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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
A criticism of the procedure which results in appropriations acts must proceed from some premises regarding the function of Congress and the nature and use of the budget process. This criticism is based on the assumption that it is not the function of Congress to govern, but instead: (1) to indicate wants, (2) to institutionalize the giving or withholding of consent, (3) to bring political conflicts toward resolution, (4) to provide a forum for the formation and expression of public opinion, and (5) to act as a court of final review in which the actions of the government may be scrutinized, controlled, and checked. All of these functions are thought of as being performed in the broadest policy sphere, the application of policy to particular matters being left to the executive branch. The whole function of Congress, so conceived, is to make value judgments in matters of widest concern.
Budgeting is commonly regarded as a method of setting down, item by item, the estimated component costs of an undertaking in order to arrive at an estimated total cost. At the same time, budgeting is also used as a technique for securing managerial control over expenditures; by requiring that funds be spent according to a budget, it is possible, if the budget is sufficiently itemized, to control the spender in minutest detail. While these uses of budgetary procedure are by no means excluded, it is the premise of this paper that the primary purpose of budgeting ought to be to achieve the most desirable allocation of funds among alternative uses, and over time.
1 It may be well to point out that both the trend of practice and much respectable theory support this view of the function of Congress.
According to a committee of the American Political Science Association, “there is a strong tendency, accelerated in recent times, for the initiation and formulation of new legislation to become an executive function and for Congress to limit itself to review, criticism, and amendment … there is also a tendency for Congress to restrict its lawmaking to the determination of general, guiding principles.…” The Reorganization of Congress (Public Affairs Press, Washington, 1945, pp. 13–14)Google Scholar.
Friedrich, C. J. (Constitutional Government and Politics, New York, 1937, p. 362)Google Scholar says: “The political function of representative assemblies today is not so much the initiation of legislation as the discussion and coördination of proposed legislation and the carrying on of the popular education and propaganda which is involved in that function. He favors (p. 408) “a clear division between the function of formulating a comprehensive program [budget], which properly belongs to the administrative head of the government, and the function of deliberating upon this program and readjusting it in terms of an emerging compromise over major policies of the major party, a function which properly belongs to Congress.”
In his Congressional Government (15th ed., 1900, p. 192)Google Scholar, Woodrow Wilson wrote: “Probably the best working commission would be one which should make plans for the government independently of the representative body, and in immediate contact with the practical affairs of administration, but which should in all cases look to that body for the sanctioning of those plans, and should be immediately responsible to it for their success when put into operation.”
J. S. Mill (from whom the phrase “to indicate wants,” used above is taken) omits the function of political decision-making from his classic statement: “Instead of the function of governing, for which it is radically unfit, the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which anyone considers questionable; to censure them if found condemnable, and, if the men who compose the government abuse their trust, or fulfill it in a manner which conflicts with the deliberate sense of the nation, to expel them from office and either expressly or virtually appoint their successors.” (Representative Government, Everyman's Library ed., p. 239Google Scholar). Mill favored a small, permanent commission to frame, but not to enact, laws: “The Commission would only embody the element of intelligence in their construction; Parliament would represent that of will” (p. 237).
2 Pigou formulated the problem as follows: “Resources should be so distributed among different uses that the marginal return of satisfaction is the same for all of them…. Expenditures should be distributed among battleships and poor relief in such wise that the last shilling devoted to each of them yields the same real return.” (Quoted in Key, V. O., “The Lack of a Budgetary Theory,” in this Review, Vol. 34, Dec. 1940, p. 11.Google Scholar) There is a difficulty, of course, in treating society as if it were an economic man; the writer therefore prefers “controlling social purposes” to “satisfactions,” although the theoretical difficulties remain serious.
3 Jump, W. A., “Budgetary and Financial Administration in an Operating Department of the Federal Government.” Proc. of the 28th Conf. of the Governmental Research Assoc. (1939)Google Scholar.
