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  • Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, Volume 8, Issue 3
  • July 1999, pp. 358-363

Response to “Advance Directives and Voluntary Slavery” by Christopher Tollefsen (CQ Vol 7, No 4): Slavery, Commitment, and Choice: Do Advance Directives Reflect Autonomy?

  • Thomas May (a1)
  • Published online: 01 July 1999

In an interesting response to an article I published in CQ that questions the ability of advance directives to reflect autonomy, Christopher Tollefsen raises a number of issues that deserve greater attention. Tollefsen offers several examples to illustrate how the critique of advance directives I offer would also threaten other choices that most people would consider autonomous. Importantly, I largely agree that the examples Tollefsen offers should be captured as autonomous. Where I disagree, however, is whether these examples reflect the particular type of second order decision strategy that I categorize advance directives as, and so whether the critique of advance directives I offer, if accepted, would commit us to an unreasonably narrow conception of autonomy.

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Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
  • ISSN: 0963-1801
  • EISSN: 1469-2147
  • URL: /core/journals/cambridge-quarterly-of-healthcare-ethics
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