¹ Professors R. Jackson Wilson, Daniel Aaron, Cecelia Kenyon, Murray Kitely, Guenter Lewy and Malcolm Smith all read an earlier version of this essay and offered criticisms. Professors Wilson and Aaron were especially helpful. Naturally, the errors which remain are mine.

² (Boston, 1966).

³ As with many other of his statements, Moore occasionally hedges (508, for example), but this is the overall thrust of his analysis.

⁴ The general argument is summarized on pp. xv–xvi, 413–414. On the obsolescence of bourgeois capitalism and Russian Communism, see pp. 507–508, 483. On Moore's hopes for China, see p. 230. I will add additional references in the sections on specific countries.

⁵ For that matter the analysis seems inapplicable to those countries in Southeast Asia, e.g., Thailand, which, for all practical purposes, lack a landowning gentry. On Thailand see: Wilson, David A., Politics in Thailand (Ithaca, 1962), p. 52Google Scholar; Mosel, James, “Thai Administrative Behavior” in Siffin, W. J. (ed.) Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration (Bloomington, 1959), pp. 283–288Google Scholar; and Insor, D., Thailand (New York, 1963), pp. 44–45Google Scholar.

⁶ Moore does mention the improvement of irrigation, but downplays its importance. Indeed the major purpose of improving irrigation was to increase the possibilities of exploitation. (169.) He also argues that its role in the maintenance of order was unimportant, given the place of the clans in administering local justice. Besides, when large scale banditry did develop it was largely the consequence of exploitation by the ruling class. What evidence, one wonders, is relevant to the question of measuring exploitation? Moore, in effect, has it both ways. If a ruling class does literally nothing, it is clearly parasitic, but whatever functions it performs are performed for bad reasons and it is still parasitic.

⁷ See Ho, Ping-ti, Studies on the Population of China, 1368–1953 (Cambridge, 1959), pp. 268–270CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Moore cites Ho several times but appears to deny that living standards were rising for the population as a whole. (Origins, 179.) Interestingly enough, however, he does argue, at least indirectly, that China was better off than India in this regard, and Japan was better off than China (Origins, 330–333 and passim.).

⁸ Ho, op. cit., 269. Reischauer, Edwin O. and Fairbank, John K., East Asia: The Great Tradition (Boston, 1958), I, p. 393Google Scholar.

⁹ Compare, for example, Origins, 10, 214, 241 with Origins, 12, 194.

¹⁰ In “Counterrevolutionary America,” Commentary (04, 1967), pp. 3–10Google Scholar.

¹¹ See Bendix, Reinhard, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Garden City, 1962)Google Scholar.

¹² Bendix, op. cit., 53.

¹³ See, for example: Hoselitz, Bert F., “Entrepreneurship and Capital Formation in France and Britain Since 1700,” in National Bureau of Economic Research, Capital Formation and Economi Growth, p. 311Google Scholar; Landes, David, “French Entrepreneurship and Industrial Growth in the Nineteenth Century,” in Supple, Barry E. (ed.), The Experience of Economic Growth (New York, 1963), pp. 340–353Google Scholar; and Taylor, George V., “Non-capitalist Wealth and the Origins of the French Revolution,” American Historical Review, 72 (01, 1967), pp. 469–496CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴ Forster, Robert, “The Provincial Noble: A Reappraisal,” American Historical Review, 68 (04, 1963), p. 687CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ He cites Lawrence Stone as more or less supporting Tawney's thesis. (Origins, 15). Stone, however, specifically rejects his own previously held belief in the key role played by such factors. Indeed, he calls for the replacement of economic interpretations of the Civil War by broader sociological interpretations, and argues that other factors, including religious factors, played a key role in the conflict. See Stone, Lawrence, The Crisis of the Aristocracy (New York, 1967; Abridged edition), pp. 4, 7–9, 345–354Google Scholar.

¹⁶ See, for example, Roots, Ivan, The Great Rebellion (London, 1966), pp. 62–68Google Scholar; Prall, Stuart E. (ed.), The Puritan Revolution (New York, 1968), ix–xxiiGoogle Scholar, and Wilson, Charles, England's Apprenticeship (New York, 1965), pp. 108–140Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Plumb, J. H., The Growth of Political Stability in England (London, 1967), p. 19Google Scholar. In the 200 years before Henry VII established the Tudor dynasty, England had been ruled by twelve monarchs. Only three reigned until death overtook them. Of the remaining nine, seven were deposed, five of whom lost their lives by violence, and two went insane.

