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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 December 2015
In the years prior to the outbreak of the First World War, the Hamburg-American-Lines (HAPAG) steamer Ypiranga gained a special reputation in the Western hemisphere. It was known for transporting several Mexican Presidents into exile, and it became especially famous for its 26th voyage, a trip from Hamburg to Veracruz in the spring of 1914.
Its hold filled with weapons for the Mexican President Huerta, the steamer approached the entrance to the Veracruz harbor on April 21. At that time, its captain had not the slightest idea that on Woodrow Wilson's order American troops had landed to take control of the harbor in order to prevent the weapons his ship carried from reaching the Mexican President.
1 Tuchmann, Barbara, The Zimmermann Telegram (New York, 1971), p. 43.Google Scholar Sec also p. 48 et seq.
2 Katz, F. in Deutschland, Diaz und die mexikanische Revolution (Berlin, 1964), p. 302 et seq. Google Scholar, has used German records in relating his version of the Ypiranga affair, but he did not use the archives of the HAPAG. See also Katz, , Hamburger Schiffahrt nach Mexiko 1870–1914 (Köln, 1965), p. 104 et seq.Google Scholar
The present article is based on documents from the following archives: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes Bonn (hereafter cited as AA Bonn), Deutsches Zentralarchiv Potsdam (hereafter cited as DZA), Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt Freiburg (hereafter cited as MGFA), Staatsarchiv Hamburg, Archiv der Hamburg-Amerika-Linie (hereafter cited as HAPAG Archiv). Record Groups 59, 94, and 141 in the National Archives in Washington, D. C., were also checked in regard to the Y piranga affair. The research for this article was undertaken in preparing a book about German foreign policy towards Mexico. That book has recently been published by the Colloquium Verlag in Berlin as Die deutsche Mexikopolitik 1913/14 (Berlin, 1971).
3 AA Bonn, Mexiko 16, vol. 1, Quadt (minister to Hamburg) to Auswärtiges Amt (hereafter cited as AA), March 6, 1917. See also AA Bonn, Mexiko 16, vol. 1, Aktennotiz: Vorgänge über De Kay, April 10, 1914.
4 AA Bonn, Mexiko 16, vol. 1, Romberg to AA, March 4, 1917. De Kay called on Romberg to offer the German Empire weapons stored in Bilbao, Spain. He explained that those were part of the weapons he had bought in the spring of 1914 for Huerta but which could not be shipped to Mexico after the events of April 1914. De Kay was offering the weapons in the expectation (Romberg to Bethmann Hollweg, March 21, 1917) “… that Germany, in case of war with the United States, would like to exploit every possibility that might present a chance for the Mexicans to get weapons.” The Foreign Office did not respond to this offer because all information it could get about de Kay was very negative.
5 AA Bonn, Mexiko 16, vol. 1, Romberg to Bethmann Hollweg, March 21, 1917. De Kay also told Romberg that he had all the records about the events and could produce them any time. Romberg received the impression that de Kay would show him the records only for money, and the Foreign Office refused to pay.
6 The accuracy of de Kay’s account is attested to by all despatches that Paul von Hintze, the German minister to Mexico at the time of the Y piranga affair, sent about these events. What M. C. Meyer has written in his article about the origin of the weapons and the persons involved in this business is a quite different and a certainly more profound story ( Meyer, , “ The Arms of the Ypiranga,” Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. L, p. 546 et seq.).Google Scholar Meyer does not mention de Kay, and Raast and Ratner in Meyer’s account play no role in the German records. How these two stories fit together has yet to be answered. The following pages of this article are important in this respect mainly because they show how much or, rather, how little the German side knew about the background of the whole affair.
7 De Kay had close connections with the London banking house of Bruno Schroeder, which played a central role in financing the arms purchases. AA Bonn, Mexiko 16, vol. 1, Romberg to AA, March 4, 1917.
8 AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 44, Romberg to Bethmann Hollweg, March 24, 1914.
9 AA Bonn, Mexiko 13, vol. 1, Romberg to Bethmann Hollweg, March 24, 1914.
10 AA Bonn RuBland 72, vol. 96, Ohnesseit to AA, January 1, 1914. Compare to the following account Meyer, loc. cit., p. 547 et seq., as well as National Archives, RG 59, M274, roll 35, and M353, roll 5.
11 AA Bonn, RuBland 72, vol. 96. Probably these are the weapons that did not get to Mexico because of the events of April 1914 and that ended up in Bilbao.
