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Authority and Community: The Contributions of Carl Friedrich, Yves R. Simon, and Michael Polanyi*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Clarke E. Cochran
Clarke E. Cochran*
Affiliation:
Texas Tech University
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Abstract

The problem of authority has a practical and a theoretical side. Practically, the decline of authority contributes to the crisis of legitimacy in contemporary governments and to difficulties in the practice of morality. Theoretically, authority is often confused with power, force, or coercion. Thus, it is viewed with suspicion. The thesis of this paper is that authority is not a form of power; rather, it transforms power. Like power, force, and coercion, authority is directive, but it is so in quite a different way. An examination of the concept of authority in three very different theorists – Carl Friedrich, Yves R. Simon, and Michael Polanyi – reveals that a sound concept of authority must be rooted in community as a system of shared beliefs, experiences, and traditions and in transcendent standards referred to by such beliefs, experiences, and traditions. Authority is that which directs a community to its proper end.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 71 , Issue 2 , June 1977 , pp. 546 - 558
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1977

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Footnotes

*

Revised version of a paper presented at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, November 7–9. Thanks for stimulating comments and criticisms are due to Stuart C. Gilman, Ronald J. Terchek, and especially Karen Johnson.

References

1 “Legitimacy in the Modern State,” in Power and Community, ed. Green, Philip and Levinson, Sanford (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), p. 279 Google Scholar.

2 “Legitimacy in the Modern State,” esp. pp. 285–288, 297–301, 311–315. See also Lowi, Theodore, The End of Liberalism (New York: Norton, 1969), passim, esp. pp. 93–97, 287–314 Google Scholar, for a discussion and examples of the crisis of public authority.

3 Simon, Yves R., “Beyond the Crisis of Liberalism,” in Essays in Thomism, ed. Brennan, Robert E., O. P., (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942), p. 273 Google Scholar. For a discussion of this point as it appears in Hegel, see Shklar, Judith N., “Hegel's Phenomenology: The Moral Failures of Asocial Man,” Political Theory, 1 (August, 1973), 259–286 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Tocqueville meant something like this when he discussed the individualism spawned by democracy. “Individualism is a mature and calm feeling, which disposes each member of the community to sever himself from the mass of his fellow-creatures, and to draw apart with his family and his friends; so that, after he has thus formed a little circle of his own, he willingly leaves society at large to itself.” Democracy in America, trans. Reeve, Henry (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, n.d.), part II, book 2, chap. 2, p. 104 Google Scholar.

5 Salkever, Stephen G., “Virtue, Obligation, and Politics,” American Political Science Review, 68 (March, 1974), 78–92 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Barry, Brian, “Liberalism and Want-Satisfaction: A Critique of John Rawls,” Political Theory, 1 (May, 1973), 152–153 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 Salkever, p. 90.

7 See Simon, Yves R., The Tradition of Natural Law, ed. Kuic, Vukan (New York: Fordham University Press, 1965), p. 96 Google Scholar; and Friedrich, Carl J., Man and His Government (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 138–144 Google Scholar, and “The Concept of Community in the History of Political and Legal Philosophy,” in Nomos II: Community, ed. Friedrich, (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959), pp. 3–24 Google Scholar.

8 The Sociological Tradition (New York: Basic Books, 1966), pp. 47–48 Google Scholar.

9 Tradition, p. 96.

10 Friedrich, Carl J., An Introduction to Political Theory (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 126 Google Scholar. For elaboration of the distinction see Man and His Government, chap. 9; Tradition and Authority (New York: Praeger, 1972), chap. 9Google Scholar, and Introduction to Political Theory, pp. 122–124. Similar criticisms of the idea of authority as a particular form of power may be found in Grazia, Sebastian de, “What Authority is Not ,” American Political Science Review, 53 (June, 1959), 321–331 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nisbet, Robert A., “The Twilight of Authority,” The Public Interest, No. 15 (Spring, 1969), pp. 3–9 Google Scholar and “The Nemesis of Authority,” The Intercollegiate Review, 8 (Winter–Spring, 1972), 3–13 Google Scholar, and Arendt, Hannah, “What is Authority?” in Between Past and Future (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1963), pp. 97–106 Google Scholar.

11 Cf. Friedrich, , Man and His Government, pp. 224–226 Google Scholar; Tradition and Authority, pp. 46–48; “Authority, Reason, and Discretion,” in Nomos I: Authority, ed. Friedrich, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 34 Google Scholar, and The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 203 Google Scholar.