¹⁸ Root, op. cit., pp. 32–42, and passim.

¹⁹ Walzer, Michael, The Revolution of the Saints (Cambridge, 1965), p. 114Google Scholar. Roper, H. R. Trevor, “The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century,” in Aston, Trevor (ed.). Crisis in Europe (New York, 1967), pp. 99–100Google Scholar.

²⁰ Tate, W. E., The Enclosure Movement (London, 1967), pp. 143–153Google Scholar, and Wilson, op. cit., pp. 141–142.

²¹ Some of the important works on the subject include: Jones, E. L. and Mingay, G. E. (ed.), Land, Labour and Population in the Industrial Revolution (London, 1967)Google Scholar; Jones, E. L., Agriculture and Economic Growth in England 1650–1815 (London, 1967)Google Scholar; Chambers, J. D. and Mingay, G. E., The Agricultural Revolution, 1750–1850 (London, 1966)Google Scholar, Thompson, F. M. L., “The Social Distribution of Landed Property in England Since the Sixteenth Century,” Economic History Review, XIX, 3 (1966), pp. 505–517CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A classic and much earlier “revisionist” analysis is Clapham, J. H., An Economic History of Modern Britain (Cambridge, 1926), I, pp. 98–142Google Scholar. See also Van Bath, B. H. Slicher, The Agrarian History of Western Europe (London, 1963), pp. 318–321Google Scholar. The edited volumes contain some of the classic earlier studies which are the basis for much of the revisionists' case.

²² Chambers and Mingay, op. cit., pp. 91–92.

²³ Clapham, op. cit., p. 114.

²⁴ Chambers and Mingay, op. cit., pp. 92–93.

²⁵ The classic essay is J. D. Chambers, “Enclosure and Labor Supply in the Industrial Revolution,” reprinted in Jones, op. cit., pp. 94–127. A recent detailed study by Lawrence White, concludes that there is absolutely no significant relationship between enclosure and migration to the city, or between enclosure and increases in poor rates. The study was done on the basis of an analysis of all English counties, using regression analysis. See Lawrence White, “Enclosures and Population Movements in England, 1701–1831.” It will be published in a forthcoming issue of Explorations in Entrepreneurial History.

²⁶ The best summary of the data is to be found in Deane, Phyllis and Cole, W. A., British Economic Growth, 1688–1559 (Cambridge, 1967, 2nd ed.), pp. 25, 27–28, 283, 301Google Scholar, and Soltow, Lee, “Long Range Changes in British Income Inequality,” The Economic History Review, XXI (04, 1968), p. 1729Google Scholar. Needless to say the issue is still fairly controversial.

²⁷ Labrousse, C. E., La Crise de l'économie française à la fin d'Ancien Régime et au début de la Révolution (Paris, 1943), xxii–xxiiiGoogle Scholar.

²⁸ Wilson, op. cit., p. 231.

²⁹ See Deane and Cole, op. cit., p. 131 and passim.

³⁰ Hobsbawn, E. J., The Age of Revolution, 1789–1848 (New York, 1962), p. 28Google Scholar. His data is from Belgium, but one suspects that it applied equally well to England.

³¹ Tobias, J. J., Crime and Industrial Society in the 19th Century (London, 1967), pp. 22–50Google Scholar.

³² This is certainly the impression left by Thompson's, E. P.The Making of the English Working Class (New York, 1966)Google Scholar, despite his attempt to prove rather a different kind of case. See, for example, pp. 830–831. We have some hard data on this from contemporary developments. Alex Inkeles, in an intensive study of urban migrants in Chile, and other countries, argues that the adjustment from rural to urban life and to the factory is not nearly so difficult as is sometimes imagined. Indeed urban factory workers from rural backgrounds not only regard their situation as an improvement over rural conditions, but, on most indices which have been used, are more able to cope with the world. The results of Professor Inkeles' work will be published in book form in the near future.

³³ The emphasis in the quote is mine. At one point much later Moore literally brings in the kitchen sink and relates British attitudes to England's whole historical tradition including the use of unpaid justices of the peace. See Origins, 444.

³⁴ His supposed explanation actually consists of a description of the differences between English and French gentry.

³⁵ Cobban, Alfred, The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution (Cambridge, 1964), pp. 25–53Google Scholar.

