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THE DEMISE OF “PARASITIC ACCESSORIAL LIABILITY”: SUBSTANTIVE JUDICIAL LAW REFORM, NOT COMMON LAW HOUSEKEEPING

  • Findlay Stark

Abstract

In Jogee and Ruddock, the Supreme Court/Privy Council decided that the law on secondary liability took a “wrong turn” in 1984 in the Privy Council's decision in Chan Wing-Siu. Chan Wing-Siu's contemplation/foresight-based fault element for secondary liability was alleged by the Supreme Court/Privy Council to have bucked a legal trend towards requiring that the secondary party intended to encourage or assist every one of the principal's offences. This article presents an alternative history of secondary liability that explains a wider selection of cases from 1553–1984 than were considered in Jogee and Ruddock. On this alternative account, Chan Wing-Siu was simply a more explicit and intellectually honest decision than its predecessors. If this alternative view of history is accepted, the Supreme Court/Privy Council's claim to be merely “correcting” (rather than substantively reforming) the law of secondary liability should be rejected. Doing so would make more critical a question that was side-stepped in Jogee and Ruddock, namely whether this reform should have been undertaken by the judiciary, rather than the legislature.

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Corresponding author

Address for Correspondence: Jesus College, Cambridge, CB5 8BL, UK. Email: fgs23@cam.ac.uk.

References

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1 A label coined in Smith, J.C., “Criminal Liability of Accessories: Law and Law Reform” (1997) 113 L.Q.R. 453 , at 455. Cf. Virgo, G.J., “Joint Enterprise is Dead: Long Live Accessorial Liability” [2012] Crim.L.R. 850, at 855–56.

2 Procurement was ignored in Jogee, but will be mentioned at various points below.

3 Where no collateral Offence B occurred, the “common purpose” usually did no useful work: Krebs, B., “Joint Criminal Enterprise” (2010) 73 M.L.R. 578 , at 588. Common purpose was, however, useful historically to found “constructive” presence when physical presence was required for aiding and abetting: e.g. R. v Passey (1836) 7 Car. & P. 282.

4 Chan Wing-Siu v R. [1985] A.C. 168.

5 R. v Powell and English [1999] 1 A.C. 1.

6 R. v Jogee and Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681.

7 Ibid., at para. [3].

8 Toulson, R., “Sir Michael Foster, Professor Williams and Complicity in Murder” in Baker, D.J. and Horder, J. (eds.), The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law: The Legacy of Glanville Williams (Cambridge 2013), 230 .

9 Parts of Jogee suggest that the secondary party must himself have the mens rea of the principal's offence(s) (e.g. at [72]), others that she simply has to intend to encourage or assist the principal's offence(s) (at [90]). The latter position is preferable: see NCB v Gamble [1959] 1 Q.B. 11.

10 This history does have academic support – see Dyson, M., “Letter to the Editor” [2016] Crim.L.R. 638, at 638–39.

11 Jogee and Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681, at [85].

12 PAL could be older – see Kaye, J.M., “The Early History of Murder and Manslaughter – Part II” (1967) 83 L.Q.R. 569, at 579.

13 See similarly, Smith, K.J.M., A Modern Treatise on Criminal Complicity (Oxford 1991), 210–11.

14 This is not to mention the additional distorting effect of capital punishment, and changing judicial attitudes towards it.

15 See Baker, J.H., The Oxford History of the Laws of England: Volume VI: 1483–1558 (Oxford 2003), 574–79.

16 On interpretational difficulties concerning older authorities, see Smith, Complicity, p. 210.

17 R. v Salisbury (1553) 1 Plowd. 97.

18 Cf. Kaye, “Murder and Manslaughter”, p. 585.

19 Salisbury's master meant to kill the deceased's master.

20 I.e. premeditation – Baker, Oxford History, p. 555.

21 See also: Kaye, “Murder and Manslaughter”, p. 586; Anon (1585) Godb. 64, at 66.

22 R. v Herbert (1556) 2 Dyer 128b. See also Baker, J.H. (ed.), The Reports of Robert Dalison 1552–1558 (London 2007), 127–28.