12 Ibid. Ohnesseit to AA, February 7, 1914.
13 Ibid. Ohnesseit to AA, February 18, 1914.
14 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, CI d 26, Die Polizeibehörde an die Senatskommission für die Reichs- und auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, March 2, 1914.
15 Ibid.
16 See particulars on this point in Meyer, loc. cit., pp. 449–450.
17 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, CI d 26, Notiz zum Schreiben: Die Polizeibehörde an die Senatskommission für die Reichs- und auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, March 2, 1914.
18 HAPAG Archiv, Bericht über Munitionssendungen mit den Dampfern “ Ypiranga ” und “Bavaria” nach Mexico (without date and signature, written by an HAPAG employee in February 1914).
19 HAPAG Archiv, Hamburg-Amerika-Linie: Mit D. “Ypiranga” und “Bavaria” nach Vera Cruz verladene Munition. The following figures are also taken from this account. For completeness and to complement the writings of Meyer, it should be mentioned that the Ypiranga received in Havana from the HAPAG steamer Savoia (which had come from Antwerp) 1,333 cases of cartridges for the military commandant of Veracruz. Besides that there were on board the Ypiranga 15 cases of sabers and one case of rifles from private senders. According to the information Hintze gave (AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 50, Tagebuch Hintze, 3. Teil) the carbine cases contained 10 rifles each, the cartridge cases 2,000 cartridges each.
20 HAPAG Archiv, Bericht über Munitionssendungen mit den Dampfern “ Ypiranga ” und “ Bavaria ” nach Mexiko.
21 Ibid.
22 Whether the order was imparted to the HAPAG that in case of diplomatic difficulties German policy towards Mexico would be discredited can only be surmised. There is nothing in the German records that supports such an idea. See Katz, , Deutschland … , p. 303, and Katz, , Schiffahrt …, p. 105.Google Scholar
23 The Foreign Office paid special attention to the following two articles: “ Der Zwischenfall von Tampico,” in Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger, April 12, 1914, and “ Mexique,” in Le Figaro, April 15, 1914.
24 AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 45, Chef des Admiralstabes der Marine to Jagow [Secretary of Foreign Affairs], April 14, 1914.
25 Ibid., Hintze to AA, April 19, 1914.
26 lbid., Bernstorff to AA, April 20, 1914.
27 HAPAG Archiv, Dampfschifï “Ypiranga,” Rapport des Kapitäns, 26. Reise, May 6, 1914.
28 MGFA, R-M-A, 637 PG 65 130 M.B. der “Dresden,” Nr. 731, April 28, 1914.
29 Daniels, J. in The Wilson Era, Years of Peace 1910–1917 (Chapel Hill, 1944), p. 200,Google Scholar writes that Bernstorff had protested the detaining of the steamer. See also Meyer, loc. Cit., p. 552. Bernstorff’s despatches, however, contain no mention of the protest. Kemnitz in the Foreign Office emphasized several times that Bernstorff had made no representation and that the American Government had apologized “ voluntarily.” AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 45, AA to Hintze, April 25, 1914. See also AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 45, Zusammenfassung (Kemnitz), April 29, 1914.
30 AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 45, Bernstorff to AA, April 21, 1914.
31 HAPAG Archiv, Dampfschiff “Ypiranga,” Rapport des Kapitains, 26. Reise, May 6, 1914.
32 It is also noteworthy that Köhler in his report of April 28 mentioned the arrival of the Ypiranga as only one among several reasons for the American landing in Veracruz (MGFA, R-M-A, 637 PG 65 130, M.B. der “Dresden,” Nr. 731, April 28, 1914). Hintze only “ presumed ” there wasa connection between the arrival of the Ypiranga and the American occupation of the town (AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 49, Tagebuch Hintze, Teil 1, April 26, 1914).
33 AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 45, Bülow to Bethmann Hollweg, April 23, 1914. A letter from HAPAG director Ecker confirmed Ballin's statement—at least it could have been so understood by the Foreign Office. Ecker wrote the Foreign Office on April 25: “ In accordance with the consignees, we wish to instruct the captain not to discharge the cargo but to keep it on board.” Ibid., Ecker to AA, April 25, 1914.
