While the general policy governing the nature and the degree of American participation in international affairs may still be regarded as a contested issue, an unequivocal decision has been reached with respect to our foreign service.

Through the enactment of the Rogers Bill, for the reorganization and improvement of the foreign service, a basis has been fixed and a structure provided which are destined to place the foreign representation of the United States in the forefront of diplomatic efficiency. It is not to be concluded that this strengthening and remodeling of the diplomatic machinery is necessarily anticipatory of a forthcoming broader participation in world affairs, or that Congress has acted in the reverse order of logic by perfecting an instrumentality for the conduct of our foreign relations before the nature and the extent of those relations have been finally determined. The need of a strong foreign service is obvious.

The position of the United States has become so commanding that its every act, whether of a positive or of a negative character, is fraught with important consequences to other nations and not infrequently with equally important repercussions at home. A policy of isolation or aloofness, in which the interests of the world are engaged, is perhaps even more difficult to maintain than a policy of active participation.

Of all the clauses in the Bill of Rights, the free speech guaranty stands foremost in the significance of the political principle it defends, and in the enduring vitality of the problems it puts before us. In an age of toleration bordering on indifference, the phrase protecting the free exercise of religion has been reverently consigned to a life of honored retirement; in the days of conscription “the right of the people to keep and bear arms” finds a place in constitutional structure similar to that of the vermiform appendix in the human body; and the good old search and seizure clause now is roused from a senile contemplation of other days only at rarest intervals, relapsing soon into a customary desuetude. But no such fate will ever befall the free speech clause. The human interest it defends is in a very real sense the most fundamental and permanent in the Bill of Rights, and no changes brought by the onward movement of civilization are ever likely to make the need for its protection less necessary.

For as long as human beings have tongues and minds they will say what they think, and they will think differently. Where the question is important and the issues vital or seemingly vital, such hatred and bitterness is likely to develop as will require a very strong constitutional guaranty and a reverential respect for the written word if oppression is to be prevented. In fact, all the rancor and bitterness attached to actual physical conflict are frequently found in scarcely diminished intensity to have gathered about mere polemics.

Ever since the famous case of Marbury v. Madison in 1803, the United States Supreme Court has exercised the power of declaring acts of Congress unconstitutional and of refusing to enforce them as law. From the beginning, the exercise of this power has been the subject of great controversies as to both theory and practice. It has been assailed as subverting the true nature of our government. It has been stigmatized as the foundation of a judicial obligarchy. It has been attacked as a means for the nullification of the popular will as expressed in Congress. It will be the purpose of this paper, therefore, to inquire into the use of this power in relation to acts of Congress with especial regard to (1) the criticisms that have been made at various times throughout American history, and (2) the proposals that have been made to modify the exercise of this power.

American democracy is not combating crime successfully. We are given the unenviable distinction of leading the civilized world in murder, robbery, burglary and other of the graver crimes against person and property. As a nation we have a disconcertingly high criminal ratio and in our large cities, where the opportunities and temptations for crime are greater, constantly recurring crime waves threaten our social organization.

The administration of justice is a state function. Police officers are technically state officials and justices of the peace, police and municipal courts are performing state functions, yet it nevertheless is true that the prevention, detection and treatment of crime and criminals are of special importance to city dwellers and under our decentralized administration of justice the city ought to feel its responsibility and be given the opportunity to deal with the problem in an intelligent manner.

It has been estimated that in Cleveland, Ohio, two-thirds of those who commit serious crimes are never arrested, and of the one-third arrested two-thirds are never convicted. The administration of criminal law has been declared a failure in Cleveland but few of our other large cities have any special reason for self-congratulation. Our criminal statistics in general are very unreliable and inadequate. The census bureau has been making an ambitious attempt at securing criminal statistics but has found it difficult and at times impossible to secure even the simplest data.