23 Technically judges, Serjeants and law officers.

24 Kaye, “Murder and Manslaughter”, p. 580.

25 Cf. R. v Gnango [2010] EWCA Crim 1691; [2011] 1 W.L.R. 1414, at [26].

26 Kaye, “Murder and Manslaughter”, p. 582.

27 Noted in Jogee and Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681, at [23].

28 See e.g. R. v Wright (1562) Gell's Reports, reproduced in Baker, J.H. (ed.), Reports from the Lost Notebooks of Sir James Dyer: Vol. 2 (London 1994), 435.

29 Baker, Oxford History, pp. 555–56.

30 R. v Saunders and Archer (1573) 2 Plowd. 473. See further J.H. Baker, “R v Saunders and Archer (1573)” in P. Handler, H. Mares and I. Williams (eds.), Landmark Cases in Criminal Law (Oxford, forthcoming).

31 R. v Saunders and Archer, ibid., at p. 475.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Kaye, “Murder and Manslaughter”, p. 594.

36 See Coke, E., The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (London 1642), 182.

37 See e.g. Snook's Case (1560) Sav. 67. Although it may have been a “necessary assumption” that such a resolution existed (Baker, Oxford History, p. 556), the cases are unclear. See further R. v Griffith (1553) 12 Plowd. 97; Lord Dacre's Case (1535) Moore K.B. 86.

38 R. v Stanley (1662) Kelyng J 86, 87. Cf. R. v Hyde (1672) 1 Hale P.C. 537.

39 Lord Mohun's Trial (1692) Holt, K.B. 479, 480.

40 See similarly Coke, E., The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (London 1644), 51.

41 Ibid.

42 E.g. R. v Thody (1673) 1 Freem. 514.

43 Hale, M., Historia Placitorum Coronæ, vol. 1 (London 1736), 435, 617.

44 Ibid., at p. 436.

45 Ibid., at p. 444.

46 Ibid., at p. 443.

47 Ibid., at pp. 443–44, emphasis added. Cf. Hawkins, W., The Pleas of the Crown, 4th ed. (London 1762), vol. 2, ch. 29, s. 8.

48 Hale, Historia, p. 444.

49 R. v Plummer (1701) Kel. J. 109, 113–14, emphasis added.

50 R. v Ashton (1703) 12 Mod. 256, 256.

51 R. v Wallis (1703) 1 Salk. 334, 335.

52 Cf. R. v Borthwick (1779) 1 Doug. 207.

53 R. v Hodgson (1730) 1 Leach 6.

54 Ibid., at p. 6.

55 See Jogee and Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681, at [18]–[20].

56 Foster, M., Crown Law (Oxford 1762), 370. See also Blackstone, W., Commentaries on the Laws of England: Book the Fourth, 7th ed. (Oxford 1775), 37.

57 Foster, Crown Law, p. 370, emphasis in original.

58 Jogee and Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681, at [73].

59 Cf. Toulson, “Complicity”, p. 237.

60 Foster, Crown Law, p. 353.

61 Ibid.

62 R. v Jackson (1857) 7 Cox. C.C. 357, discussed below. Cf. Wilson, W. and Ormerod, D., “Simply Harsh to Fairly Simple: Joint Enterprise Reform” [2015] Crim.L.R. 3, 8.

63 Smith, K.J.M., “Criminal Law” in Cornish, W. et al. (eds.), The Oxford History of the Laws of England: Volume XIII: 1820–1914 Fields of Development (Oxford 2010), 291.

64 Jogee and Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681, at [18], [20].

65 Ibid., at para. [21].

66 E.H. East, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown (London 1803), 257.

67 Ibid., at p. 259.

68 Reforms of the criminal trial in the early nineteenth century facilitated a sharper focus on proof of “subjective” fault. See Duff, R.A. et al. , The Trial on Trial: Vol. 3 – Towards a Normative Theory of the Criminal Trial (Oxford 2007), 4648 .

69 R. v White (1806) R. & R. 99, 101.

70 R. v Dixon (1814) 3 Mau. & Sel. 11. The strength of the presumption wavered over time – see Smith, K.J.M., Lawyers, Legislators and Theorists: Developments in English Criminal Jurisprudence 1800–1957 (Oxford 1998), 166–71.

