¹ On the sources and nature of the strategic theoretical renaissance, see Gray, Colin S.: “The ‘Second Wave’: New Directions in Strategic Studies,” RUSI Journal, 118 (December, 1973), 35–41)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Strategic Studies and Public Policy (forthcoming), Chapter 11.

² Note the judgment in Burns, Arthur L., “Scientific and Strategic-Political Theories of International Politics,” in The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919–69, ed. Porter, Brian (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 58Google Scholar.

³ This argument permeates Gallagher and Spielmann.

⁴ See Gray, Colin S.: “The Arms Race Phenomenon,” World Politics, 24 (October, 1971), 39–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and The Soviet-American Arms Race (Farnborough, Hants., England: D. C. Heath, 1976)Google Scholar.

⁵ The pioneer statement of the promise of dialogue was Stone, Jeremy J., Strategic Persuasion: Arms Limitations Through Dialogue (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967)Google Scholar.

⁶ Smart, , “Perspectives from Europe,” in Willrich, and Rhinelander, , pp. 187, 195–196Google Scholar.

⁷ See the “ACA Policy Statement on the Vladivostok Accords,” Arms Control Today, 4 (December, 1974) 3Google Scholar.

⁸ The significance of a large disparity in missile throw-weight is debated in Nitze, Paul H., “Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente,” Foreign Affairs, 54 (January 1976), 207–232CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Lodal, Jan M., “Assuring Strategic Stability: An Alternative View,” Foreign Affairs, 54 (April 1976), 462–481CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹ See Young, Elizabeth, A Farewell to Arms Control? (London: Penguin, 1972), p. 195, fn. 51Google Scholar.

¹⁰ See the testimony of James Schlesinger in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, Hearing, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (March 4, 1974), pp. 13–14Google Scholar.

¹¹ See Hoffmann, Stanley, Gulliver's Troubles, Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 111Google Scholar.

¹² “Bureaucratic politics” may be approached through such works as Allison, Graham, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), particularly chapter 5Google Scholar; and Halperin, Morton H., Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974)Google Scholar.

¹³ See Bull, Hedley, “The Theory of International Politics, 1919–1969,” in Porter, , ed., The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919–69, pp. 48–54Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Illustrative of the divisions within the community was the (quite proper) investigation by the Operations Research Society of America of the professional quality of the operations research conducted pro and contra the ABM. See Operations Research, 19 (September, 1971). Even more revealing of animosity were the readers' letters in reply. See Operations Research, 20 (January-February, 1972), 205–246CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ See Kahn, Herman, “The Missile Defense Debate in Perspective,” in Why ABM? Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy, ed. Holst, Johan J. and Schneider, William Jr. (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon, 1969), pp. 298–290Google Scholar.

¹⁶ For example, Donald Brennan, “The Case for Population Defense,” in ibid., pp. 100–106.

¹⁷ The principal official contributions to the strategy debate are Schlesinger, James R., Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 4, 1974), pp. 3–6, 25–45Google Scholar; Schlesinger, James R., Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and 197T (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 5, 1975), pp. I-10–12, 13–17, II–1–11Google Scholar; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies; and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, Hearing, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (September 11, 1974)Google Scholar.

¹⁸ For example, see Chayes, Abram, “Nuclear Arms Control After the Cold War,” Daedalus, 104 (Summer 1975), 27Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Enthoven, Alain and Smith, K. Wayne, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961–1969 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 207–208Google Scholar. Also see Bellany, Ian, “The Essential Arithmetic of Deterrence,” RUSI Journal, 118 (March, 1973), 28–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar. EMT is a measure of the expected surface damage that should be inflicted by a number of re-entry vehicles, expressed as EMT = N.Y. 2/3. N is the number of warheads and Y is their total yield. Useful explanation may be found in Kemp, Geoffrey, Nuclear Forces for Medium Powers: Part I: Targets and Weapons Systems, Adelphi Paper 106 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1974), p. 26Google Scholar.

