I address three topics. First, I argue that the issue of corporate moral responsibility is an important one for business ethics. Second, I examine a core argument for the claim that the corporate organization is a separate moral agent and show it is based on an unnoticed but elementary mistake deriving from the fallacy of division. Third, I examine the assumptions collectivists make about what it means to say that organizations act and that they act intentionally and show that these assumptions are mistaken in their failure to understand the nature of intentional causality and of “as-if” intentionality. In exposing these mistakes I set out my own view in the form of two theses, the first of which states that individual members of an organization are always causally responsible for any corporate act, and the second of which states that attributions of intentions to corporations are always either descriptive or prescriptive attributions of “as if” intentionality.

The challenge that confronts corporate decision-makers in connection with global labor conditions is often in identifying the standards by which they should govern themselves. In an effort to provide greater direction in the face of possible global cultural conflicts, ethicists Thomas Donaldson and Thomas Dunfee draw on social contract theory to develop a method for identifying basic human rights: Integrated Social Contract Theory (ISCT). In this paper, we apply ISCT to the challenge of global labor standards, attempting to identify labor rights that could serve as guides for corporations producing or outsourcing outside of their home country. In addition to identifying areas of universal agreement, we also examine whether ISCT is, in fact, a sufficient basis for determining worker rights; we seek to define the parameters of the “sweatshop” problem; we include the application and results of our ISCT analysis as applied to labor standards: the global labor rights hypernorms; and conclude that ISCT is sufficient only for rights that are universal. We also discuss whether market-driven decisions can identify the boundaries of labor rights, or at least assure that market outcomes are compatible with maintaining labor rights, in order to respond to the shortcomings of ISCT. We conclude with some comments on directions of analysis for labor rights determination.

Scholars have developed many theories of international strategy and many theories of international ethics. Separating strategy and ethics in this way, though, perpetuates a perception that profit and ethics are mutually exclusive. Accordingly, I offer a framework that links international strategy and international ethics. I suggest that at an abstract level the strategic concepts of integration and responsiveness and the ethical concepts of justice and caring are concerned with the same theoretical quandaries. Therefore, in any situation there are behaviors that are both integrative and just and/or both responsive and caring, and these behaviors are both strategic and ethical. To demonstrate the potential descriptive and prescriptive value of the framework, I descend the ladders of abstraction associated with these concepts and apply the framework to two business situations.

This article applies the Kantian doctrine of respect for persons to the problem of sweatshops. We argue that multinational enterprises are properly regarded as responsible for the practices of their subcontractors and suppliers. We then argue that multinational enterprises have the following duties in their off-shore manufacturing facilities: to ensure that local labor laws are followed; to refrain from coercion; to meet minimum safety standards; and to provide a living wage for employees. Finally, we consider and reply to the objection that improving health and safety conditions and providing a living wage will cause greater harm than good.

The following address considers the relevance of business ethics education to our students. Is our concept of ethics one of practice and application? And, if so, are we accountable to our students, our institutions and ourselves, for the practical impact that we have or, conversely, that we do not have? Aren’t we responsible in part if one of our students ventures forth and does not act in an ethical manner? Though a positive response to this query may not be popular, what is the alternative? If we are not responsible for the impact (or lack thereof) that we have on our students, then what is our purpose? The discussion further explores the nature of this impact and the process by which we can amplify the results.

It has been suggested that a new form of moral responsibility, labeled “social products liability,” is relevant to business ethics. In particular, this kind of responsibility might justify recent legal claims against firearm manufacturers. This paper argues that, as it has been presented, social products liability must rest upon utilitarian considerations or on a deeper, more complete theory of moral responsibility. In the first case, a new form of responsibility seems unnecessary, since liability could be directly apportioned on utilitarian grounds. In the second case, proponents of social products liability face the tasks of presenting the more complete theory and then anchoring social products liability to it.

This 2001 Presidential Address critically examines the mission of SBE and how it can be fulfilled. I begin with Brother Leo Ryan’s 1994 Presidential Address, in which he asked how the SBE mission can be accomplished given the growing number of organizations that focus on business ethics. I take up his challenge by focusing on one objective of our stated mission: To help develop ethical business organizations. I examine two ways we might promote this objective: the Moral Market Model advocated by John Boatright in his 1998 Presidential Address and the Market of Morality model advocated by Thomas Dunfee in his 1996 Presidential Address. I argue both views are limited because they focus only on market institutions. I conclude with an example of how breast cancer awareness among African-American women was increased by relying on a multi-institutional approach: organizations (beauty parlors), individuals (hairdressers, who distributed the information), personal relationships, culture, and educational and health care institutions. The question remains: Who are our hairdressers?