71 Russell, W.O., A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanors, vol. 1 (London 1819), 3132 . Cf. Chitty, J., A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law (Philadelphia 1819), 174. It was noted that a murder conviction would be “particularly” available in cases involving a common purpose to resist opposition, suggesting such a common purpose was not a necessary condition, in Archbold, J.F., A Summary of the Law Relative to Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases (London 1822), 397. That part of the text remained unchanged into the 1920s: e.g. Delacombe, H. and Ross, R.E., Archbold's Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases, 26th ed. (London 1922), 1438.

72 Turner, J.W.C., Russell on Crime: On Felonies and Misdemeanors, vol. 2, 10th ed. (London 1950), 1852.

73 See Smith, Lawyers, ch. 9.

74 Russell, Treatise, p. 33, emphasis added.

75 R. v Hawkins (1828) 3 Car. & P. 392.

76 Ibid., at p. 393.

77 Redford v Birley and Others (1822) 3 Stark. 76, 97. See also 114–15.

78 Cf. Deacon, E.E., A Digest of the Criminal Law of England, vol. 2 (London 1831), 907 (emphasising both the probability of Offence B and the defendant's “contemplation” of what the principal might do).

79 Cross, R., “The Reports of the Criminal Law Commissioners (1833–1849) and the Abortive Bills of 1853” in Glazebrook, P.R. (ed.), Reshaping the Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of Glanville Williams (London 1978), 7.

80 R. v Collison (1831) 4 Car. & P. 565, 566, emphasis added.

81 Jogee and Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681, at [22].

82 R. v Duffey (1830) 1 Lewin 194.

83 Ibid., at p. 194. See too the headnote in R. v Cruse (1838) 8 Car. & P. 541.

84 E.g. R. v Doddridge (1860) 8 Cox. C.C. 335.

85 R. v Scotton (1844) 5 Q.B. 493.

86 R. v Macklin and Murphy (1838) 2 Lewin 225 (recognised as the genesis of PAL in Assisting and Encouraging Crime (Law Com. C.P. No. 131, 1993), para. 1.13).

87 Ibid., at p. 226.

88 R. v Howell (1839) 9 Car. & P. 437, 448, emphasis added.

89 Ibid., at p. 450, emphasis added.

90 See e.g. R. v Bowen (1841) Car. & M. 149 (the jury indicated that the secondary party intended to encourage the collateral crime, but were not told this was a necessary ingredient of liability); R. v Harvey and Caylor (1843) 1 Cox. C.C. 21; R. v Cooper (1846) Q.B. 533.

91 See similarly Smith, “Criminal Law”, p. 292; Smith, Complicity, p. 211.

92 R. v Jackson (1857) 7 Cox C.C. 357.

93 R. v Harrington (1851) 5 Cox. C.C. 231.

94 Smith, H. and Keep, A.P.P., A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanors, vol. 1, 6th ed. (London 1896), 168–69.

95 See further R. v Price and Others (1858) 8 Cox. C.C. 96, 96.

96 R. v Franz (1861) 2 F. & F. 580.

97 Ibid., at p. 580. See also R. v Caton (1874) 12 Cox. C.C. 624, 625.

98 See also R. v Lee (1864) 4 F. & F. 63, 67.

99 R. v Luck (1862) 3 F. & F. 483, 486.

100 R. v Turner (1864) 4 F. & F. 339, 339.

101 Ibid., at p. 341.

102 R. v Skeet (1866) 4 F. & F. 931, 936.

103 See Stark, F., Culpable Carelessness: Recklessness and Negligence in the Criminal Law (Cambridge 2016), ch. 4.

104 Skeet (1866) 4 F. & F. 931, 937.

105 Cf. Jogee and Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681, at [24].

106 Bruce, W., Archbold's Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases, 16th ed. (London 1867), 881.

107 Delacombe, H. and Ross, R.E., Archbold's Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases, 26th ed. (London 1922), 1438.

108 Smith, “Criminal Law”, p. 292.

109 Smith, Complicity, p. 214.

110 Prentice, S., A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanors, vol. 1, 5th ed. (London 1877), 164.

111 Smith, Complicity, pp. 211–12; Smith, “Criminal Law”, p. 292.

112 Turner, J.W.C., Russell on Crime: A Treatise on Felonies and Misdemeanors, 10th ed. (London 1950), 1855. Cf. Smith, Complicity, p. 213.