4 A recent (Aug. 1, 1948) New York Times article describes the process as it operated under James E. Webb: “Each agency furnishes a preliminary outline to the Budget Bureau on its program for a forthcoming year. Then the Budget Bureau works up a total program outline for the whole government. [It is working now on the program for the year starting next July 1.] Then there's an appraisal of the total program. The total is adjusted to what is considered best from an over-all standpoint, and each agency's part in the revised program is determined. Next the agencies are told how much money they can ask for and what parts of their programs best fit the whole government program. They're asked to make the best budgets they can within the limits set for them.”
5 A. W. Macmahon found that in twenty-six appropriations bills containing 1,801 items in 1941 the House increased 103 items above the Budget estimates and decreased 542. The Senate increased twenty-five per cent of the items above the House figure, with the result that the total appropriated was $55,325,771,373, as against budget estimates of $53,133,772,698. “Congressional Oversight of Administration; The Power of the Purse,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 58 (Sept., 1943), footnotes, pp. 387 and 407Google Scholar.
6 Jensen, B. F. [of Iowa], Organization of Congress, Hearings before Joint Committee on Organization of Congress, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, p. 208Google Scholar.
7 Jerry Voorhis was one of those most concerned by Congress' dependence on the bureaucrats. See his testimony, Organization of Congress, op. cit., pp. 34–35. Congress might depend very heavily upon the Budget Bureau for special service, but it has chosen not to do so. Representative Michener probably explained why when he said (ibid., p. 209) the Budget Director is “the personal representative or mouthpiece of the Administration.”
8 Congress at the Crossroads (New York, 1946), p. 254Google Scholar. See also (in Organization of Congress, op. cit., p. 845) the testimony of Robert Heller, who made a study for the National Planning Association. Heller's criticism: “At present little effort is made (a) to relate total revenue and total appropriations so that they are balanced or designedly unbalanced; (b) to analyze specific revenue measures in terms of total revenue requirements; (c) to align specific appropriation measures with a predetermined level for total appropriations; and (d) to grant real discretion to appropriations committees as regards the total amount of money to be spent, since such a large percentage is already committed by the previous passage of substantive legislation.” Heller does not explain what is inherently good in these relations among totals or how they would be used. He suggests creation of a policy committee (which he also calls a “management committee” and a “planning committee”) to furnish a mechanism for the coördination of fiscal affairs.
9 The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (Public Law 601, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess.) did actually require Congress to establish, not later than Feb. 15, a maximum for the year's appropriations. According to the New York Times of Nov. 27, 1948, Representative Clarence Cannon will press for repeal of this “futile gesture” in the 81st Congress. For an account of this experience, see Leiserson, Avery, “Coördination of Federal Budgetary and Appropriations Procedures Under the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,” National Tax Journal, Vol. 1 (June, 1948), pp. 118–126Google Scholar.
10 Lewis, Verne B. (Budgetary Administration in the United States Department of Agriculture, Public Administration Service, Chicago, 1941, p. 55)Google Scholar says that many Washington budget officers favor putting appropriations on a biennial basis to relieve “hard-pressed administrators and congressmen” and to allow for more careful review of proposals. These are the wrong reasons, of course. The traditional nature of the twelve-month period for budgeting is revealed in Perloff's, Harvey S. study, “Budgetary Symbolism,” Public Policy, Vol. II (1941)Google Scholar.
11 Chicago Sun-Times, Aug. 16, 1948.
12 According to Karl Mannheim, a series of actions is functionally rational if it is “organized in such a way that it leads to a previously defined goal, every element in this series of actions receiving a functional position and rô1e.” (Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, New York, 1948, p. 53Google Scholar.) See Simon's, Herbert discussion of fact and value, means and ends, in relation to rationality in Administrative Behavior (New York, 1948)Google Scholar.
