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How Democratic Alliances Solve the Power Parity Problem

  • Justin Conrad

Abstract

Why do challengers attack some states that have allies, while avoiding conflict with others? This article builds upon previous research by arguing that parity in the observable capabilities of opposing states and their allies generates greater uncertainty and miscalculations on the part of challengers, which leads to a higher probability of conflict. Unlike previous research, however, this article argues that military alliances among democracies are better able to overcome this uncertainty, making power distributions largely irrelevant. The results demonstrate that uncertainty generated at power parity is mitigated when a target state’s allies are more democratic, resulting in no overall change in the probability of conflict. This study therefore emphasizes that the effectiveness of military alliances lies not necessarily in their aggregation of power, but in their ability to co-ordinate their power and communicate this co-ordination to potential challengers.

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University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, 450B Fretwell Bldg., 9201 University City Blvd., Charlotte, North Carolina 28202 (email: justinconrad@uncc.edu). I would like to thank Mark Souva, David Siegel, William Reed, Robert Art and Will Moore for their guidance and helpful suggestions on this project. Data replication sets are available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/BJPolS, and online appendices are available at http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1017/S0007123415000538.

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How Democratic Alliances Solve the Power Parity Problem

  • Justin Conrad

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