³⁶ See Taylor, op. cit., and Albert Goodwin, “The Social Structure and Economic and Political Attitudes of the French Nobility in the Eighteenth Century,” in Comité International de Sciences Historiques, XII, Congrès International …, Rapports, I, (Vienna, 1965), pp. 356–367Google Scholar.

³⁷ Cobban, op. cit., pp. 54–67. See also Eisenstein, Elizabeth L., “Who Intervened in 1788? A Commentary on the Coming of the French Revolution,” American Historical Review, LXXI (10, 1965), pp. 77–103CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and the debate which followed in Volume LXXII of the same journal, pp. 497–522.

³⁸ If establishing equality before the law and a modern system of private property are the essential features of bourgeois democracy, then the restoration in Japan established a bourgeois democratic regime, something which Moore denies.

³⁹ The definitive study is Godechot, Jacques, Les institutions de la France sous la Révolution et l'empire (Paris, 1951)Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ For references on this point, see the sources cited in footnote 37. See also Cobban, op. cit., pp. 68–80, Gerschenkron, Alexander, “Reflections on Economic Aspects of Revolutions,” in Eckstein, Harry (ed.), Internal War (New York, 1964), pp. 180–204Google Scholar, and Lunham, Arthur L., The Industrial Revolution in France (New York, 1955), pp. 3–13Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Camp, Wesley D., Marriage and the Family in France Since the Revolution (New York, 1961), p. 101Google Scholar.

⁴² Marcel Reinhard, “Bilan démographique de L'Europe, 1789–1815,” Comité International, Rapports, op. cit., pp. 451–455.

⁴³ The classic study of these influences on the revolution is Mornet, Daniel, Les Origines intellectuelles de la Révolution française (Paris, 1933)Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ We may also ask why the German working class was so much more of a threat to the German bourgeoisie than the English working class was to the English middle class? Despite the rhetoric, they were not notoriously more violent. And if the relatively mild rhetoric of British working class leaders is to be explained by rising living standards, as Moore suggests, why didn't this have the same effect on German workers whose real wages almost doubled between 1870 and 1914? See Desai, Ashok V., Real Wages in Germany, 1871–1913 (Oxford, 1968), p. 36Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Sharkey, Robert, Money, Class and Party, Baltimore, 1967)Google Scholar, discusses the Reconstruction period in some detail and reviews the general literature. The book is but one of a series which have succeeded in demolishing Charles Beard's portrait of Reconstruction beyond repair. On the Tariff question see Hofstadter, Richard, “The Tariff Issue on the Eve of the Civil War,” in Nash, Gerald D., Issues in Economic History (Boston, 1964), pp. 50–55Google Scholar, and Montgomery, David, Beyond Equality (New York, 1967), pp. 64–65Google Scholar. On the bank issue see Hammond, Bray, Banking and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil War (Princeton, 1954)Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ This is the general thrust of Brock's, W. R. analysis in An American Crisis: Congress and Reconstruction, 1865–67 (New York, 1966)Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ Jordan, Winthrop D., White Over Black (Chapel Hill, 1968)Google Scholar. Jordan proves fairly conclusively that negative attitudes toward Africans preceded the establishment of slavery, and were a key factor justifying it in the minds of English settlers.

⁴⁸ See the discussion in Cash, W. J., The Mind of the South (New York, 1941), pp. 31–43Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ Berwanter, Eugene H., The Frontier Against Slavery (Urbana, 1967)Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Donald, David, Lincoln Reconsidered (New York, 1961), pp. 19–36Google Scholar.

⁵¹ On the relative position of the North and South see Peter d'A., Jones, The Consumer Society (Baltimore, 1965), pp. 127–128Google Scholar. That the South faced a crisis of which this factor was part, is pointed out by Genovese, Eugene D., The Political Economy of Slavery (New York, 1967)Google Scholar. Nevins certainly implies that this was one of the reasons for the militancy of at least some Southerners. See the selection from his Ordeal of the Union, Vol. I, in Rolywine, Edwin C., The Causes of the American Civil War (Boston, 1961), pp. 200–216Google Scholar.

⁵² Indeed Woodward himself lists this as the key factor in the compromise. See Woodward, C. Vann, Reunion and Reaction (Boston, 1951), pp. 13–14Google Scholar.