13 Democracy in America (Knopf, ed.), Vol. 11, p. 7Google Scholar.
14 On this question, Pendleton Herring has written: “If any scientific adjustment of interests is impossible, we can at least strive for a clear view of the alternatives before us. Officials can be made to offer a program. Means can be provided for weighing the merits of different demands…. What administrative devices or institutional changes will encourage this approach?” (“The Politics of Fiscal Policy,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 47 [1938], p. 739Google Scholar.) Research into such questions will aid greatly in advancing planning theory and practice. For examples of research along three different lines (establishment of work units and standards, development of economic criteria for public spending, and definition of goals) which converge on these problems, see Ridley, Clarence E. and Simon, Herbert A., Measuring Municipal Activities (International City Managers' Association, Chicago, 1943)Google Scholar; Bunce, Arthur C., The Economics of Soil Conservation (Ames, 1942, Chaps. VIII–X)Google Scholar; and Myrdal, Alva, Nation and Family (London, 1947, Chap. VII)Google Scholar.
15 See Tugwell, R. G., “The Study of Planning as a Scientific Endeavor.” Fiftieth Annual Report of the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts, and Letters, 1948, pp. 34–48Google Scholar. The writer owes much to this and other (unpublished) work by Mr. Tugwell.
16 The feasibility of this kind of planning can readily be seen from some of the studies which have been made by the Forest Service. See the several reports under the general title “A Reappraisal of the Forest Situation,” particularly Report 1, Gaging the Timber Resources of the Untied States (1946)Google Scholar, and Report 2, Potential Requirements for Timber Products in the United States (1946). Of course the value of such planning is severely limited by the fact that there is no comprehensive national development plan. It is possible to judge from these plans how funds may best be spent on forestry, but it is not possible to judge among forestry and other competing purposes such as, for example, soil conservation or the building of additional prisons.
The use of its “long-range program” has been described by the chief of the Forest Service (R. E. Marsh, acting) in a letter (June 10, 1948) to the writer as follows:
“This program in reality constitutes a set of bench marks, a framework for the general guidance of detailed resource management, and of operational plans that are formulated by the operating arms of the Forest Service. It also serves to weld the Forest Service together as an organization in a common understanding of the basic problems and the line of action needed for their solution. It aids in an understanding of and adherence to basic policy. It is a guide for the frequent public statements by officials of the Forest Service with respect to needed action. It helps to orient our recommendations with regard to basic legislation…. Operational planning is keyed to long-term objectives largely through annual plans of work. The annual plans must consider available finances in relation to work priorities. The annual plan of work stresses certain program objectives for the current year. Our estimates of financial needs for carrying out recurrent work programs in the National Forests are based on measured work loads. The major activities are broken down into specific jobs; standards of performance are set for the jobs; and a unit time allowance determined for handling the job in an efficient manner. This unit time allowance multiplied by the number of times the job is repeated (volume of business), and in turn converted into dollars, forms the basis for financial estimates. Inasmuch as funds are inadequate to handle the full analyzed job load, priorities must be set in annual plans…. A plan for non-recurrent developmental projects such as reforestation, road construction, etc., is also prepared for each National Forest and drawn from as funds become available.”
17 An example of such a procedure is to be found in Puerto Rico. The Fourth Six-Year Financial Program for the Fiscal Years 1947–1948 to 1952–1953, submitted by the Puerto Rico Planning, Urbanizing, and Zoning Board to the 16th Legislature of Puerto Rico, March, 1947, contains income and expenditure estimates on this basis. From this budget the Puerto Rican legislators could see, for example (p. 50), that the total anticipated cost of improvements (itemized separately from construction) to first-class (itemized separately from second-class and municipal) insular roads was $36,156,000. Of this, $2,017,000 had been authorized by June 30, 1947, the start of the six-year period. The proposed expenditure for each of the six years was then given, followed by the estimate of the total that would be required to complete the planned improvements after the six-year period. Each year's items were broken down to show the anticipated source of funds: “general,” “special,” or “federal.” The example of New York City is also relevant. For an account of this, see Tugwell, R. G., “Implementing the General Interest,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 1 (Autumn, 1940)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