113 See Smith, Complicity, p. 213. The importance of codes in understanding the contemporary view of secondary liability is emphasised in Simester, A.P., “The Mental Element in Complicity” (2006) 122 L.Q.R. 578, 596–98.

114 Seventh Report of Her Majesty's Commissioners on Criminal Law (London 1843), Article 16; Second Report of Her Majesty's Commissioners on Criminal Law (London 1846), Article 12. The words in square brackets are present in the 1843, but not the 1846, version.

115 Articles 13, 10.

116 Cl. 71.

117 Williams, G.L., Criminal Law: The General Part, 2nd ed. (London 1961), 402 (n. 1). Cf. Smith, Complicity, p. 211.

118 E.g. Indian Penal Code (Act No. 45 of 1860), s. 111 (particularly illustration (c)); The Criminal Code Act 1899 (63 Vic. No. 9), s. 8 (Queensland).

119 The Criminal Code 1892 (55–56 Vict. c. 29), ss. 61(2), 62(2) (Canada) (cf. R. v Logan [1990] 2 S.C.R. 731); Criminal Code Act 1893 (57 Vic. No. 56), ss. 73(2), 74(2) (New Zealand).

120 Mendez [2010] EWCA Crim 516; [2011] Q.B. 876, at [29].

121 Admittedly, Collison’s requirement of a resolution to resist opposition was adopted as an aspect of the offence of rioting, but that is irrelevant to the requirements of secondary liability. See Field v Metropolitan Police Receiver [1907] 2 K.B. 853; Ford v Receiver for Metropolitan Police District [1921] 2 K.B. 344.

122 Smith, Complicity, p. 214.

123 E.g. R. v Rubens (1909) 2 Cr. App. R. 163. See Smith, “Criminal Law”, p. 294; Smith, Complicity, pp. 214–15; Williams, Criminal Law, p. 398.

124 R. v Pridmore (1913) 8 Cr. App. R. 198, 199.

125 Ibid., at pp. 202–03.

126 Ibid., at p. 203. A similarly relaxed approach existed in conspiracy cases: Kerr (1921) 15 Cr. App. R. 165.

127 Smith, “Criminal Law”, p. 294.

128 R. v Pearce (1930) 21 Cr. App. R. 79.

129 Ibid., at p. 81.

130 Ibid.

131 E.g. R. v Hyde (1672) 1 Hale P.C. 537.

132 See similarly R. v Short (1932) 23 Cr. App. R. 170.

133 Though Woolmington v DPP [1935] A.C. 462 would soon eat away at it: Smith, Lawyers, pp. 288–92. The presumption was already weakened in intoxication cases: see e.g. R. v Meade [1909] 1 K.B. 895.

134 Kenny, C.S., Outlines of Criminal Law, 12th ed. (Cambridge 1926), 87, emphasis added.

135 E.g. Disney, H.W., The Criminal Law: A Sketch of its Principles and Practice, 2nd ed. (London 1926), 17.

136 Questions of evidence and substantive law were, admittedly, not distinguished between neatly far into the twentieth century. See e.g. Hyam v DPP [1975] A.C. 55, critiqued in R. v Maloney [1985] A.C. 905, 928–29.

137 R. v Betts and Ridley (1931) 22 Cr. App. R. 148.

138 Ibid., at p. 155.

139 Ibid., at pp. 155–56.

140 Smith, Complicity, pp. 216–17.

141 Nor was “conditional intent”, but cf. Giles, M., “Complicity: The Problems of Joint Enterprise” [1990] Crim.L.R. 383, 383 (n. 6).

142 R. v Appleby (1943) 28 Cr. App. R. 1, 6.

143 See Smith, Lawyers, pp. 297–304.

144 See n. 112 .

145 Cf. Sturge, L.F. (ed.), A Digest of the Criminal Law (Indictable Offences), 9th ed. (London 1950), Article 39.

146 Davies v DPP [1954] A.C. 378, 401, emphasis added.

147 Jogee and Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681, at [40]; Wilson and Ormerod, “Joint Enterprise Reform”, p. 6.

