¹ The last statement might seem to contradict the previous assumption of agreement upon the desirability of democratic institutions. Actually, however, it only points to the fact that the broad area of agreement is qualified when it comes to details. Here, all too frequently, discussion of what is desirable is obfuscated by debate over what is “democratic.”

² It may well be contended that this is the literal and more obvious meaning of the phrase. There is need, however, for some expression to cover what we have called the minimum meaning, and no alternative to the term “majority rule” has gained currency for this purpose.

³ Willmoore Kendall is the most active current defender of this position, which was earlier championed by Hugo Krabbe and by J. Allen Smith. See Kendall's, “The Majority Principle and the Scientific Elite,” Southern Review, Vol. 4, pp. 463–473 (Winter, 1939)Google Scholar, and his “Prolegomena to Any Future Work on Majority Rule,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 12, pp. 694–713 (11, 1950)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ Cf. Lindsay's, A. D. general argument in The Essentials of Democracy (Philadelphia, 1929)Google Scholar, and especially the following statement: “We cannot, I think, ever make our political government, considered in itself, really representative. The scale on which it has to operate is too vast—its units, the constituencies, are, if taken in themselves, too big and far too little informed by any public spirit to be really democratic. But if a vigorous nonpolitical democratic life exists, the political machinery may harmonize and coordinate all that partial focussing of public opinion which the nonpolitical associations perform” (p. 81).

⁵ By a ”multiple constituency system,” is meant one in which the electorate is organized in more than one way for the purpose of getting it to register its opinions, as for instance by congressional districts and by states.

⁶ Note that we are avoiding the question of whether or not it is democratic. If someone wants to argue that it is undemocratic to prevent democracy from committing suicide, let him take that position. To argue that point here would merely distract attention from the essential question of whether or not to prevent such action would be a good thing.

⁷ It is interesting to note that Professor Kendall admits that a majority loses its claim to obedience when there ceases to be a community (“Prolegomena to Any Future Work on Majority Rule,” p. 706). Perhaps, then, it may be wise to try to keep it from doing certain things peculiarly likely to undermine its moral (and practical) foundation.

⁸ Lippmann, Walter, The Phantom Public (New York, 1925), p. 126Google Scholar. The fact that, if party government worked in full accordance with the theory, the intent of the separation of powers would be defeated is generally thought to be one of the virtues of strong political parties.

⁹ Readers of this article will not need to be referred to the very extensive literature setting forth and defending this position. It has, of course, been given its most authoritative recent expression by the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association in “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System,” Supplement to The American Political Science Review, Vol. 44 (09, 1950)Google Scholar.

¹⁰ See Turner, Julius, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress, The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series 69, No. 1 (Baltimore, 1951), pp. 28–34Google Scholar, and especially Table 3, p. 28.

¹¹ It is true that this phenomenon may itself be a consequence of the indeterminate nature of the parties; but it pretty effectively disposes of the argument that strong parties are needed because of the voters' inability to distinguish between individual candidates.

¹² Lasswell, Harold D., National Security and Individual Freedom (New York, 1950), p. 120Google Scholar.

¹³ See the excellent analysis by McCallum, R. B. and Readman, Alison, The British General Election of 1945 (London, 1947), pp. 250–253Google Scholar. Even this insignificant margin is cancelled out if the unclassified Independents and Welsh Nationalists be counted as anti-Socialist. Ibid., pp. 252–253.

¹⁴ Cf. the account of the effects of changes of governments on housing programs in Britain during the twenties, in Wootton, Barbara, Freedom Under Planning (Chapel Hill, 1945), pp. 131–133Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Bailey, Stephen Kemp, Congress Makes a Law (New York, 1950), p. 236Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Bailey, p. 237.

¹⁷ See Riggs, Fred W., Pressures on Congress; A Study of the Repeal of Chinese Exclusion (New York, 1950)Google Scholar, for an excellent study of a successful repeal movement.

¹⁸ We may also hazard the guess that even in Great Britain its vitality is on the decline. However, the sharp class-consciousness of British politics contributes greatly to the solidarity of parties and to the difficulty of achieving government by consensus.

¹⁹ It is true, of course, that attitudes on many of these subjects tend to cluster, so that a person's views on health insurance, for instance, may give a very good indication of what his position will be with regard to tax policy. Unless this situation existed, our party system would be completely unworkable. Even after making due allowance for this fact, however, the situation in incompatible with the existence and survival of programmatic major parties.

²⁰ See his recent volume, A Foreign Policy for Americans (New York, 1951)Google Scholar.

²¹ For an excellent account of them, see Truman, David B., The Governmental Process; Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York, 1951)Google Scholar. See also Riggs, Pressures on Congress, for a valuable case study. His dissussion of the “catalytic group” is especially interesting (pp. 43–46). Riggs also gives concrete evidence in support of what was said (above, pp. 795–796) about the effect given to intensity of demand by the American system (Pressures on Congress, pp. 197–199).

²² In some of these cases the mutually opposing policies were in effect at the same time, while in others they came in fairly rapid succession.

²³ It is not within the province of this article to offer solutions to this problem. It may be pointed out, however, that government by consensus places power in the hands of any major group to secure the modification of policies opposed to its interests. Where inconsistent programs merely defeat each other, no great harm is done to the general public. Where they do have a harmful general effect, other powerful groups are likely to be aroused and to take effective action. Moreover, the process of political education proceeds by experience. It is often discouragingly slow, but it is sometimes surprisingly effective. It is notable that, following the war, we did attain a balanced budget, and even a budget surplus. That the return of a semi-war economy has reversed the situation is hardly a matter for surprise. Whether any government can avoid some form of inflation under such conditions is doubtful. It is not irrelevant to remark, however, that it can come nearer to accomplishing this result if it is able to borrow from abroad.

²⁴ Conceivably the same result could be obtained by a regional division, with the threat of civil war or national disintegration.