⁵³ Sharkey, op. cit., points out the difficulty of uncovering a unified capitalist versus agrarian or worker position during the period. He is supported in this by Montgomery, op. cit., and linger, Irwin, The Greenback Era (Princeton, 1964)Google Scholar. Both of the latter stress the importance of ideological as well as economic variables.

⁵⁴ See Brock, op. cit., especially pp. 274–304. See also Hirshon, Stanley P., Farewell to the Bloody Shirt (Bloomington, 1962)Google Scholar, and Stampp, Kenneth M., The Era of Reconstruction (New York, 1966), especially pp. 186–215Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ Moore is a little more cautious. He points out that the Kuomintang resembled European Fascism in a number of interesting ways. However, the general thrust of his argument is clear.

⁵⁶ According to Rhoads Murphey, large cities were proportionately more numerous in China than in Europe until the nineteenth century, and until the eighteenth century urbanism may have been higher. He argues that as much as a quarter or more of the population lived in towns and cities of more than 2500 population and perhaps 10 or 15 per cent in cities over 10,000. Most cities or towns of more than 5,000 had well defined commercial or manufacturing districts, and special areas for each important enterprise. These only represent educated guesses, but I gather that the order of magnitude is accepted as correct by most scholars in the field. See, “The City as a Center of Change; Western Europe and China,” Annals of the Association of Geographers, LIV (1954), p. 354Google Scholar. Incidentally, in dealing with Japan, Moore drops the requirement of “moderately diffused and increasing prosperity.” The key factors in Japan were peace and luxurious display on the part of the nobility (Origins, 234–235.)

⁵⁷ Wright points out first that there were good economic arguments against increasing the tax on land, and, second, that there were other mechanisms available to the government which would not have alienated any major economic groups, but which it did not use. See Wright, Mary C., The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism (Stanford, 1957), pp. 169, 186, 193Google Scholar. Moore and I must have derived a different meaning from the text, for he cites almost the same pages. Wright does not deny that the regime was limited in its power by various interests. The real question, however, is the relation between interest and ideology.

⁵⁸ Levy, Marion J. Jr., “Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan,” in Kuznets, Simon (ed.), Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan (Durham, 1955), p. 523Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ For industrial growth during the period see Chang, J. K., “Industrial Development of Mainland China 1912–1949,” Journal of Economic History, 27 (03, 1967), 56–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Professor Chang, develops his argument more fully in a new book, Industrial Development in Pre-Communist China (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969)Google Scholar. For a discussion of the efforts of the Kuomintang and the difficulties they faced see Fairbank, Reschauer and Craig, op. cit., II, pp. 691–704. Not all of the latter were of their own making.

⁶⁰ Jacoby, Neil H., U.S. Aid to Taiwan (New York, 1966), pp. 81–82Google Scholar.

⁶¹ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, op. cit., Michael, Franz H. and Taylor, George E., The Far East in the Modern World (New York, 1956), p. 409Google Scholar.

⁶² Tsou, Tang, America's Failure in China (Chicago, 1963), p. 77 and passimGoogle Scholar.

⁶³ It is very difficult to get a clear picture of Chiang Kai-shek. Almost all of the writing about him is heavily rhetorical whether hostile or laudatory.

⁶⁴ Revisionist analysts of the Communist revolution in China argue, contrary to Moore, that per capita food production was actually rising during the period 1900-1950; that tenancy had not increased substantially, except around a few large cities, and that the Communists established their strongest and most important bases in areas of relatively low tenancy. See Hofheinz, Roy, “The Ecology of Chinese Communist Success: Rural Influence Patterns, 1923–1945,” in Barnett, A. Doak (ed.), Chinese Communist Politics in Action (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 3–77Google Scholar. His analysis is confirmed in an exhaustive study by Dwight H. Perkins. See his Agricultural Development in China 1368–1968 (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969)Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ Compare footnote 56.

⁶⁶ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, op. cit., II, pp.513–578.

⁶⁷ The table (X) appears on page 201 of Allen's volume.

