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Political Leadership and Liberal Economic Subsystems: The Constraints of Structural Assumptions*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Mark R. Brawley
Mark R. Brawley
Affiliation:
McGill University
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Abstract

Theories of hegemonic leadership often begin with a constraining assumption: that international structure can explain both a state's capability to provide leadership and its interest in doing so. By conflating these explanations, traditional theories, even those from quite different approaches, share common problems. These problems are illustrated by examining three well-known models, and comparing their applications to the eighteenth century. This period provides difficult cases for all three, since countries with power did not provide political or economic leadership, and those which were attempting to provide leadership were not powerful. An alternative theory of leadership is then offered, using structural factors to explain capabilities, but domestic political economic factors to explain interests. The ability of this model to handle the historical cases with greater accuracy suggests that domestic factors could offer fresh insight into theories of leadership.

Résumé

Les théories du leadership hégémonique s'appuient souvent sur l'hypothdse contraignante selon laquelle la structure internationale permet d'expliquer à la fois la capacité d'un État à exercer son leadership et l'intérêt qu'il a à le faire. En amalgamant ces deux explications, les théories classiques, même lorsqu'elles ont des fondements très différents, se heurtent aux mêmes problèmes. L'article illustre l'étendue de ces problèmes en examinant trois modèles bien connus, et en comparant leur application au 18e siècle. Cette période présente en effet des difficultés pour chacun des trois modèles, car les États puissants n'y ont pas exercé d'hégémonie politique ou économique, tandis que ceux qui ont cherché à le faire &aient dépourvus de la puissance nécessaire. L'article présente une autre théorie du leadership, où la capacité s'explique par des facteurs structurels, mais où l'intérêt découle des facteurs politico-économiques endogènes. Le fait que ce nouveau modèle réussisse à mieux expliquer la réalité historique donne à penser que les facteurs se situant à l'intérieur des Etats peuvent permettre de jeter un nouvel éclairage sur les théories du leadership.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 28 , Issue 1 , March 1995 , pp. 85 - 103
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1996

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References

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28 Note that Gilpin and Wallerstein treated the national economy as a whole when discussing efficiency; others have also talked about national economic attributes to suggest that a country would then pursue free trade in all goods with all other countries. This is rather unrealistic. A sectoral argument allows for the blending of protectionism in some sectors with free trade, which is a more accurate portrayal of policy, even for examples such as Britain in the nineteenth century.

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31 Note the number of advantages in terms of theory testing and model building gained through this approach. Previous theorizing had to treat hegemony as an “either/or” proposition; a country either was or was not hegemonic. This approach allows for a more nuanced view of the evidence. It also opens the number of possible cases to test, and is clearly falsifiable.

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