34 Ibid., AA to Hintze, April 25, 1914.
35 Ibid., Bernstorff to AA, April 24, 1914.
36 Ibid., AA to Bernstorff, April 25, 1914.
37 Ibid., Bernstorff to AA, April 26, 1914.
38 Written as a marginal note from the Foreign Office to Hintze“s inquiry of April 23, 1914, concerning the Ypiranga.
39 Articles clipped from the American press can be found among the records of the German Foreign Office. For example: “ Munitions of War Must be Returned to Ger-many,” New York Herald, April 24, 1914. The German press, too, had gotten the impression that Germany had promised the United States to return the weapons to Germany. The Kölnische Volkszeitung criticized the alleged promise (“ Die Schädigung des deutschen Handels durch Wilson,” April 27, 1914). Montgelas in the Foreign Office annotated this article with the marginal note: “ Germany has not promised that; rather, the HAPAG has sent such an instruction to its ship.” A A Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 45, Randbemerkung Montgelas.
40 AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 46, Zimmermann (Undersecretary of State) to Hintze, May 1, 1914; Bundesarchiv Koblenz, R 85, 6624, Jagow: Zur Information, May 1, 1914. See also AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 45, Zusammenfassung von Kemnitz, May 29, 1914.
41 Until he received the telegram, Hintze knew very little about what had happened in Tampico and Veracruz—in fact, not much more than what was rumored in the German colony: for example, that the Ypiranga had been stopped, that the German cruiser Bremen had defended the Ypiranga and had been sunk in battle by the Americans, and so on. Hintze tried as well as he could to avoid any encounter with the Mexican Foreign Minister, who already had tried to greet Hintze as an “ally.” AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 48, Hintze to Bethmann Hollweg, April 24, 1914.
42 Ibid.. Bernstorff to AA, April 30, 1914.
43 The Kronprinzessin Cecilie did not discharge its weapons but returned them to Hamburg, as the consignees wished (HAPAG Archiv, Dampfschiff “ Kronprinzessin Cecilie,” Rapport des Kapitäns, 47. Reise, May 14, 1914). The Bavaria was still on its way to Puerto México. Press reports about the Bavaria’s discharging weapons at this time were contradictory, and those that reported that it had unloaded weapons were wrong. The Dania, also a HAPAG steamer heading for Puerto México, carried no weapons (cf. Katz, Deutschland … , p. 306). See as an example of the press reports: “ Die Vereinigten Staaten und Mexiko, ” in Kölnische Zeitung, May 10, 1914.
44 A A Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 46.
45 “ Die neue Kriegsgefahr in Mexiko,” in Berliner Tageblatt, May 10, 1914.
46 “ Mexiko, ” Berliner Tageblatt, May 10, 1914.
47 AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 46, Bernstorff to Bethmann Hollweg, April 25, 1914. Ibid., Falcke (consul general in New York) to Bethmann Hollweg, April 26, 1914. Ibid., vol. 47, Bernstorff to Bethmann Hollweg, May 9, 1914.
48 Ibid., vol. 46, Boy-Ed to Tirpitz, April 22, 1914.
49 Ibid., AA to Bernstorff, May 15, 1914.
50 Worth noting are the comments of Kemnitz written on an article clipped from the Morning Post of May 29 (“The Pacification of Mexico,” AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 48). In the records there are many memoranda which state that from the legal point of view there is no reason to object to discharging the articles of war.
51 AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 49, Hintze to Bethmann Hollweg, June 3, 1914. The Foreign Office’s reaction is noted in marginal remarks. Hintze’s precautions were felt to be extreme. Cf. HAPAG Archiv, Dampfschiff“Ypiranga,” Rapport des Kapitäns, 26. Reise, May 6, 1914.
52 AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 49, Hintze to Bethmann Hollweg, June 3, 1914.
53 Ibid., Heynen [HAPAG agent in Mexico] to HAPAG, June 4, 1914.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., Hintze to Bethmann Hollweg, June 5, Tagebuch Hintze, Teil 2, June 17, 1914.
56 Ibid., vol. 47, Hintze to AA, May 17, 1914.
57 Ibid., AA to Hintze, May 19, 1914.
58 When the Foreign Office learned on May 26 from Bülow in Hamburg that the weapons would be unloaded in Puerto Míxico, it made a feeble effort to persuade the HAPAG not to accept further cargoes of weapons for Mexico. Not that the Foreign Office was aware of the political dangers involved in discharging the weapons; rather, it acted only because Hintze had in the meantime described the terrible consequences of a renewed civil war for German commercial interests in Mexico. AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 47, Bülow to Bethmann Hollweg, May 25, 1914 and ibid., AA to Bülow, May 27, 1914.
59 Ibid., vol. 49, Hintze to Bethmann Hollweg, June 3, 1914. Next to Huerta there was no one happier about the delivery of the weapons than the English Minister, Carden. When he heard the news, he jumped up and shouted triumphantly: “ Then Huerta will stick! ” Ibid., vol. 50, Hintze to Bethmann Hollweg, June 25, 1913, Tagebuch Hintze, Teil 3, May 24, 1914.
