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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2014
In the period following World War II before the declaration of martial law in the Philippines, politics and heavy demands for patronage affected the allocation of resources, the administrative process, and personnel policies in ways inimical to the interests of businessmen and technocrats. When faced with intense competition, politicians pressed to employ growing numbers of clients and protégés in local administration. Strong political machines were better able than weak machines to ignore pressures for social services benefitting largely the lower class. The level of political mobilization and size of the lower class increased expenditures on primary education, and expenditures on intermediate and secondary education grew as the percentage of the electorate that was lower class increased. To the dismay of business interests and technocrats, “wasteful” expenditures on local administration and social services were most institutionalized and difficult to cut, while expenditures on economic improvements proved more elastic.
This is a revised version of a paper presented to the Eighth World Congress of Sociology in Toronto, August 20, 1974. Fieldwork for the project of which this paper is a part was supported by a Fulbright-Hays and London-Cornell project fellowship. I would like to thank Kay Snyder for her considerable help in data collection and her perceptive comments; the College of Public Administration of the University of the Philippines through Raul de Guzman for institutional support; The Cornell Southeast Asia Program and the Cornell Government Department for subsequent research support; and anonymous referees of the American Political Science Review for helpful comments.
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27 Laquian documents the transition in Manila “from prominent family to big businessmen, civic leaders, professional politician and ‘new-breed’ organization man” Laquian, pp. 82–87, quote p. 83. In his study of municipal officials in Capiz and Batangas, Machado also notes the growing recruitment of political professionals into politics. Machado, Kit G., “Changing Patterns of Leadership Recruitment and the Emergence of the Professional Politician in Philippine Local Politics,” Philippine Journal of Public Administration, 16 (April, 1972), 147–169 Google Scholar. See also, by the same author, “From Traditional Faction to Machine: Changing Patterns of Political Leadership and Organization in the Rural Philippines,” Journal of Asian Studies, 33 (August 1974), 523–546 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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29 Lowi, Theodore J., “American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory,” World Politics, 16 (July, 1964)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, reprinted in The Power Elite in America, ed. Crockett, Norman L. (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1970), p. 84 Google Scholar.
30 The simple correlation between the percentage of population (in chartered cities) which is college-educated and the percentage of school-aged children enrolled in private elementary and intermediate schools is .80. In 1964, the private secondary school system enrolled from 35 to 100 per cent of all secondary students, depending on the chartered city.
31 See Pacho, Arturo G., The Administration of Public Highways Program in Davao (Manila: Local Government Center, College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1969), appendix A, p. 12 Google Scholar. Since the Philippines has a surplus of literate, semi-skilled labor, business and landowning interests are not concerned to expand public primary and intermediate education, particularly nonvocational education, nor politicize public health programs. Lacking land, capital, or marketable surpluses, the poor, we feel, see greater relative benefits from cheap education and health services than from roads.
32 Huntington, p. 415.
33 For a summary of this literature, see Carmines, Edward G., “The Mediating Influence of State Legislatures on the Linkage Between Interparty Competition and Welfare Policies,” American Political Science Review, 68 (September, 1974), 1118–1124 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
34 My measure of political machines will be discussed subsequently. Political factionalism is described in Nowak and Snyder, pp. 1158 and 1159.
35 While a number of chartered cities have rural peripheries, all of the variables loading highly on this factor except “percentage of population in farming” measure poverty, not “ruralness.” Antipolo or open-pit toilets (neither of which require a central sewer system) and cheap, battery-powered portable radios are widely used in rural areas. Thus the absence of toilets and radios in such areas indicates poverty, not a lack of urban facilities such as electric power and sewers. The author will, upon request, send factor matrices for any or all of the factor scores used in this article.
36 See Nowak and Snyder, Tables 2 and 4, pp. 1156 and 1158 for the relevant factor matrices.
37 The logic and validity of using pluralities as measures of machine strength in the Philippines is examined in Nowak and Snyder, pp. 1157–1158. The current measure of machine strength is more comprehensive than that discussed in the previous article because it combines pluralities for both local and national elections.
38 Summarizing American policy literature, Hayes writes: “The extant American literature is fairly conclusive in demonstrating that levels of wealth correlate strongly with amounts expended in policy areas.” In her analysis of policy outputs in Brazilian States, Hayes uses per cent expenditures rather than per capita expenditures in different policy areas. Hayes, Margaret Daly, “Policy Outputs in the Brazilian States, 1940–1960: Political and Economic Correlates,” Sage Professional Papers, Comparative Politics Series, Series No. 01 −030, Vol. 3 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972), p. 17 Google Scholar.
