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Person as lawyer: How having a guilty mind explains attributions of intentional agency

  • Frank Hindriks (a1)

In criminal law, foresight betrays a guilty mind as much as intent does: both reveal that the agent is not properly motivated to avoid an illegal state of affairs. This commonality warrants our judgment that the state is brought about intentionally, even when unintended. In contrast to Knobe, I thus retain the idea that acting intentionally is acting with a certain frame of mind.

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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

F. Hindriks (2008) Intentional action and the praise-blame asymmetry. Philosophical Quarterly 58:630–41.

B. Malle & S. Nelson (2003) Judging mens rea: The tension between folk concepts and legal concepts of intentionality. Behavioral Sciences and the Law 21:563–80.

T. Nadelhoffer (2006a) Bad acts, blameworthy agents, and intentional actions: Some problems for jury impartiality. Philosophical Explorations 9:203–20.

K. Setiya (2003) Explaining action. Philosophical Review 112:339–93.

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • ISSN: 0140-525X
  • EISSN: 1469-1825
  • URL: /core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences
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