²⁰ Note the observation in Newhouse, p. 266. Former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger contended that, despite the rhetorical attention accorded strategic flexibility over the past decade, until the early 1970s the Department of Defense did not engage in a dedicated effort to program limited strategic use options. See Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, pp. 9, 18, 26Google Scholar.

²¹ Prominent examples of this argument may be found in Panofsky, Wolfgang K. H., “The Mutual-Hostage Relationship Between America and Russia,” Foreign Affairs, 52 (October, 1973), 109–118CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Scoville, Herbert, “Flexible MADness?” Foreign Policy, 14 (Spring, 1974), 164–177CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rathjens, George W., “Flexible Response Options,” Orbis, 18 (Fall, 1974), 677–688Google Scholar; and Kahan, Jerome H., Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1975), chapter 6Google Scholar.

²² See Gray, Colin S., “The Arms Race Is About Politics,” Foreign Policy, 9 (Winter, 1972–1973), 123–127Google Scholar.

²³ Cold Dawn, p. 9. Stability may be “a truly divine goal,” but—in common with such other divine goals as peace and order—its empirical referents and the proper path to its attainment are far from being self-evident.

²⁴ See Panofsky, , “The Mutual-Hostage Relationship Between America and Russia,” p. 113Google Scholar; and Scoville, , “Flexible MADness,” pp. 168–170Google Scholar. On the fighting retreat currently being conducted by MAD adherents, see Wohlstetter, Albert, “Threats and Promises of Peace: Europe and America in the New Era,” Orbis, 17 (Winter, 1974), 1134–1138Google Scholar.

²⁵ See Wohlstetter, Albert, “Alternative to Mass Destruction—Comments on the Addresses of Professor York and Mr. Clifford,” in Pacem in Terris III, Proceedings, Vol. II (Santa Barbara, Cal.: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1974)Google Scholar.

²⁶ A forthright assault by York upon counterforce reasoning is “Reducing the Overkill,” Survival, 16 (March/April, 1974), 70–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁷ Very much to the point are the comments and arguments in Brennan, Donald, Fashions in Military Technology Fifty Years Hence, HI-951-P (Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hudson Institute, February 12, 1968), pp. 4–7Google Scholar; and Young, , A Farewell to Arms Control? pp. 139–140Google Scholar.

²⁸ May, Michael M., Strategic Arms Technology and Doctrine under Arms Limitation Agreements, Research Monograph 37 (Princeton: Princeton University, Center of International Studies, October 1972), p. 15Google Scholar.

²⁹ See Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Jr., “The Rationale for Super-power Arms Control,” in Kintner, and Pfaltzgraff, , p. 4Google Scholar. For contrasting policy positions that share a devotion to a very technical understanding of stability, see the contributions by Richard Garwin (chapter 4) and Richard Perle (chapter 5) in Kaplan, SALT: Problems and Prospects.

³⁰ The texts of all of the SALT—and SALT-related — agreements through and including the results of the Brezhnev visit to the United States in June 1973, may be located in Willrich and Rhinelander, Appendices 1–10. A useful SALT bibliography is provided on pp. 348–354. Documentation on the Vladivostok accords is in Survival, 17 (January/February 1975), 32–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³¹ (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 1–28. Brodie attributes the question to Marshal Foch (p. 1).

³² For example, see Kolkowicz, Roman et al. , The Soviet Union and Arms Control: A Superpower Dilemma (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 34–37Google Scholar.

³³ The most notorious, or celebrated, of these leaks was the so-called “Beecher leak” of July 23, 1971. See The New York Times, July 23, 1971; Newhouse, Cold Dawn, pp. 224–225; and the testimony of Elliot L. Richardson in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger, Hearings, Part 2, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), pp. 276–277Google Scholar. A more recent example of a major leak is Latham, Aaron, “Kissinger's Bluff Is Called,” New York Magazine, 9 (April 12, 1976), 30–35Google Scholar. In this article the author claims to reveal how Kissinger negotiated very poorly indeed over cruise missiles and the Back-fire bomber during his visit to Moscow in January 1976. Strong circumstantial evidence supports Latham's case, but the absence of specified sources for SALT leaks means that they must be regarded skeptically.