39 Appropriations for the operation and maintenance of schools, for health and sanitation, and for maintenance, repair, and construction of roads could not be less than the amounts received respectively from tuition fees, municipal aids for health and sanitation purposes, and the manufactured oil allotment and motor vehicles allotment. Republic Act No. 5447 created a special education fund based on proceeds from an additional property tax and a certain percentage of the taxes on Virginia cigarettes. This fund was earmarked for uses such as the organization and operation of extension classes, elementary school buildings, repairs and construction, and teachers' salaries. See Pagtakhan-Sumilong, and Silao, Federico B., eds., A Summary of Laws and Regulations Affecting Philippine National-Local Government Relations (Manila: Local Government Center, College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1970), pp. 7 and 50–51 Google Scholar. Tied revenues in Davao City, for example, constituted on the average (1961–1969) 31 per cent of the school fund. The remaining school revenues were transferred from the General Fund. de Guzman, Raul P., et al., Report on the Davao City Government (Manila: Local Government Center, College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1970), p. 126 Google Scholar. Since secondary education was less of a “public right” in the Philippines than intermediate education (grades 5–6), the transfer of expenditures for intermediate education to the national government in 1964 increased the elasticity of local expenditures on education, and social improvements in general.
40 Sharkansky argues that as “the span between present and past expenditures increases … there is increasing opportunity for factors to enter the budgeting process that are remote from the context that surrounded the first budgeting period.” Sharkansky, Ira, The Politics of Taxing and Spending (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), p. 114 Google Scholar.
41 Other categories of expenditures include protective services, adjudication expenses, and costs of revenue collection. These categories are not used in the analysis because they are not as easily tied to particular class or political interests.
42 See Bohrnstedt, George W., “Observations on the Measurement of Change,” in Sociological Methodology, 1969, ed. Borgatta, Edgar F. and Bohrnstedt, George W. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969), pp. 113–133 Google Scholar.
43 The maximum percentage which can be spent on salaries and wages for city employees under Republic Act 4477 is as follows:
Source: Pagtakhan-Sumilong and Silao, eds., Table 2, p. 24.
44 Between 1955 and 1966 the percentage of local revenues received from the national government rose from 31.4 and 43.3 per cent, according to the Joint Legislative-Executive Tax Commission, Ninth Annual Report, Table 2, p. 33 Google Scholar. City expenditures constitute a mean of 25 per cent of total public expenditures in Philippine chartered cities ( The Joint Legislative-Executive Tax Commission, Tenth Annual Report, Table 1, p. 41 Google Scholar).
45 A more complex version of the dummy-variable procedure for time-series data (two-way rather than one-way analysis of variance) is described in some letail by Jackman, Robert W., “Political Parties, Voting, and National Integration: The Canadian Case”, Comparative Politics, 4 (July, 1972), 511–536 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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47 Marcos is the only Filipino president to have been reelected. The poor showing of Marcos-backed senatorial candidates in the 1971 off-year elections indicated that, with high inflation and rising unrest, defections from the ruling coalition were once again occurring.
48 Averch, Denton, and Koehler, pp. 97, 99, and 107.
49 Golay, Frank H., “Forward,” in The Protection and Development of Philippine Manufacturing, by Valdepeñas, Vicente B. Jr. (Manila: Ateneo University Press, 1970), p. xvi Google Scholar.
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51 The simple correlation between city size and diversity and mean revenues per capita in Philippine cities between 1961 and 1969 is .64. Larger, more economically diverse cities are also less dependent on the national government for funds than are smaller cities. For example, city size and diversity correlates −.52 with the percentage of total revenues which are from the internal revenue allotment and −.33 with the percentage of revenues from national government aids.
52 The percentage of the population registered to vote correlates −.35 with the size of the lower class in chartered cities.
53 Expenditures on mass primary education in the Philippines may be an irrational use of resources, since the rates of return to Philippine educational capital generally are not impressive. The only exception to this generalization appears at the high school level where the rate of return is impressive. Williamson, Jeffrey G. and De Voretz, Don J., “Education as an Asset in the Philippine Economy,” in Philippine Population in the Seventies, ed., Concepcion, Mercedes B. (Manila: Community Publishers, 1969), pp. 133–168 Google Scholar.
54 See Nowak and Snyder, Tables 12 and 13, pp. 1164–1165.
55 Because there were literacy requirements for voting (albeit very lax), the relationship between educational expenditures and political mobilization or voting turnout is reciprocal. Rising expenditures on education raise literacy, which increases the percentage of the population eligible to vote. In turn, the existence of more voters increases pressures for social services such as education.
