¹ United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Blueprint for the Peace Race: Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1962)Google Scholar. This article is from a study prepared for the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, The Johns Hopkins University. The judgments in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or any other department or agency of the United States Government.

² Outline, Stage III, H, 3; A. Objectives, 4.

³ Outline, Stage III, B, 1.

⁴ Finer, S. E., The Man on Horseback (New York, Praeger, 1962), pp. 6–13 Google Scholar.

⁵ This conclusion is warranted by a careful reading. Indeed, no alternative interpretation seems adducible. After completion of disarmament, “The Parties … would apply to national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens those applicable measures concerning the reduction of the risk of war that had been applied to national armed forces in Stages I and II.” Outline, Stage III, F, 2. Moreover, the International Disarmament Organization “would be strengthened … to ensure its capacity … to verify….” This would be accomplished through extension of arrangements referred to. Outline, Stage III, G. Relevant provisions for Stage II simply refer to “extending and improving the measures undertaken in Stage I….” Outline, Stage II, E. Hence it is necessary here to refer only to Stage I. The measures are expressed as follows:

Specified Parties to the Treaty would give advance notification of major military movements and maneuvers to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organization. Specific arrangements relating to this commitment, including the scale of movements and maneuvers to be reported and the information to be transmitted, would be agreed. [Moreover], Specified Parties to the Treaty would permit observation posts to be established at agreed locations, including major ports, railway centers, motor highways, river crossings, and air bases to report on concentrations and movements of military forces. The number of such posts could be progressively expanded in each successive step of Stage I. Specific arrangements relating to such observation posts, including the location and staffing of posts, the method of receiving and reporting information, and the schedule for installation of posts would be agreed. (Outline, Stage I, F, 1 and 2.)

The Outline says further, in relation to Stage I: Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded and that activities limited or prohibited by the Treaty were not being conducted clandestinely would be provided by the International Disarmament Organization through agreed arrangements which would have the effect of providing that the extent of inspection during any step or stage would be related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to the Parties to the Treaty of possible violations (Outline, Stage I, G, 2, C.) …

⁶ Stern, Frederick Martin, The Citizen Army (New York, St. Martin Press, 1957), p. 4 Google Scholar.

⁷ This point seems adequately clear, notwithstanding a tendency among some to meet questions of how to fit United Nations contingents for unmeasured responsibilities by imagining the problem of force to have been obviated and the way thus opened for immaculate order. For example, one such writer predicates such a moral authority for the United Nations as to enable a force under its aegis to prevail by symbols—its efficacy in its arm bands rather than its arms. See Frye, William P., A United Nations Peace Force (New York, Oceana, 1957), p. 91 Google Scholar. The context shows this idea to have been a generalization overdrawn from the single case of the United Nations Emergency Force interposed between Israel and Egypt.

⁸ Outline, Stage III, B, 1 and 2.

⁹ A quite different set of hypotheses is employed, however, in one relevant work. The portion of nationals permissible from any one state would be limited to 3 per cent of the force. Nationals of the twelve most populous states—namely China, the Soviet Union, India, the United States, Indonesia, Pakistan, Germany, Brazil, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and Italy—would be wholly barred from service in the top command. Basing of any portion of the force in the aforementioned countries would be forbidden. Implicitly, these provisions would amount to a wholesale realignment of military capability. Militarily significant and resourceful areas would be ordained to become militarily insignificant, and vice versa. No empirical evidence to support the practicability of the proposal is adduced, however. Clark, Grenville and Sohn, Louis B., World Peace Through World Law (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2d ed., 1960), pp. xxix–xxxiiGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰ Again, note should be taken of a proposal, ibid., p. xxx, for locating “main bases … on easily defensible islands or peninsulas.” The proposal has been elaborated with a suggestion of Trinidad, Madeira, Iceland, Malta, Cyprus, Zanzibar, and Ceylon as locations. Sohn, in Larson, Arthur B., ed., A Warless World (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 5 Google Scholar. Reasons for such anxiety about security in locating a force supposed to be inherently paramount do not need to be speculated upon here. The main point of doubt concerns something else. A world peace force, if realized, would be a central reality, not a marginal and abeyant one. Of far greater apparent practicality—if such a quality may be invoked in respect of so hypothetical an exercise—is the idea of deliberately positioning such a peace force within the larger industrial countries. See Schelling, Thomas C. in Bloomfield, Lincoln P., ed., International Military Forces (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1964), p. 227 Google Scholar.

¹¹ Some readers of this part of the manuscript have suggested an alternative possibility. States participating in the disarmament arrangement might be permitted to retain control of facilities, contracting authority, patents, and so on, relevant to capacity for making war, and at the same time be subjected to restrictions which would permit making use of them only as agents of the world collectivity and providing material under-pinnings for the global peace force. The idea underlying this alternative possibility is that states would be spared thereby from impingements upon their autonomy. The idea involves a distinction without a real difference. Agency is not the same as autonomy. To fulfill the characteristics stipulated for the peace force, that force would have to be placed beyond possibility of challenge by any state. That would require placing it beyond possibility of being hamstrung by any state's withholding use of facilities or other material requirements.