148 Cf. Jogee and Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681, at [63].

149 R. v Grant (1954) 38 Cr. App. R. 107.

150 Cf. Smith, Complicity, p. 217.

151 Homicide Act 1957, s. 1.

152 Turner, J.W.C., Russell on Crime: A Treatise of Felonies and Misdemeanors, 11th ed., vol. 1 (London 1958), 152. See Smith, Complicity, pp. 213–14.

153 Cf. Williams, Criminal Law, p. 397 (n. 4).

154 Ibid., at pp. 397–98.

155 R. v Spraggett [1960] Crim. L.R. 840.

156 R. v Betty (1963) 48 Cr. App. R. 6.

157 Cf. Jogee and Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681, at [30].

158 R. v Smith [1963] 1 W.L.R. 1200.

159 Ibid., at pp. 1205–06, emphasis added.

160 See R. v Rahman [2008] UKHL 45; [2009] 1 A.C. 129, at [13].

161 Cf. Jogee and Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681, at [70]–[71].

162 See Turner, J.W.C., Russell on Crime: A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanors, 12th ed., vol. 1 (London 1964) 144; Hooper, A. (ed.), Harris's Criminal Law, 21st ed. (London 1968), 7879 .

163 Cf. Jogee and Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681, at [53].

164 R. v Anderson and Morris [1966] 2 Q.B. 110.

165 Ibid., at pp. 118–19.

166 Jogee and Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681, at [64].

167 Cf. Wilson and Ormerod, “Joint Enterprise Reform”, p. 8 (arguing that Anderson and Morris involved establishing “from an objective point of view, [what the secondary party] was signing up to”).

168 Anderson and Morris, [1966] 2 Q.B. 110, 120, emphasis added.

169 Criminal Justice Act 1967, s. 8.

170 Criminal Law Act 1967, s. 1.

171 R. v Lovesay [1970] 1 Q.B. 352.

172 Ibid., at p. 356.

173 Ibid. See further R. v Dunbar [1988] Crim. L.R. 693. Cf. Smith, Complicity, p. 219.

174 See e.g. Smith, J.C. and Hogan, B., Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (London 1969), 88; Smith, J.C. and Hogan, B., Criminal Law, 3rd ed. (London 1973), 102, 105.

175 R. v Reid (1976) 62 Cr. App. R. 109, 112, emphasis added.

176 Though, again, in Jogee and Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681, at [72], an intention to encourage or assist murder and the mens rea of murder are elided.

177 J.C. Smith [1976] Crim. L.R. 570, 571.

178 Citing Betts and Ridley (1930) 22 Cr. App. R. 148.

179 Smith, J.C. and Hogan, B., Criminal Law, 3rd ed. (London 1973), 102–05. Cf. DPP for Northern Ireland v Maxwell [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1350, 1361 (“[S] must have contemplated that a violent attack of some kind was to be made … When he obeyed the order he must therefore have intended to assist in carrying out such an attack”).

180 R. v Penfold (1980) 71 Cr. App. R. 4.

181 Ibid., at p. 8.

182 Cf. Ibbetson, D.J., “The Mental Element in Complicity” (1982) 2 O.J.L.S. 287, 287.

183 R. v Johns (1980) 143 C.L.R. 108.

184 Ibid., at p. 113.

185 Ibid., at p. 125.

186 Ibid., at pp. 118–19, citing Howard, C., Criminal Law, 3rd ed. (Sydney 1977), 276. Cf. R. v Jubb and Rigby [1984] Crim. L.R. 616.

187 Jogee and Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681, at [44]. See also at [67].

188 See the discussion in ibid., at para. [43].

189 Ibid., at para. [44].

190 Ibid., at para. [87].

191 Ibid., at para. [67].

192 The Australian case of R. v Miller (1980) 1 A. Crim. R. 165 was also cited, but is irrelevant: the parties’ common purpose was lawful.

193 Williams, G., Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (London 1983), 352, emphasis added (cf. the comments about express agreements and untrustworthy principals at 355). The difference between knowing x may happen and foreseeing x might happen is unaddressed.