56 Williamson and De Voretz, p. 165.
57 In the most urbanized cities, a division of labor occurs between affluent consumers who create garbage, scavengers who help recycle it, and garbage collectors who help dispose of it. Since garbage expands with affluence, cities with larger middle and upper classes have more garbage than other cities.
58 The simple correlation between mean level of political mobilization between 1949 and 1969 and class diversity is .50. Class diversity is computed as follows: class diversity = 1 − [percentage of working population estimated as being: (professional)2 + (administrative)2 + (in sales)2 + (in farming)2 + (in mining)2 + (in transportation)2 + (in crafts and factory operatives)2 + (in service)2 + (in stevedoring)2]. The estimates are from occupational statistics for urban populations in the provinces within which the chartered cities are located. See advanced reports for the Bureau of Census and Statistics, Census of the Philippines, 1970, Population and Housing. The formula for class diversity is adapted from Lieberson, Stanley, “Measuring Population Diversity,” American Sociological Review, 34 (December, 1969), 850–862 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
59 In his comparative study of two Philippine cities, Leichter found Bacolod City's mayoral incumbents (members of a cohesive socioeconomic, sugar-based oliĢarchy) particularly responsive to millers' and planters needs for roads. Iloilo City, governed since 1955 by a political professional lacking land and business enterprises, did not show comparable sensitivity to demands for roads. The need to build up a political base through expansion of the city administration took precedence. Leichter, Howard M., Political Regime and Public Policy: A Study of Two Philippine Cities (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1973), pp. 214–220 Google Scholar.
60 This shift need not imply a redistribution of resources. Expanding public services may simply mean offering functional replacements for services formerly provided through traditional exchange with kin and patrons. Using cross-national data and three different measures of equality, Jackman finds no support for Lenski's argument that the extension of the suffrage in itself leads to greater equality. Jackman, Robert W., “Political Democracy and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis,” American Sociological Review, 39 (February, 1974), 29–45 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In spite of growth in the percentage of Filipinos voting between 1956 and 1971, the proportion of income received by the bottom 49 per cent of the population has decreased. See Bureau of Census and Statistics, Survey of Households, Family Income and Expenditures, 1957 and 1971 Google Scholar.
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62 “Agribusiness” represents a factor score which indexes such measures as mean employment in mining and manufacturing, mean fixed assets in mining and manufacturing, and per capita assets in mining and manufacturing. The factor matrix and rationale for using these measures are discussed in Nowak and Snyder, Table 1, pp. 1155–1156.
63 See, for example, Garcia-Dungo, Nanette, A Southern Industrial Complex (Quezon City: Community Development Research Council, University of the Philippines, 1969)Google Scholar, and Lynch, Frank, A Bittersweet Taste of Sugar (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1970)Google Scholar. Unlike the situation in colonial Java where companies owned or leased acreage on which to raise sugar, Philippine sugar centrals contract for sugar produced by local landowners. Areas bordering on sugar centrals thus contain the local landowning elite, tenants, and migrant contract labor used by planters during harvest.
64 Adding agribusiness to the regression equation summarized in the top part of Table 6 yields betas of .286, −.145, and −.113 between agribusiness and change in percentage expenditures on economic improvements, social improvements, and administration, respectively.
65 Substituting “percentage of salaries and wages spent on wages alone” for the “percentage of budget spent on salaries and wages” as the independent variable in the stepwise regression equation summarized in Table 7 changes the beta between political mobilization and the independent variable from .053 to .304.
66 Giarda, Pietro, “Un'analisi statistica sui determinant! delle spese degli enti locali,” in Studi sulla finanza locale, ed. Cosciani, Cesare (Milan: Giuffrè, 1967)Google Scholar, cited in Fried, Robert C., “Communism, Urban Budgets and the Two Italies: A Case Study in Comparative Urban Government,” Journal of Politics, 33 (November, 1971), 1047 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
67 In my open-ended interviews with 22 city mayors between 1969 and 1971, mayors from powerful families with extensive agribusiness and corporate interests seemed more development- and efficiency-oriented than did the upwardly mobile, political professionals. Many “patricians” were widely read, and were more willing to make use of technocrats as consultants for reform in city government or for planning integrated infrastructure projects.
68 In his study of public policy in Bacolod and Iloilo cities, Leichter concludes that the “oligarchs of Bacolod, whose political support is based upon their economic dominance, have not found it necessary to politicize the bureaucracy in order to maintain their position and power.” The middle-class politicians of Iloilo City, often mistrustful of the socioeconomic elite which dominated local politics before 1955, managed budgets in a far less programmatic manner, politicized their police department to a greater extent, and spent a smaller portion of their budget on infrastructure than their Bacolod counterparts. Leichter, Tables 5–1 and 6–4, pp. 158, 209, 217, quotation at p. 224.
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