⁶⁸ Allen, G. C., A Short Economic History of Japan (London, 1962, 2nd edition), p. 116Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ One wonders who “everyone” was, given the fact, as Moore himself notes (Origins, 300), that right wing parties received only a small percentage of the vote in the 1936 elections. He fails to point out that relatively moderate pro-system parties captured the overwhelming bulk of the popular vote in 1932, 1936, and 1937, and that left wing parties were also quite small. See Scalapino, Robert. “Elections and Political Modernization in Japan,” Ward, Robert E. (ed.), Political Development in Modern Japan (Princeton, 1968), pp. 249–92Google Scholar. Since this essay was originally written, I have come across a very useful article on the subject by George M. Wilson. See his “A New Look at the Problem of ‘Japanese Fascism,’” in Comparative Studies in Society and History, X (07, 1968) 403–412Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ Allen, op cit., pp. 159, 213, 224. Indeed Japanese prosperity in the postwar period indicates that democracy and reform are quite compatible with high profits.

⁷¹ Gleason, Alan A., “Economic Growth and Consumption in Japan,” in Lockwood, William W. (ed.), The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan (Princeton, 1965), pp. 391–444Google Scholar. Gleason presents evidence which indicates that from 1890–1925 real consumption per capita rose somewhat more rapidly in Japan than in the United States. Some scholars have recently challenged the traditional picture of Japanese economic growth, claiming that living standards before the restoration were higher than is generally assumed, and, thus, subsequent growth was slower. I am in no position to come to any final conclusion on this, but Rosovsky's suggestion that the overall picture is not radically altered seems reasonable. See Rosovsky, Henry, “Rumbles in the Ricefields: Professor Nakamura vs the Official Statistics,” The Journal of Asian Studies, XXVII (02, 1968), 347–360CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷² Gleason, op. cit., pp. 402–403. In fact rice consumption per head has continued its decline in the postwar period as the Japanese have shifted to other foods, a pattern which began in the 1920's. It is this shift rather than a sudden decline in living standards which probably explains the data cited by Allen. For example Japanese consumption of meat increased 400% in the period between 1892–1896 and 1923–7. Ibid., p. 401.

⁷³ For example, Lockwood, William W., The Economic Development of Japan (Princeton, 1954), p. 76Google Scholar; Reischauer, Fairbank, Craig, op. cit., II, pp. 510–511; Lockwood, William W., “Japan,” in Rustow, D. A. and Ward, Robert E. (eds.), Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton, 1964), pp. 129–131Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ It could also be used to prove that Japanese democracy today is based on big business for the same reasons.

⁷⁵ In fact, given the population and weapons differentials which characterized the nations and the periods, it may have been rather less of a tragedy if we, as Moore seems to, take the number of people killed as our index.

⁷⁶ Basham, A. L., The Indian Sub-Continent in Historical Perspective (London, 1958)Google Scholar.

⁷⁷ The point is made by Moreland, upon whom Moore relies quite heavily, See Moreland, W. H., India at the Death of Akbar (London, 1920), p. 4Google Scholar.

⁷⁸ Morris, Morris D., “Towards a Reinterpretation of Nineteenth Century Indian Economic History,” Journal of Economic History (12, 1963) p. 609Google Scholar.

⁷⁹ Moore, in fact, suggests that one of the major reasons for the lack of development of a Hindu variant of Fascism is the fragmentation of the Hindu world along caste class and ethnic lines.

⁸⁰ To prove his case, Moore uses Dumont, Rene, Terres Vivantes (Paris, 1961)Google Scholar; Gough's essay in Marriott, McKim, Village India (Chicago, 1955)Google Scholar, and Beals, Alan R., Gopalpur (New York, 1962)Google Scholar. None of them directly support his assertion and Beals states almost the opposite on p. 82.

⁸¹ Moore loves to cite such great “truths” as: “A policy of law and order favors those who already have privileges, including some whose privileges are not very large.” (Origins, 354). To which I might reply: “A policy of violence and disorder favors those who are both aggressive and strong, including those who are just a little more aggressive than the vast majority of the people.”

⁸² Moore is very ambivalent on this question. See his essay in Wolff, Robert Paulet al., A Critique of Pure Tolerance (Boston, 1965)Google Scholar. He is ambivalent on a number of other issues as well. On the one hand he feels that men are capable of discovering scientific truths which will enable them to create a more humane society. On the other he is not sure that enough men can learn quickly enough to avoid the necessity for revolution even in advanced countries. He is not clear as to whether it is their class position, their general selfishness or their ignorance (or stupidity) which is the key variable here. In Origins he gives not a single instance of men learning from past mistakes in such a way as to act more humanely for the general welfare, and yet the implication of his chapter on India is that its leaders can learn a limited truth, i.e., the need for some form of compulsion if India is to industrialize.