Hostname: page-component-76d6cb85b7-dqfph Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-07-17T20:32:24.711Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

From conceptual representations to explanatory relations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2010

Tania Lombrozo
Tania Lombrozo
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720. lombrozo@berkeley.edu http://cognition.berkeley.edu/
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Machery emphasizes the centrality of explanation for theory-based approaches to concepts. I endorse Machery's emphasis on explanation and consider recent advances in psychology that point to the “heterogeneity” of explanation, with consequences for Machery's heterogeneity hypothesis about concepts.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 2-3 , June 2010 , pp. 218 - 219
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Carey, S. (1985) Conceptual change in childhood. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Gopnik, A. & Meltzoff, A. N. (1997) Words, thoughts, and theories. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Hilton, D. J. & Slugoski, B. R. (1986) Knowledge-based causal attribution: The abnormal conditions focus model. Psychological Review 93:75–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Keil, F. C. (2006) Explanation and understanding. Annual Review of Psychology 57:227–54.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Kelemen, D. (1999) Function, goals, and intention: Children's teleological reasoning about objects. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3:461–68.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Laurence, S. & Margolis, E. (1999) Concepts and cognitive science. In: Concepts, core readings, ed. Margolis, E. & Laurence, S., pp. 3–82. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Lombrozo, T. (2006) The structure and function of explanations. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10(10):464–70.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Lombrozo, T. (2009) Explanation and categorization: How “why?” informs “what?” Cognition 110:248–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lombrozo, T. (under review) Causal-explanatory pluralism: How intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions.Google Scholar
Lombrozo, T. & Carey, S. (2006) Functional explanation and the function of explanation. Cognition 99(2):167–204.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Lombrozo, T., Kelemen, D. & Zaitchik, D. (2007) Inferring design: Evidence of a preference for teleological explanations in patients with Alzheimer's disease. Psychological Science 18(11):999–1006.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Machery, E. (2009) Doing without concepts. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Murphy, G. L. & Medin, D. L. (1985) The role of theories in conceptual coherence. Psychological Review 92:289–316.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Prasada, S. & Dillingham, E. M. (2006) Principled and statistical connections in common sense conception. Cognition 99:73–112.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Rehder, B. (2003b) Categorization as causal reasoning. Cognitive Science 27:709–48.Google Scholar
Rehder, B. (2006) When causality and similarity compete in category-based property induction. Memory and Cognition 34:3–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rips, L. J. (1989) Similarity, typicality, and categorization. In: Similarity and analogical reasoning, ed. Vosniadou, S. & Ortony, A., pp. 21–59. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, J. J. & Lombrozo, T. (in press) The role of explanation in discovery and generalization: Evidence from category learning. Cognitive Science.Google Scholar