracy was rather a second American phase of that enduring struggle between the business community and the rest of society which is the guarantee of freedom in a liberal capitalist state.” Jacksonian democracy, he contends, was basically a “revival of Jeffersonianism, but the Jeffersonian inheritance was strengthened by the infusion of fresh influences; notably the anti-monopolistic tradition, formulated primarily by Adam Smith …; and the pro-labor tradition, formulated primarily by William Cobbett ….” Thus, Schlesinger concludes: “The basic Jacksonian ideas came naturally enough from the East.” (See Ch. 24, “Jacksonian Democracy as an Intellectual Movement,” pp. 307–308.) The influence of Jefferson on the Jacksonian democrats and their opposition to “monopoly” have long been recognized, though in what sense anti-mercantilist thinking amounted to a “fresh” influence is far from clear; the Jeffersonians frequently refer to Adam Smith, the Jacksonians rarely do. What is original with Schlesinger is his contention that the “pro-labor” ideas of the East, rather than the pro-agrarian ideas of the West, influenced Jacksonian democracy. At no point, however, does he demonstrate either (1) that pro-labor ideas of the East influenced Jacksonian thought or practice, or (2) that pro-agrarian ideas of the West did not. As Blau, Joseph L., editor of a volume entitled Social Theories of Jacksonian Democracy; Representative Writings of the Period, 1825–1850 (New York, 1947)Google Scholar, points out in a bibliographical note (p. vi), Schlesinger errs in equating the Jacksonian “laboring class” with present-day industrial “wage workers.” (Incidentally, in that collection of extracts from writings of twenty-six “Jacksonian democrats,” there is no reference to the English journalist, Cobbett). In explaining the “more complex facts,” Schlesinger confines himself to isolated statements and actions of certain minor Massachusetts figures (mainly lawyers in the course of their professional duties) of dubious Jacksonian pedigree. (See Ch. 26, “Jacksonian Democracy and Industrialism,” pp. 334–49.)

²⁵ According to Turner, in the thought of Thomas Jefferson, the founder of America's first tax-supported state university as well as the father of “agrarian democracy,” it was the frontier influence that was most significant. And it was Henry Clay of Kentucky who advanced a comprehensive program for national development, his “American system,” the two key points of which were internal improvements and protective tariff. The newly-founded Republican Party selected Abe Lincoln of Illinois as its presidential candidate, and its 1860 platform called for congressional appropriations for river and harbor improvements and legislation to encourage construction of railways to the Pacific Ocean. It was Lincoln's administration that enacted, in the space of three months, the Homestead Act, the Pacific Railway Act, and the Morrill Act. “The Greenback movement and the Granger movements,” says Turner, “were appeals to government to prevent what the pioneers thought to be invasions of pioneer democracy” (The Frontier in American History, p. 276). The Grangers, “alarmed over the future of the free democratic ideal,” turned to legislation as the method of collective action; they were responsible for the many state laws providing for the regulation of railroads to protect the public interest.

²⁸ Porter, , National Party Platforms, pp. 166–69Google Scholar.

²⁷ From a speech delivered in Philadelphia, February 12, 1912, at the annual banquet of the Periodical Publishers' Association; reprinted in LaFollette's Autobiography: A Personal Narrative of Political Experiences (6th ed., Madison, Wis., 1913)Google Scholar; see pp. 790 ff.

²⁸ The New Nationalism, p. 145.

²⁹ “Our basic problem in the twentieth century,” he declared, “is to see that the marvelously augmented powers of production bequeathed to us by the nineteenth century be made to administer to the needs of the many rather than be exploited for the profit of the few” (p. 126). In view of this problem, he held that “It is indispensably necessary, in order to preserve to the largest degree our system of individualism, that there should be effective and organized collective action” (p. 128). To solve the problem, he believed in “steadily using the power of government to secure economic democracy as well as political democracy” (pp. 239–40). For, he pointed out, “it has become entirely clear that we must have government supervision of the capitalization, not only of public service corporations, including, particularly, railways, but of all corporations doing an interstate business” (p. 14). Like all American democrats, he assumed that “the object of government is the welfare of the people” (p. 31). “Now to preserve the general welfare, to see to it that the rights of the public are protected, and the liberty of the individual secured and encouraged consistent with this welfare, and curbed when it becomes inconsistent there-with,” he argued, “it is necessary to invoke the aid of government. There are points in which this government aid can best be rendered by the states; that is, where the exercise of states' rights helps to secure popular rights; and where this is true … I believe in states' rights. But there are large classes of cases where only the authority of the national government will secure the rights of the people; and where this is the case, I am a convinced and thoroughgoing believer in the rights of the national government”(p. 54).

³⁰ In a well-known little book published in 1922, Hoover defined the problem as he saw it: “To curb the forces in business which would destroy equality of opportunity and yet to maintain the initiative and creative faculties of our people are the twin objects we must attain” (American Individualism [Garden City, 1929], p. 54Google Scholar). Some years later he laid down the essentially collectivist principle that “the nation must protect its people from catastrophes beyond their control.” “The economically successful,” he argued, “must carry the burdens of social improvement for the less fortunate by taxes or otherwise. Child labor, health, sweated labor, old age, and housing are but part of our social responsibilities” (Addresses upon the American Road, 1933–1938 [New York, 1938], p. 295Google Scholar. These remarks are from an address entitled “Economic Security and the Present Situation,” delivered at Chicago, December 16, 1937; for the full address, see pp. 287–99). Furthermore: “The growing recognition of public responsibility in the advancement of general welfare requires new commitments of government” (The Challenge to Liberty [New York, 1934], p. 145)Google Scholar. “We have developed State and Federal regulation of competition through anti-trust laws by which we compel competition. … In the semi-monopolies, we have developed the regulation of rates, services, or profits in canals, turnpikes, railroads, ferries, electric power, gas, water, telegraphs, telephones, radios, and others. We have regulated the businesses engaged in public trusts such as banks, insurance companies, building and loan associations, and others. We have required purity and proper presentation of goods. We have established the protection of health, and conditions of labor of men, women, and children. We have insisted on fair competitive action, and acted in a score of other directions. Such regulation must be periodically revised but the long history of these advances demonstrates that Democracy can remain master in its own house” (ibid., pp. 158–59).

³¹ The Challenge to Liberty, p. 106.

³² On Our Way (New York, 1934), p. 166Google Scholar. And, like Herbert Hoover and other empirical collectivists, Franklin Roosevelt asserted: “It is up to the government to maintain its most sacred trust, the welfare of its citizens”; in the field of economic enterprise “such a trust requires the regulation of such balance among productive processes as will tend to a stabilization of the structure of business. That such balance ought to be maintained by cooperation within business itself goes without saying. It is my hope that interference of government to bring about such a stabilization can be kept at a minimum, limiting itself perhaps to a wise dissemination of information” (Looking Forward [New York, 1933], p. 243Google Scholar).