1 Young, Robert, The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press with the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1995), 89Google Scholar.

2 Dion, Stéphane, “Why Is Secession Difficult in Well-Established Democracies? Lessons from Quebec,” British Journal of Political Science 25 (1995), 1103–1117Google Scholar.

3 A previous attempt to predict the process of a Quebec secession has been done by Drache, Daniel and Perrin, Roberto, Negotiating with a Sovereign Quebec (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1992)Google Scholar. See also Keith Banting, “If Quebec Separates: Restructuring Northern North America,” in Weaver, R. Kent, ed., The Collapse of Canada? (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1992), 159–178Google Scholar. The sovereignist point of view is presented in Jacques Brossard (Supplement of Daniel Turp), L'accession àa la souveraineté et le cas du Québec. Conditions et modalitis politicojuridiques (Montréal: Les Presses de I'Université de Montréal, 1976/1995). The various issues raised by the Quebec secessionist movement have been reviewed recently by Lemco, Jonathan, Turmoil in the Peaceful Kingdom: The Quebec Sovereignty Movement and Its Implications for Canada and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994)Google Scholar.

4 See also Webber, Jeremy, “The Referendum and the Future of Anglophones in Quebec,” Choices, Institute for Research on Public Policy 1,9 (1995), 16–27Google Scholar.

5 That the Canadian union entails no right to secede under international and Canadian law is a point of view that one will find in the other books under review as well.

6 A point of view shared, with some nuances, by Young, Freeman and Grady, and Gibson. It is true that “fundamental and irreversible change should enjoy overwhelming support” (Gibson, 30), but “these aren't the rules we're dealing with” (Freeman and Grady, 30).

7 See also his The Breakup of Czechoslovakia, Research Paper No. 32 (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1994).Google Scholar

8 See also Mestral, Armand de, “La structure de l'association dconomique Qudbec-Canada,” Choix, Institut de recherche en politiques publiques 1, 6 (1995)Google Scholar, and Daniel Schwanen, “Break Up to Make Up: Trade Relations after a Quebec Declaration of Sovereignty, ” Commentary, C. D. Howe Institute 69 (March 1995). Francois Rocher has argued that a set of common institutions may not be necessary for maintaining an economic union involving only two partners, as would be the case for Canada and Quebec. In fact, as Young (54) and Jonathan Lemco argue, there are good reasons to think that a union of two partners is more unstable and fragile than a union of many partners. Indeed, in bipartite confederations, the larger partner always has difficulties accepting the veto power of the smaller partner, and there is less opportunity for compromise because there is no room for coalition building: “If there are more units, with multiple cleavages dividing them, shifting coalitions can form on different issues, and conflicts of interest are much less stark” (Young, 54). Rocher, Franjois, “L'environnement commercial d'un Québec souverain,” Choix, Institut de recherche en politiques publiques 1, 6 (1995), 21–47Google Scholar; and Lemco, Jonathan, Political Stability in Federal Governments (New York: Praeger, 1991)Google Scholar.

9 Polls support Freeman and Grady. Although a majority of Canadians outside Quebec may agree with the principle of an economic association with an independent Quebec, they are characteristically not willing to support specific arrangements. For instance, a February 1995 CROP/Environics/SRC/CBC poll showed that while 61 per cent of Canadians outside Quebec agreed that “the rest of Canada should maintain an economic association with a sovereign Quebec,” only 20 per cent agreed that “the rest of Canada should share the Canadian dollar with a sovereign Quebec.” For a review of the polls on this issue, see Martin, Pierre, “Association after Sovereignty? Canadian Views on Economic Association with a Sovereign Quebec,” Canadian Public Policy 21 (1995), 53–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 See also Patrick Monahan: “The most likely outcome of a UDI is that, following a period of disruption and chaos, the Quebec government would withdraw the declaration and return to the bargaining table” (Monahan, Patrick J., Cooler Heads Shall Prevail: Assessing the Costs and Consequences of Quebec eparation [Toronto: C. D. Howe Institute, 1994], 30)Google Scholar.

11 Ibid.

12 Cairns, Alan C., “Suppose the‘Yes” Side Wins: Are We Ready?” Western Perspectives (February 1995), 1–12Google Scholar.

13 The 1867 Austria and Hungary compromise also was not a secession. The Austrian Emperor became King of Hungary, and they kept different common links, diplomacy and the army in particular. The army was by far the most important public-sector issue at that time. Had the two political units really seceded, the process would have been much more difficult and dangerous (Fejtö, François, Requiem pour un empire défunt. Histoire de la destruction de I'Autriche-Hongrie [Paris: Edima/Lieu commun, 1994])Google Scholar.

14 Quoted in Wills, Terence, “Who Could Speak for Rest of Canada?” The Gazette (Montreal), March 26, 1995, A8—9Google Scholar.

15 Or, in the case of Czechoslovakia, were not taken seriously. Opinion polls indicated that only about one third each of the Slovak and Czech populations wanted the split when the two prime ministers decided to divide the state. This “almost conspiratorial” way to end a country seems unthinkable in a well-established democracy like Canada or Belgium (Draper, Theodore, “The End of Czechoslovakia,” The New York Review of Books 40 [1993], 20–26Google Scholar; and Young, The Breakup of Czechoslovakia).

16 Monahan, Cooler Heads Shall Prevail, 23.

17 Brenner, Reuven, “La monnaie d'un Queébec souverain,” Choix, Institut de recherche en politiques publiques 1,8 (1995), 2–29Google Scholar.

18 See also ibid, and P. Robson, William B., “Change for a Buck? The Canadian Dollar after Quebec Secession,” Commentary: C. D. Howe Institute 68 (March 1995)Google Scholar.

19 Consider, for instance, the results of the February 1995 SRC/CBC/CROP/Environics poll made under the scientific supervision of Richard Nadeau. The support for the right to remain part of Canada received 65 per cent in the ROC and 56 per cent in Quebec concerning Quebec regions, and respectively 81 and 54 per cent concerning Aboriginal peoples. Regarding Quebec's right to secede, there are 57 per cent in the ROC who consider that it is not a right. With respect to the 50 percent plus one rule, only 19 per cent in the ROC and 43 per cent in Quebec think that it is sufficient to allow secession. (All these percentages indicate results before distribution of the DNK/NA answers). SRC/CBC/CROP/Environics (Montr'al: Direction de la recherche, Soci't' Radio-Canada, 16 février 1995).

20 The same February 1995 SRC/CBC/CROP/Environics poll showed that among Yes voters, 30 per cent thought that a sovereign Quebec would stay a province of Canada and 62 per cent thought that they would keep their Canadian citizenship.

21 Marissal, Vincent, “Landry affirme que le PQ ne bousculera pas le Canada apres le OUI,” Le Soleil (Quebec City), May 27,1995, Al–2Google Scholar.

22 SRC/CBC/CROP/Environics, February 16,1995.

23 “Extensive and protracted negotiations on the nature of these economic and political relationships would be necessary,” the New York-based agency said in a statement reported in The Globe and Mail (Toronto), June 17,1995, B-5.

24 A Yes victory seems to me unlikely. But this is another topic that I address elsewhere. See, in particular, “Secession Does Not Suit the Median Voter,” Canada Watch, September 1995.

25 I share Gagnon's, Gabriel anticipation on this point (Gabriel Gagnon, “L'avenir ne s'arrêeterapasen 1995,” Possible 19 [1995], 258)Google Scholar.