60 Ibid., Hintze to Bethmann Hollweg, June 25, 1914.
61 Ibid., Tagebuch Hintze, Teil 3, May 23, 1914. It was not only the German side that understood the American attitude in this way. See ibid., vol. 49, Hintze to Bethmann Hollweg, June 3, 1914. The HAPAG explained the American’s release of the Ypiranga and its weapons similarly. Bülow wrote from Hamburg to Berlin: “ The board of directors of the HAPAG explained the attitude of the American admiral [Badger] as follows: that Washington, unsatisfied at that time, in April, with the conduct of the rebel leaders Villa and Carranza, might well have intended to let Huerta gain a stronger position for a while.” Ibid., vol. 47, Bülow to Bethmann Hollweg, May 30, 1914.
62 MGFA, R-M-A. 637 PG 65 130, M.B. der “Dresden,” G.B. Nr. 395, June 20, 1914.
63 MGFA, Kaiserliche Admiralität, 4321 XVII 1.5.-6, H. C. Lodge to Senator Lodge, May 29, 1914, Anlage zum Washingtoner Marine-Bericht Nr. 87, June 11, 1914. According to Heynen, the American captain in authority at Veracruz mentioned after the return of the Ypiranga: “… had he had any idea that the weapons and munitions were going to be unloaded, he would have denied the despatch, but that he never had such an idea because he was firmly convinced that the weapons would return to Hamburg, for he had seen copies of cables from Hamburg in which this had been instructed.” AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 49, Heynen to HAPAG, June 4, 1914.
64 See also in this regard AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 47, Bülow to Bethmann Hollweg, May 29, 1914.
65 HAPAG Archiv, Telegrammwechsel mit den Herren C. Heynen, Mexiko City, und G. Büsing, Vera Cruz, betreffend Munition in den D. “ Ypiranga ” und “ Bavaria.” Both telegrams are in this compilation. So is the telegram of confirmation from Heynen to the HAPAG. The HAPAG wrote on June 4 to Undersecretary of State Zimmerman: “ Had there been any indication from the Americans that they did not want the landing at Puerto México, we certainly would have respected such a wish.” AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 48, HAPAG to Zimmermann, June 4, 1914.
66 AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 49, Heynen to HAPAG, June 4, 1914.
67 Cf. Katz, , Deutschland … , p. 305, and Katz, , Schifffahrt … , p.107.Google Scholar
68 See Baecker, op. cit., pp. 67–109.
69 “Der ‘Ypiranga’-Zwischenfall,” in Kölnische Zeitung, June 18, 1914.
70 AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 48, Falcke to Bethmann Hollweg, May 29, 1914.
71 Ibid., Bernstorff to AA, June 16, 1914. Bernstorff laid the sole blame for unloading the weapons on the representative of the HAPAG in Mexico because the representative had falsely supposed “… that under the changed circumstances there would not have been American objections to the discharge.” See also Bernstorff to AA, June 1, 1914. When Bryan asked Bernstorff on June 1 about the events in Puerto México, Bernstorff himself had no information or explanation to give. The HAPAG was soon made to feel American anger about the discharge of the weapons. When the Yp iranga and Bavaria unsuspectingly returned from Puerto México to Veracruz, American harbor authorities imposed a large fine upon them. AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 49, Hintze to AA, June 31, 1914. See as well Meyer, loc. cit., p. 555.
72 AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 47, Hintze to AA, May 26, 1914.
73 Ibid., Depesche der Continental-Telegraphen-Compagnie, May 29, 1914.
74 “ Mexico, in Frankfurter Zeitung, June 2, 1914.
75 See details in AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 48, Falcke to Bethmann Hollweg, June 2, 1914. Zimmermann instructed Bernstorff on June 2 (ibid.) to work to calm American public opinion and the American Government. The Foreign Office prepared articles for the German press which read to the effect (ibid., Kemnitz to Zimmermann, June 8, 1914) : “ Had the American authorities indicated that they would not welcome a discharge at Puerto México, it can be supposed that the Hamburg-American-Line would have respected such a wish out of consideration for the larger interest it has in the United States.”
76 An egregious example can be found in Tweedie, Alec , Mexico, From Díaz to the Kaiser (New York, 1918), pp. 163, 176, and 268.Google Scholar, Heynen to HAPAG, June 4, 1914.
