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Aiding self-knowledge

  • Casey Doyle (a1)

Abstract

Some self-knowledge must be arrived at by the subject herself, rather than being transmitted by another’s testimony. Yet in many cases the subject interacts with an expert in part because she is likely to have the relevant knowledge of their mind. This raises a question: what is the expert’s knowledge like that there are barriers to simply transmitting it by testimony? I argue that the expert’s knowledge is, in some circumstances, proleptic, referring to attitudes the subject would hold were she to reflect in certain ways. The expert’s knowledge cannot be transmitted by testimony because self-knowledge cannot be proleptic.

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Corresponding author

Casey Doyle casey.doyle@st-hildas.ox.ac.ukSt Hilda’s College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

References

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Aiding self-knowledge

  • Casey Doyle (a1)

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