³⁴ NSSM: National Security Study Memorandum; NSDM: National Security Decision Memorandum. For Kissinger's version of what Newhouse was and was not permitted to investigate from original sources (human and documentary), see Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger, Part 1, pp. 109–112; and ibid., Part 2, pp. 330–332. A very different perspective upon the access granted to Newhouse has been provided in Van Cleave's, William R. review of Cold Dawn, “The SALT Papers: A Torrent of Verbiage or a Spring of Capital Truths?”, Orbis, 17 (Winter, 1974), 1396–1401Google Scholar.

³⁵ Newhouse's former Brookings colleague, Morton Halperin, emerges as a heroic figure in the quest for arms control. Reference is made to Halperin's “sturdy arms control bias” (p. 112), to “his open aversion to ABM's in all forms” (p. 112), and to the fact that “arms control is his passion” (p. 50). Newhouse's robust, almost lyrical, approving prose suggests very strongly that arms control concern has transcended scholarly enquiry and has become ideology.

³⁶ Cold Dawn, p. 2.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 3.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 3.

³⁹ For discussion of Soviet-American asymmetries, see Kintner and Pfaltzgraff, pp. 369–371; Clemens, Walter C. Jr., The Superpowers and Arms Control (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973), pp. 35–36, 59–61Google Scholar; Van Cleave, William R., “Political and Negotiating Asymmetries: Insult in SALT I,” in Contrasting Approaches to Strategic Arms Control, ed. Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Jr. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974), pp. 10–21Google Scholar; and Colin S. Gray, The Soviet-American Arms Race, chapter 3.

⁴⁰ See Frye, Alton, “U.S. Decision Making for SALT,” in Willrich, and Rhinelander, , p. 93Google Scholar. For a good example of possible (Kissinger's) image-damaging information not made available to Newhouse, see Clemens, pp. 43–44, fn.a.

⁴¹ A fairly comprehensive statement of Paul Nitze's views on American SALT-related practices is “The Strategic Balance Between Hope And Skepticism,” Foreign Policy, 17 (Winter 1974–1975), 136–156Google Scholar.

⁴² All three works are cited fully at the beginning of this article.

⁴³ Apart from the operation of friendship networks, arms control interests now have extra-government institutional form in the Arms Control Association (ACA), while the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) has long conducted itself as an arms control lobby (for example, providing witnesses and prepared testimony for congressional hearings). Arms Control Today (monthly publication), published by ACA, was created to be both the “house journal” of the arms control community, and an effective instrument for the dissemination of the views of that community to interested outsiders.

⁴⁴ Most useful are the lists of identified gaps in current knowledge provided in Kintner and Pfaltzgraff, pp. 103, 381–382.

⁴⁵ “SALT and the Soviet Union,” pp. 101–121.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 121.

⁴⁷ Newhouse, Cold Dawn, pp. 3–4. This is very close to an assertion that “I (Newhouse has since moved “in-house,” to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) and my official friends know best, are the most expert—by definition.”

⁴⁸ See Wohlstetter, Albert, Legends of the Strategic Arms Race (Washington, D.C.: United States Strategic Institute, 1975)Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ “Comparative U.S. and Soviet Deployments, Doctrines, and Arms Limitation,” in Kaplan, , SALT: Problems and Prospects, particularly pp. 56–57Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ For example, see the optimistic prognoses given in Henry Kissinger's Press Conference in Moscow on May 26, 1972, in Senate Committee on Armed Services, Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Hearing, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972), p. 99Google Scholar.

⁵¹ In the words of Rathjens, George, “… there is not the slightest evidence that it [the Soviet Union] accepts the concept of strategic sufficiency.” In “Future Limitations of Strategic Arms,” in Willrich, and Rhinelander, , p. 230Google Scholar.