12 Man and His Government, p. 219.

13 Man and His Government, p. 222; see also pp. 220–221, and Tradition and Authority, pp. 51–56.

14 Man and His Government, 224. Cf. Tradition and Authority, chap. 5.

15 Tradition and Authority, p. 62. For Friedrich's concept of community see his “The Concept of Community”; also Man and His Government, pp. 38–44, 136–154, and Introduction to Political Theory, pp. 90–104.

16 Tradition and Authority, p. 58. For a similar view, Winch, Peter, “Authority,” in Political Philosophy, ed. Quinton, Anthony (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 97–111 Google Scholar.

17 Tradition and Authority, pp. 16–18, 65.

18 Ibid., chap. 2. An even stronger emphasis on the necessity for tradition grounding authority is made by Arendt, , Between Past and Future, pp. 91–141 Google Scholar. See also Michael Oakeshott's conception of politics as attending to the traditional arrangements of a community, Rationalism in Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1962), esp. pp. 111–136 Google Scholar. See also Winch, pp. 107–109.

19 Mark 1:22.

20 Man and His Government, pp. 228–229.

21 Ibid., p. 230; see also pp. 260–261;Philosophy of Law, pp. 188–191, and Transcendent Justice (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1964)Google Scholar.

22 For Friedrich's direct discussion of values see Man and His Government, pp. 62–69 and Tradition and Authority, pp. 62–65.

23 Cf. Man and His Government, p. 227 and Tradition and Authority, p. 49. Parallel is Friedrich's argument that ideology may legitimize rule, thus making it possible for Hitler and Stalin (and many other tyrants) to exercise legitimate rule as well as authority. See Tradition and Authority, pp. 94–97.

24 Introduction to Political Theory, p. 129. For a more general criticism of Friedrich's theory of politics, see Crosby, Richard W., “Carl Friedrich's Empirical Theory of Politics,” The Political Science Reviewer, 3 (Fall, 1973), 183–200 Google Scholar.

25 Simon was concerned with the concept of authority for the last twenty years of his life. See his Nature and Functions of Authority (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1940)Google Scholar and A General Theory of Authority, with an Introduction by A. Robert Caponigri (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962). See also The Philosophy of Democratic Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, 1961), chap. 1Google Scholar. (All quotations are firom the 1961 paperback edition.)

26 Nature and Functions of Authority, p. 7. The “person” may be the whole community acting as a public person or particular individuals in official positions.

27 Ibid., pp. 5–6; one of the best statements of this position is Wolff, Robert Paul, In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper & Row, 1970)Google Scholar.

28 Philosophy of Democratic Government, pp. 4–6 and chap. 1, passim; General Theory of Authority, pp. 21–22; Freedom and Community, ed. O'Donnell, Charles P. (New York: Fordham University Press. 1968), pp. 49, 51 Google Scholar.

29 Ibid., pp. 7–19.

30 “Common Good and Common Action,” Review of Politics, 22 (April, 1960), 203 Google Scholar.

31 Philosophy of Democratic Government, pp. 29–30. This is so because prudential judgments do not enjoy necessary intersubjectivability (see pp. 27–29).

32 Ibid, pp. 31–33. Simon has considered the question of deficiency, perfection, and choice at greater length in Freedom and Community, esp. chaps. 1–2 and in Freedom of Choice, ed. Wolff, Peter (New York: Fordham University Press, 1969), chap. 3Google Scholar.

33 Ibid., p. 33; see also “Common Good and Common Action,” pp. 210–223 for a slightly different statement of the argument just presented.

34 “Common Good and Common Action,” p. 225; see also Philosophy of Democratic Government, p. 39.

35 “Common Good and Common Action,” p. 227; also Philosophy of Democratic Government, pp. 41–42.

36 “Common Good and Common Action,” p. 228; also Philosophy of Democratic Government, pp. 47–48. For other functions of authority not directly relevant to political society, see Philosophy of Democratic Government, pp. 59–62, n. 23 and General Theory of Authority, chaps. 3–5.

37 Philosophy of Democratic Government, p. 64; also “Common Good and Common Action,” p. 210. Simon systematically considered community and common good in three places: Philosophy of Democratic Government, pp. 48–50, 62–66; Tradition of Natural Law, pp. 86–109; “Common Good and Common Action,” pp. 202–244. See General Theory of Authority, chap. 2 and Freedom and Community, pp. 103–108, 130–144.

38 “Common Good and Common Action,” p. 207; also Tradition of Natural Law, pp. 88–89.

39 Tradition of Natural Law, pp. 91, 105–107. This position is identical to Maritain's. For an elaboration of it, see Maritain, Jacques, Person and The Common Good, trans. Fitzgerald, John J. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947)Google Scholar.