194 Jogee and Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681, at [62].

195 Ibid., at para. [74].

196 Ibid., at para. [79].

197 Chan Wing-Siu [1985] A.C. 168, 175.

198 Ibid., at 170–71.

199 Jogee and Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681, at [65]–[66]. Cf. Krebs, B., “ Mens Rea in Joint Enterprise: A Role for Endorsement?” (2015) 74 C.L.J. 480, 493–95.

200 Chan Wing-Siu [1985] A.C. 168, 175.

201 Powell and English [1999] 1 A.C. 1 (seen by Smith as a “valuable clarification”: [1998] Crim. L.R. 48, 49).

202 Ibid., at pp. 10–11.

203 [1984] Crim. L.R. 550. See similarly Cowley, D., “Complicity: Liability for Unintended Consequences” (1985) 49 J.Crim.L. 38, 38.

204 Smith, “Accessories”, p. 456. See Gnango [2010] EWCA Crim 1691; [2011] 1 W.L.R. 1414, at [67].

205 Spencer, J.R., “On Contemplating the Range of Contemplation” [1985] C.L.J. 8, 9.

206 Spencer, J.R., “ Jogee – the ‘Parasite’ Excised” [2016] 3 Arch. Rev. 4, 4.

207 Stephen, M., Richardson, P.J. and Buzzard, J.H., Archbold's Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases, 42nd ed. (London 1985), para. 20.16. Cf. para. 29.3: “The cases on [joint enterprise] are not easy to reconcile.”

208 E.g. R. v Smith [1988] Crim. L.R. 616.

209 Ward (1987) 85 Cr. App. R. 71; R. v Slack [1989] Q.B. 775 (though the court's analysis is clouded by talk of “conditional intention”); R. v Hyde [1991] 1 Q.B. 134. See further Virgo, G.J., “Accessory to Murder – Foresight or Intention?” (1990) 49 C.L.J. 6.

210 Choo, A.L.T., “Joint Unlawful Enterprises and Murder” (1992) 55 M.L.R 870, 871.

211 Dennis, I., “The Mental Element for Accessories” in Smith, P. (ed.), Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of J.C. Smith (London 1987), 40, pp. 4344 , 56–58, 61. See also Wilson and Ormerod, “Joint Enterprise Reform”.

212 Smith, Complicity, p. 220. See similarly Assisting and Encouraging Crime (Law Com. C.P. No. 131, 1993), para. 2.113; Giles, “Joint Enterprise”, pp. 385–86.

213 See further Wilson and Ormerod, “Joint Enterprise Reform”, at 26, citing the departures from Hyam v DPP [1975] A.C. 55 (on murder) and R. v Caldwell [1982] A.C. 341 (on recklessness) as examples of previous judicially created injustices being resolved by the courts. Yet, Hyam was a decision on far thinner doctrinal ice than Chan Wing-Siu and stood for a far shorter time, and Caldwell straightforwardly misinterpreted Parliament's intention.

214 See Supreme Court Practice Direction 3.1.3; Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234.

215 Jogee and Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681, at [85].

216 See C v DPP [1996] 1 A.C. 1; F. Stark, “R. v Howe (1987)” in P. Handler, H. Mares and I. Williams (eds.), Landmark Cases in Criminal Law (Oxford, forthcoming).

217 Jogee and Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681, at [3].

218 See most recently Participating in Crime (Law Com. No. 305, 2007) paras. 3.123–3.162.

219 The Government has not responded positively to prompts to reform the law: see Krebs, “Endorsement”, p. 482.

220 Jogee and Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681, at [81]–[86].

* University Lecturer in Criminal Law, University of Cambridge. Thanks to John Baker, Mark Dsouza, Matthew Dyson, P.R. Glazebrook, Chloë Kennedy, Henry Mares, Simon Mackay, Nick McBride, Jonathan Rogers, Rajiv Shah, Graham Virgo and two anonymous referees for reading and commenting on earlier drafts. Thanks also to Renaud Morieux for help in translating some sources.

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THE DEMISE OF “PARASITIC ACCESSORIAL LIABILITY”: SUBSTANTIVE JUDICIAL LAW REFORM, NOT COMMON LAW HOUSEKEEPING

  • Findlay Stark

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