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Universalism in Experimental Committees

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 September 1982

Gary J. Miller  and
Joe A. Oppenheimer
Gary J. Miller
Affiliation:
Michigan State University
Joe A. Oppenheimer
Affiliation:
University of Maryland
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Abstract

Most rational choice theories of committee decision making predict a process of competitive coalition formation leading to a minimum winning coalition. Committee experiments reported to date tend to support these theories. However, both theories and committee experiments are contradicted by the evidence of real-world legislatures making distributive decisions; these decisions are characterized by coalitions of the whole providing virtually all members with a share of distributive benefits. The results in this article help to resolve this contradiction by showing that if the committee experimental design includes a universalistic alternative which provides a high level of expected benefits for committee members, it will be selected. Competitive coalition formation occurs in experimental settings which do not include such an alternative. The results call into question the generality of ordinalist theories of competitive coalition formation.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 76 , Issue 3 , September 1982 , pp. 561 - 574
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1982

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