⁵² In “Comparative U.S. and Soviet Deployments, Doctrines, and Arms Limitation,” in Kaplan, , pp. 66–67Google Scholar. A clear statement to the effect that students of the Soviet Union do not understand the role of Soviet strategic doctrine vis-à-vis procurement decisions is Holloway, David, “Strategic Concepts and Soviet Policy,” Survival, 13 (November, 1971), 364–369CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵³ On the strong and very particular roots of Soviet strategic doctrine, see Lee, William T., “The ‘Politico-Military-Industrial Complex’ of the U.S.S.R.,” Journal of International Affairs, 26 (1972), 79–83, 86Google Scholar; Wolfe, Thomas W., “The Convergence Issue and Soviet Strategic Policy,” in Rand: 25th Anniversary Volume (Santa Monica, Cal.: The Rand Corporation, 1973), 137–150Google Scholar; Lambeth, Benjamin S., “The Sources of Soviet Military Doctrine,” in Comparative Defense Policy, ed. Horton, Frank B. III, Rogerson, A. S., and Warner, E. L. III (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1974), 200–216Google Scholar; and Scott, William F., Soviet Sources of Military Doctrine and Strategy (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975)Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Wyle, Frederick S., “U.S., Europe, SALT, and Strategy,” in Kaplan, , SALT: Problems and Prospects, pp. 142–143Google Scholar; Clemens, , The Superpowers and Arms Control, p. 55Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ Schlesinger, , Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and FY 197T, pp. I-13, II-7–8Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ See Burt, Richard, “The Cruise Missile and Arms Control,” Survival, 18 (January/February 1976), 10–17CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁷ On the Soviet approach to SALT, see Wolfe, Thomas W., “Soviet Approaches to SALT,” Problems of Communism, 19 (September-October, 1970), 1–10Google Scholar; Wolfe, Thomas W., “Soviet Interests in SALT,” in Kintner, and Pfaltzgraff, , pp. 21–54Google Scholar; Caldwell, Lawrence T., Soviet Attitudes to SALT, Adelphi Paper 75 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, February 1971)Google Scholar; and Ra'anan, Uri, “Soviet Decision-Making and the Strategic Balance: Some Reflections,” in Pfaltzgraff, , Contrasting Approaches to Strategic Arms Control, pp. 113–122Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ See Senate Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, The Changing American-Soviet Strategic Balance: Some Political Implications, Memorandum by Ra'anan, Uri, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972)Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ The Vladivostok accords comprise a very poor set of agreements in the longer run, for the Soviet Union. I base this judgment on the fact that the principal future questions of strategic stability are not addressed in the accords. Those questions pertain to the vulnerability of missile silos, “counterforce matching” and to political perceptions of specific imbalances. See Gray, Colin S., “SALT II and the Strategic Balance,” British Journal of International Studies, 1 (1975), 183–208CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁰ Iklé, Fred C., “Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?” Foreign Affairs, 51 (January, 1973), 267–285CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wohlstetter, Legends of the Strategic Arms Race; Wohlstetter, “Threats and Promises of Peace: Europe and America in the New Era”; Russett, Bruce, “Counter-Combatant Deterrence: A Proposal,” Survival, 16 (May/June, 1974), 135–140CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Allison, Graham, “Questions About the Arms Race: Who's Racing Whom?: A Bureaucratic Perspective,” in Pfaltzgraff, , Contrasting Approaches to Strategic Arms Control, 31–72Google Scholar.

⁶¹ A good way into the debate is via Orbis, III (Fall, 1974)Google Scholar, which contains eight articles on “the Military Balance, U.S. Strategic Forces, and the New Targeting Doctrine.”

⁶² Martin, Laurence, “Changes in American Strategic Doctrine—An Initial Interpretation,” Survival, 16 (July/August, 1974), p. 160Google Scholar.

⁶³ Schlesinger, , Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975, respectively pp. 32–41Google Scholar (MAD doctrine), 27, 43–44 (political consequences of perceived strategic imbalance). Schlesinger argued that unless the United States gives evidence of a willingness to accept the current Soviet arms race challenge, the Soviet Union will be allowed a politically advantageous measure of strategic imbalance.