40 Philosophy of Democratic Government, p. 49; also “Common Good and Common Action,” pp. 208–210 and Freedom and Community, pp. 103–109.

41 Tradition of Natural Law, pp. 95–96; also General Theory of Authority, pp. 125–126.

42 Cf. Freedom and Community, pp. 103–109, esp. 107–108. The relationship between liberty and authority is beyond the scope of this paper. For a comprehensive treatment, see Kuic, Vukan, “The Contribution of Yves R. Simon to Political Science,” The Political Science Reviewer, 4 (Fall, 1974), 55–104 Google Scholar.

43 General Theory of Authority, p. 145. All of chap? 4 of this work is an explanation of this point.

44 General Theory of Authority, p. 84.

45 Ibid., p. 92.

46 The results of this inquiry are expressed primarily in Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1964)Google Scholar. Other major statements are: Science, Faith, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964)Google Scholar, The Study of Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963)Google Scholar, and The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966)Google Scholar. My analysis in the following pages owes much to discussions over a number of years with James L. Wiser. See his “Michael Polanyi: Personal Knowledge and the Promise of Autonomy,” Political Theory, 2 (February, 1974), 77–78 CrossRefGoogle Scholar and “Political Theory, Personal Knowledge, and Public Truth,” Journal of Politics, 36 (August, 1974), 661–674 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

47 This exposition follows Personal Knowledge, pp. 55–131, 255–298; Tacit Dimension, pp. 3–25, and Study of Man, pp. 11–70.

48 For elaboration, see Wiser, , “Political Theory,” pp. 668–671 Google Scholar, and “Michael Polanyi,” pp. 79–80.

49 Personal Knowledge, p. 305. Emphasis in original.

50 Polanyi defends himself against this charge in Personal Knowledge, pp. 299–324; see also pp. 104, 132–150.

51 “Political Theory,” pp. 663–664.

52 Polanyi, , Tacit Dimension, p. 61 Google Scholar.

53 Polanyi, , Personal Knowledge, pp. 53–55, 374–380 Google Scholar; see also Wiser, , “Michael Polanyi,” pp. 82–84 Google Scholar.

54 Polanyi, , Personal Knowledge, p. 203 Google Scholar.

55 Ibid., p. 207.

56 Ibid., pp. 210–212. Cf. Tacit Dimension, pp. 53–92.

57 Cf. Tacit Dimension, pp. 61, 72–74; Personal Knowledge, pp. 53, 163–164, 207–209; Science, Faith, and Society, chap. 2.

58 Wiser, , “Michael Polanyi,” p. 84 Google Scholar. Emphasis in original.

59 Science, Faith, and Society, p. 16.

60 Ibid., p. 16.

61 Socrates' claim is evident in the Apology, Gorgias, and Republic; Cf. Voegelin, Eric, Order and History, Vol. III: Plato and Aristotle (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), esp. pp. 7–10, 36–45, 48–70 Google Scholar. See also Wiser, , “Political Theory,” pp. 664–668, 674 Google Scholar for the two aspects of authority.

62 For Socrates, see previous note; for Christ, Luke 20:2–8 and esp. Mark 1:21–28.

63 Cf. Hendel, Charles W., “An Exploration of the Nature of Authority” in Friedrich, (ed.), Nomos I, pp. 3–27, esp. p. 14Google Scholar.

64 Pace the accusation of Salkever, , “Virtue, Obligation, and Politics,” p. 90 Google Scholar.

65 On this distinction see especially Simon, , Philosophy of Democratic Government, pp. 37–38 Google Scholar.

66 Cf. Wiser, “Political Theory” and “Michael Polanyi”; also Schaar, , “Legitimacy in the Modern State,” pp. 294–295 Google Scholar.

67 This may be the place to point out that the theory of authority I have elucidated is not hostile to freedom. Friedrich, Simon, and Polanyi all emphasize the interdependence of freedom and authority. Since the exploration of this interdependence would require a larger compass, I have chosen not to consider it in this paper.

68 For connections between ceremony, ritual, tradition, and community see Cox, Harvey, The Feast of Fools (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), passim CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Stein, Maurice R., The Eclipse of Community (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), chap. 10Google Scholar.

69 An exciting recent attempt to work with the idea of community is Tinder, Glenn, “Transcending Tragedy: The Idea of Civility,” American Political Science Review, 68 (June, 1974), 545–560 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tinder, , “In Defense of Pure Tolerance,” Polity, 6 (Summer, 1974), 446–468 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Tinder, , Tolerance: Toward a New Civility (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1976)Google Scholar.