¹² It seems pointless to churn at length through ideas contained in the largely fantastical literature on the subject. Essays of Schelling and Henry V. Dicks, respectively, loc. cit., pp. 212–256, are of some considerable value, however, as endeavors to come to terms with problems inherent in such an undertaking. They avoid the fallacy of assuming that the world and all factors relevant to creating such a force can be made over to suit statesmen's designs. In contrast, little of relevant value appears in Clark and Sohn, op. cit., which is interesting chiefly as an illustration of what has been called the civilian fallacy. This sort of fallacy has been aptly described by an authority in gestalt psychology. From structural similarities between one heart and another, it construes a community among hearts and over-looks the ties functionally binding a heart to a pair of lungs in a relationship infinitely closer than any conceivable between one heart and another. Köhler, Wolfgang, Gestalt Psychology (New York, Liveright, 1929), p. 351 Google Scholar, cited by Lynd, Robert S., Knowledge for What? (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1948), p. 12 Google Scholar.

¹³ This last interpretation is consistent with a ban on conscription expressed elsewhere in the Outline: “The parties … would halt all military conscription … inconsistent with the foregoing measures” which include the provision regarding supply of agreed manpower for the peace force. Outline, Stage III, B, 3.

¹⁴ The French Foreign Legion as an example might have seemed more persuasive before the French government's decision in 1961 to disband its paratrooper battalions because of their recalcitrance and potential for mutiny. In any event, the Foreign Legion is a French Foreign Legion. The members are subject to French indoctrination and authority, serve on missions ordained by the French government, and use French as their operational language. Company officers are largely French and senior officers entirely so. Some Frenchmen serve in ranks. The rest are drawn mainly from European cultures somewhat assimilated to the French. Alien members usually serve in expectation of receiving French nationality upon completion of service. All are judged and rewarded or punished according to standards authorized by the French government. Discipline, however, emphasizes rigorous punishment for strictly military infractions but is indulgent with respect to social offenses, as would be usual in a service based on a mercenary principle—that is, without high identity between the outfit and the frame of authority. Withal, desertions have been a perennial problem, as gang tendencies also have been. The Legion's suitability is limited to duties in marginal areas with high incidence of combat rather than to routine duties in metropolitan areas. See Hart, Adrian Liddell, Strange Company (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1953), passim Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Barnard, Chester, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1938), pp. 163–164 Google Scholar. Also Harbord, James G., The American Army in France (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1936), p. 259 Google Scholar. Military annals are replete with instances of units rendered actively mutinous or passively unresponsive, whereupon power of command was vitiated even though the structure of command was left intact.

¹⁶ “Military institutions are intimately bound up with the state of culture which the nation has obtained,” in the words of Rudiger von der Goltz, quoted by Nickerson, Hoffman, The Armed Horde (New York, Putnam, 1939), p. 3 Google Scholar. Literature constituting what might be called a sociology of military organization is not abundant. Stern, op. cit., Nickerson, op. cit., and Vagts, Alfred, A History of Militarism (New York, Macmillan, 1959)Google Scholar are useful, however. Two relevant points emerge from a perusal of such works: the basic and complex social character of military organization in contrast to the relatively simple technical aspect; the fallacy of thinking of military culture as a culture per se rather than as an aspect of culture normally related to a national base. Niccolò Machiavelli's insights into the national basis of military morale, though brief, are incisive. See his Discourses (New York, Random House, 1940), Bk. I, ch. xliiGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷ A reader has asked whether an army of occupation would not be in the same category. That would depend on its inherent character as a force, not on its relation to a particular scene of duty. An army of occupation, though at least formally alienated from its surroundings, is not ipso facto in the mood of feeling detached from any home-land whatever or being disposed to think of home as being the barracks. This is no less the case with troops on occupation duty accompanied by their kindred.

¹⁸ Kecskmeti, Paul, “Nuclear Absolutism,” Commentary (07, 1963), pp. 43, 47 Google Scholar.

¹⁹ See for example Dicks, loc. cit., p. 252. The author envisions a force imbued with, and motivated by, zeal for peace. He suggests the Ghurkas and the French Foreign Legion as possible prototypes. The inappositeness of these two traditional groups, with high reputations as fighting men, needs no laboring.

²⁰ This danger is dealt with, and a solution offered, by one highly reputed writer in this field: “The danger of Caesar worship may be avoided if the command of the force is entrusted, not to a single person, but to a committee of five or seven persons, all of whom preferably ought to be nationals of small nations. At the same time, to ensure the impartiality of decisions, the majority of the command group should come from the non-committed nations rather than the two major blocs.” Sohn, in Larson, op. cit., p. 5. No showing is made on the relevance of such concepts as “major blocs” and “noncommitted nations” under conditions of complete national disarmament. No links between “impartiality” and “non-committed nations” are demonstrated. No showing is made for the assumed likelihood of finding small nations to be resourceful in affording talents and experience for the intricate and subtle problems of command under the contemplated conditions. No experiential data on the efficacy of command by committee are offered. Nothing is adduced to support an assumption in favor of the appropriateness of plural command as a means of averting the perils. The passage quoted is an interesting example of how to project the future in disregard of experience.

²¹ Schelling, loc. cit., p. 233, puts the matter succinctly: unless conceived as a purely ceremonial or symbolic entity, such a force would have to have a strategy. A set of purposes and assumed missions would have to be built into the organization and reflected in its doctrine. Determining that strategy would be a central concern in world politics, because in turn that strategy would have a determinative influence on world politics.