⁶⁴ Schlesinger, , Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and FY 197T, pp. II-1–9Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ The rise of assured destruction in official favor may be traced through Mr.McNamara's, Posture Statements from 1964 until 1968Google Scholar. See Table I in Allison, Graham T. and Morris, Frederic A., “Armaments and Arms Control: Exploring the Determinants of Military Weapons,” Daedalus, 104 (1975), 110–111Google Scholar. Revealing in (I suspect) an unintentional way is Sanders, Ralph, The Politics of Defense Analysis (New York: Dunellen, 1973), p. 142Google Scholar. Also see Newhouse, Cold Dawn, pp. 66–68.

⁶⁶ “Superpower Postures in SALT: An American View,” p. 98.

⁶⁷ Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and FY 197T, pp. II-1–2.

⁶⁸ In “Superpower Postures in SALT: An American View,” p. 113.

⁶⁹ See Greenwood, Ted, Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975)Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ The principal SALT-related hearings were the following: Senate Committee on Armed Services, Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements; Hearings, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972)Google Scholar.

⁷¹ Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 173. A very different view is Van Cleave, , “Political and Negotiating Asymmetries: Insult in SALT I,” pp. 16–19Google Scholar.

⁷² Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, p. 383.

⁷³ “Strategic Arms Limitation: The Precedent of the Washington and London Naval Treaties,” in Kaplan, , SALT: Problems and Prospects, p. 50Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ Probably the most trenchant critique of SALT I along these lines is Brennan, Donald, “When the SALT Hit the Fan,” National Review, June 23, 1972Google Scholar; more recent analysis in a similar vein is Nitze, “Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente.”

⁷⁵ The Future of the International Strategic System.

⁷⁶ For one example of such fantasies, see Clemens' aspiration that arms control may move the super-powers from detente to entente. The Superpowers and Arms Control, p. 134.

⁷⁷ A former member of the SALT I delegation, Joseph Kruzel, has asserted that the ABM Treaty “had the dual effect of shutting off a new avenue of strategic arms competition and legitimizing the doctrine of assured destruction” in “SALT II: The Search for a Follow-On Agreement,” Orbis, 17 (Summer 1973), p. 361Google Scholar. Unfortunately, it may be argued that the Soviet Union was very interested in constraining an ABM competition because of the anticipated superiority of United States' defensive technologies.

⁷⁸ In the words of a SIPRI author: “The strategic arms race should be recognized as a malignancy and dealt with cooperatively by those responsible for it.” SIPRI Yearbook, 1973 (New York: Humanities Press, 1973), p. xixGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁹ Dr. Henry Kissinger, Press Briefing in Vladivostok, November 24, 1974, official text (mimeo), p. 7.

⁸⁰ Kissinger, Press Briefing, Nov. 24, 1974, pp. 3, 6.

⁸¹ For detail on the more important qualitative improvements that must be anticipated, see the section “New Strategic Technologies,” in Strategic Survey, 1974 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), pp. 46–50Google Scholar.

⁸² Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race.

⁸³ Fred Iklé's book with this title (New York: Praeger, 1967) serves as a devastating indictment of American negotiating practice in SALT from 1969 until 1976.

⁸⁴ Very much to the point is Zartman, I. William, “The Political Analysis of Negotiation: How Who Gets What and When,” World Politics, 26 (April, 1974), 385–399CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also see Zartman, , ed., The Analysis of Negotiation (New York: Anchor, 1975)Google Scholar; and the special issue of Journal of International Affairs, 29 (Spring, 1975)Google Scholar, “An Era of Negotiation.”

⁸⁵ An important work in this area is Horelick, Arnold L., Johnson, A. Ross and Steinbruner, John D., The Study of Soviet Foreign Policy: A Review of Decision-Theory-Related Approaches, R-1334 (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, December 1973)Google Scholar.